Sampling algorithms play an important role in controlling the quality and runtime of diffusion model inference. In recent years, a number of works (Chen et al., 2023c;b; Benton et al., 2023; Lee et al., 2022) have analyzed algorithms for diffusion sampling with provable guarantees; these works show that for essentially any data distribution, one can approximately sample in polynomial time given a sufficiently accurate estimate of its score functions at different noise levels. In this work, we propose a new scheme inspired by Shen and Lee's randomized midpoint method for log-concave sampling (Shen & Lee, 2019). We prove that this approach achieves the best known dimension dependence for sampling from arbitrary smooth distributions in total variation distance ($\widetilde O(d^{5/12})$ compared to $\widetilde O(\sqrt{d})$ from prior work). We also show that our algorithm can be parallelized to run in only $\widetilde O(\log^2 d)$ parallel rounds, constituting the first provable guarantees for parallel sampling with diffusion models. As a byproduct of our methods, for the well-studied problem of log-concave sampling in total variation distance, we give an algorithm and simple analysis achieving dimension dependence $\widetilde O(d^{5/12})$ compared to $\widetilde O(\sqrt{d})$ from prior work.

We quantify the value of the monopoly's bargaining power in terms of competition complexity—that is, the number of additional bidders the monopoly must attract in simple auctions to match the expected revenue of the optimal mechanisms —within the setting of multi-item auctions. We show that for simple auctions that sell items separately, the competition complexity is Θ(n/α) in an environment with n original bidders under the slightly stronger assumption of α-strong regularity, in contrast to the standard regularity assumption in the literature, which requires Ω (n · ln m/n) additional bidders. This significantly reduces the value of learning the distribution to design the optimal mechanisms, especially in large markets with many items for sale. For simple auctions that sell items as a grand bundle, we establish a constant competition complexity bound in a single-bidder environment when the number of items is small or when the value distribution has a monotone hazard rate. Some of our competition complexity results also hold when we compete against the first best benchmark (i.e., optimal social welfare).

We consider a principal seller with m heterogeneous products to sell to an additive buyer over independent items. The principal can offer an arbitrary menu of product bundles, but faces competition from smaller and more agile single-item sellers. The single-item sellers choose their prices after the principal commits to a menu, potentially under-cutting the principal's offerings. We explore to what extent the principal can leverage the ability to bundle products together to extract revenue.

Weitzman (1979) introduced Pandora’s box problem as a mathematical model of sequential search with inspection costs, in which a searcher is allowed to select a prize from one of n alternatives. Several decades later, Doval (2018) introduced a close version of the problem, where the searcher does not need to incur the inspection cost of an alternative, and can select it uninspected. Unlike the original problem, the optimal solution to the nonobligatory inspection variant is proved to need adaptivity by Doval (2018), and by recent work of Fu Li and Liu (2022), finding the optimal solution is NP-hard.

The enhanced competition paradigm is an attempt at bridging the gap between simple and optimal auctions. In this line of work, given an auction setting with m items and n bidders, the goal is to find the smallest n' ≥ n such that selling the items to n' bidders through a simple auction generates (almost) the same revenue as the optimal auction. Recently, Feldman, Friedler, and Rubinstein [EC, 2018] showed that an arbitrarily large constant fraction of the optimal revenue from selling m items to single bidder can be obtained via simple auctions with a constant number of bidders. However, their techniques break down even for two bidders, and can only show a bound of n' = O(n · łog m/n).

Machine Learning graphs (or models) can be challenging or impossible to train when either devices have limited memory, or the models are large. Splitting the model graph across multiple devices, today, largely relies on learning-based approaches to generate this placement. While it results in models that train fast on data (i.e., with low step times), learning-based model-parallelism is time-consuming, taking many hours or days to create a placement plan of operators on devices. We present the Baechi system, where we adopt an algorithmic approach to the placement problem for running machine learning training graphs on a small cluster of memory-constrained devices. We implemented Baechi so that it works modularly with TensorFlow. Our experimental results using GPUs show that Baechi generates placement plans in time 654X--206K X faster than today's learning-based approaches, and the placed model's step time is only up to 6.2% higher than expert-based placements.

State-of-the-art posted-price mechanisms for submodular bidders with m items achieve approximation guarantees of O((log log m)^3) [Sepehr Assadi and Sahil Singla, 2019]. Their truthfulness, however, requires bidders to compute an NP-hard demand-query. Some computational complexity of this form is unavoidable, as it is NP-hard for truthful mechanisms to guarantee even an m^(1/2-ε)-approximation for any ε > 0 [Shahar Dobzinski and Jan Vondrák, 2016]. Together, these establish a stark distinction between computationally-efficient and communication-efficient truthful mechanisms. We show that this distinction disappears with a mild relaxation of truthfulness, which we term implementation in advised strategies. Specifically, advice maps a tentative strategy either to that same strategy itself, or one that dominates it. We say that a player follows advice as long as they never play actions which are dominated by advice. A poly-time mechanism guarantees an α-approximation in implementation in advised strategies if there exists advice (which runs in poly-time) for each player such that an α-approximation is achieved whenever all players follow advice. Using an appropriate bicriterion notion of approximate demand queries (which can be computed in poly-time), we establish that (a slight modification of) the [Sepehr Assadi and Sahil Singla, 2019] mechanism achieves the same O((log log m)^3)-approximation in implementation in advised strategies.