Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
David Kreitschmann
dblp:225/4652
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2019
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 2Security and privacy · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Computer networks
2 papers |
Wireless networking · 78% Internet architecture and protocols · 22% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Network security · 84% Privacy and data protection · 16% |
Topics — the 7 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network security › wireless network security
wireless network attack |
0.4 | 1 | 2019 | A Billion Open Interfaces for Eve and Mallory: MitM, DoS, and Tracking Attacks on iOS and macOS Through Apple Wireless Direct Link · USENIX Security Symposium 2019 |
Wireless networking
medium access control |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | One Billion Apples' Secret Sauce: Recipe for the Apple Wireless Direct Link Ad hoc Protocol · MobiCom 2018 |
Internet architecture and protocols
protocol implementation |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | Linux Goes Apple Picking: Cross-Platform Ad hoc Communication with Apple Wireless Direct Link · MobiCom 2018 |
Wireless networking › cognitive radio
channel hopping |
0.2 | 2 | 2018 | Linux Goes Apple Picking: Cross-Platform Ad hoc Communication with Apple Wireless Direct Link · MobiCom 2018 One Billion Apples' Secret Sauce: Recipe for the Apple Wireless Direct Link Ad hoc Protocol · MobiCom 2018 |
Network security › attack strategy
denial-of-service attack |
0.1 | 1 | 2019 | A Billion Open Interfaces for Eve and Mallory: MitM, DoS, and Tracking Attacks on iOS and macOS Through Apple Wireless Direct Link · USENIX Security Symposium 2019 |
Network security › attack strategy
man-in-the-middle attack |
0.1 | 1 | 2019 | A Billion Open Interfaces for Eve and Mallory: MitM, DoS, and Tracking Attacks on iOS and macOS Through Apple Wireless Direct Link · USENIX Security Symposium 2019 |
Privacy and data protection
online tracking |
0.1 | 1 | 2019 | A Billion Open Interfaces for Eve and Mallory: MitM, DoS, and Tracking Attacks on iOS and macOS Through Apple Wireless Direct Link · USENIX Security Symposium 2019 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
runtime analysis · 0.3reverse engineering · 0.3pcap · 0.3binary analysis · 0.3Netlink API · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | A Billion Open Interfaces for Eve and Mallory: MitM, DoS, and Tracking Attacks on iOS and macOS Through Apple Wireless Direct Link
Milan Stute, Sashank Narain, Alex Mariotto, Alexander Heinrich, David Kreitschmann, Guevara Noubir, Matthias Hollick |
USENIX Security Symposium | 5 |
| 2018 | One Billion Apples' Secret Sauce: Recipe for the Apple Wireless Direct Link Ad hoc ProtocolabstractApple Wireless Direct Link (AWDL) is a proprietary and undocumented IEEE 802.11-based ad hoc protocol. Apple first introduced AWDL around 2014 and has since integrated it into its entire product line, including iPhone and Mac. While we have found that AWDL drives popular applications such as AirPlay and AirDrop on more than one billion end-user devices, neither the protocol itself nor potential security and Wi-Fi coexistence issues have been studied. In this paper, we present the operation of the protocol as the result of binary and runtime analysis. In short, each AWDL node announces a sequence of Availability Windows (AWs) indicating its readiness to communicate with other AWDL nodes. An elected master node synchronizes these sequences. Outside the AWs, nodes can tune their Wi-Fi radio to a different channel to communicate with an access point, or could turn it off to save energy. Based on our analysis, we conduct experiments to study the master election process, synchronization accuracy, channel hopping dynamics, and achievable throughput. We conduct a preliminary security assessment and publish an open source Wireshark dissector for AWDL to nourish future work. Milan Stute, David Kreitschmann, Matthias Hollick |
MobiCom | 2 |
| 2018 | Linux Goes Apple Picking: Cross-Platform Ad hoc Communication with Apple Wireless Direct LinkabstractApple Wireless Direct Link (AWDL) is a proprietary and undocumented wireless ad hoc protocol that Apple introduced around 2014 and which is the base for applications such as AirDrop and AirPlay. We have reverse engineered the protocol and explain its frame format and operation in our MobiCom '18 paper "One Billion Apples' Secret Sauce: Recipe of the Apple Wireless Direct Link Ad hoc Protocol." AWDL builds on the IEEE 802.11 standard and implements election, synchronization, and channel hopping mechanisms on top of it. Furthermore, AWDL features an IPv6-based data path which enables direct communication. To validate our own work, we implement a working prototype of AWDL on Linux-based systems. Our implementation is written in C, runs in userspace, and makes use of Linux's Netlink API for interactions with the system's networking stack and the pcap library for frame injection and reception. In our demonstrator, we show how our Linux system synchronizes to an existing AWDL cluster or takes over the master role itself. Furthermore, it can receive data frames from and send them to a MacBook or iPhone via AWDL. We demonstrate the data exchange via ICMPv6 echo request and replies as well as sending and receiving data over a TCP connection. Milan Stute, David Kreitschmann, Matthias Hollick |
MobiCom | 2 |