In this paper, we investigate the adversarial robustness of nonparametric regression, a fundamental problem in machine learning, under the setting where an adversary can arbitrarily corrupt a subset of the input data. While the robustness of parametric regression has been extensively studied, its nonparametric counterpart remains largely unexplored. We characterize the adversarial robustness in nonparametric regression, assuming the regression function belongs to the second-order Sobolev space (i.e., it is square integrable up to its second derivative). The contribution of this paper is two-fold: (i) we establish a minimax lower bound on the estimation error, revealing a fundamental limit that no estimator can overcome, and (ii) we show that, perhaps surprisingly, the classical smoothing spline estimator, when properly regularized, exhibits robustness against adversarial corruption. These results imply that if $o(n)$ out of $n$ samples are corrupted, the estimation error of the smoothing spline vanishes as $n \to \infty$. On the other hand, when a constant fraction of the data is corrupted, no estimator can guarantee vanishing estimation error, implying the optimality of the smoothing spline in terms of maximum tolerable number of corrupted samples.

Coding theory revolves around the incorporation of redundancy into transmitted symbols, computation tasks, and stored data to guard against adversarial manipulation. However, error correction in coding theory is contingent upon a strict trust assumption. In the context of computation and storage, it is required that honest nodes outnumber adversarial ones by a certain margin. However, in several emerging real-world cases, particularly, in decentralized blockchain-oriented applications, such assumptions are often unrealistic. Consequently, despite the important role of coding in addressing significant challenges within decentralized systems, its applications become constrained. Still, in decentralized platforms, a distinctive characteristic emerges, offering new avenues for secure coding beyond the constraints of conventional methods. In these scenarios, the adversary benefits when the legitimate decoder recovers the data, and preferably with a high estimation error. This incentive motivates them to act rationally, trying to maximize their gains. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic formulation for coding, called the game of coding, that captures this unique dynamic where each of the adversaries and the data collector (decoder) have respective utility functions to optimize. The utility functions reflect the fact that both the data collector and the adversary are interested in increasing the chance of data being recoverable by the data collector. Moreover, the utility functions express the interest of the data collector to estimate the input with lower estimation error, but the opposite interest of the adversary. As a first, still highly non-trivial step, we characterize the equilibrium of the game for the repetition code with a repetition factor of 2 for a wide class of utility functions with minimal assumptions.

Coding theory revolves around the incorporation of redundancy into transmitted symbols, computation tasks, and stored data to guard against adversarial manipulation. However, error correction in coding theory is contingent upon a strict trust assumption. In the context of computation and storage, it is required that honest nodes outnumber adversarial ones by a certain margin. However, in several emerging real-world cases, particularly, in decentralized blockchain-oriented applications, such assumptions are often unrealistic. Consequently, despite the important role of coding in addressing significant challenges within decentralized systems, its applications become constrained. Still, in decentralized platforms, a distinctive characteristic emerges, offering new avenues for secure coding beyond the constraints of conventional methods. In these scenarios, the adversary benefits when the legitimate decoder recovers the data, and preferably with a high estimation error. This incentive motivates them to act rationally, trying to maximize their gains. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic formulation for coding, called the game of coding, that captures this unique dynamic where each of the adversary and the data collector (decoder) have a utility function to optimize. The utility functions reflect the fact that both the data collector and the adversary are interested in increasing the chance of data being recoverable by the data collector. Moreover, the utility functions express the interest of the data collector to estimate the input with lower estimation error, but the opposite interest of the adversary. As a first, still highly non-trivial step, we characterize the equilibrium of the game for the repetition code with a repetition factor of 2, for a wide class of utility functions with minimal assumptions.

In this article, we consider a secure multi-party computation problem (MPC), where the goal is to offload the computation of an arbitrary polynomial function of some massive private matrices (inputs) to a cluster of workers. The workers are not reliable. Some of them may collude to gain information about the input data (semi-honest workers). The system is initialized by sharing a (randomized) function of each input matrix to each server. Since the input matrices are massive, each share's size is assumed to be at most 1/k fraction of the input matrix, for some k ∈ \mathbb N. The objective is to minimize the number of workers needed to perform the computation task correctly, such that even if an arbitrary subset of t-1 workers, for some t ∈ \mathbb N, collude, they cannot gain any information about the input matrices. We propose a sharing scheme, called polynomial sharing, and show that it admits basic operations such as adding and multiplication of matrices and transposing a matrix. By concatenating the procedures for basic operations, we show that any polynomial function of the input matrices can be calculated, subject to the problem constraints. We show that the proposed scheme can offer order-wise gain in terms of the number of workers needed, compared to the approaches formed by the concatenation of job splitting and conventional MPC approaches.

In this paper, we introduce limited-sharing multiparty computation; in which there is a network of workers (processors) and a set of sources, each having access to a massive matrix as a private input. These sources aim to offload the task of computing a polynomial function of the matrices to the workers, while preserving the privacy of data. We also assume that the load of the link between each source and each worker is upper bounded by a fraction of each input matrix for some c ∈ {1, [1/2],[1/3], ...}. The objective is to minimize the number of workers needed to perform the computation, such that even if an arbitrary subset of t-1 workers, for some t ∈ N, collude, they cannot gain any information about the input matrices. This framework extends the conventional problem of multi-party computation, where the complexity of computation in each worker is not a constraint. We propose a novel sharing scheme, called polynomial sharing, and several procedures for basic operations such as adding and multiplication of two matrices, and transposing a matrix, and show that any polynomial function of the input matrices can be calculated using the proposed sharing algorithm and above procedures, subject to the problem constraints. We show that for basic operation such as addition and multiplication, the proposed scheme offers order wise gain, in terms of number of servers needed, compared to the approaches formed by concatenation of job splitting and conventional MPC approaches.

In a secure multiparty computation (MPC) system, there are some sources, where each one has access to a private input. The sources want to offload the computation of a polynomial function of the inputs to some processing nodes or workers. The processors are unreliable, i.e., a limited number of them may collude to gain information about the inputs. The objective is to minimize the number of required workers to calculate the polynomial, while the colluding workers gain no information about inputs. In this paper, we assume that the inputs are massive matrices, while the workers have the limited computation and storage at each worker. As proxy for that, we assume the link between each source and each worker admits a limited communication load. We propose a scheme for private data sharing, called entangled polynomial sharing, and show that it admits basic operations such as addition, multiplication, and transposing, respecting the constraint of the problem. Thus, it allows computing arbitrary polynomial of the input matrices, while it reduces the number of servers needed significantly compared to the conventional scheme. It also generalizes the recently proposed scheme of polynomial sharing.