Cloud communication, as a core component of the cloud computing architecture, relies on the communication mechanism of TCP/UDP protocols. However, with the popularity of cloud communication, the security threats that it faces are also becoming increasingly severe. Graphene is a new cloud communication security architecture that targets both TCP and UDP communication. It provides security assurance during data transmission and authentication for cloud users and cloud service providers, effectively addressing some of the shortcomings of traditional security protocols. In light of Graphene’s advantages, it is gaining increasing attention from industries. Hence, ensuring the reliability of Graphene becomes paramount. In this paper, we first utilize process algebra CSP to model the TCP-based communication processes within the Graphene architecture. Subsequently, we model the UDP-based communication processes as well. Then, we employ the model checker PAT to run the CSP models for both protocols and subsequently verify six properties: Deadlock Freedom, Divergence Freedom, Data Reachability, Cloud User Faking, Cloud Instance Faking, and Central Key Server Faking. According to the verification results, our models for both TCP and UDP satisfy all of the aforementioned properties. Therefore, we can conclude that the communication execution processes for both TCP and UDP in the Graphene architecture fulfill the anticipated security standards, thus indicating the reliability of the system.

Cloud communication, as a core component of the cloud computing architecture, relies on the communication mechanism of TCP/UDP protocols.However, with the popularity of cloud communication, the security threats that it faces are also becoming increasingly severe.Graphene is a new cloud communication security architecture that targets both TCP and UDP communication.It provides security assurance during data transmission and authentication for cloud users and cloud service providers, effectively addressing some of the shortcomings of traditional security protocols.In light of Graphene's advantages, it is gaining increasing attention from industries.Hence, ensuring the reliability of Graphene becomes paramount.In this paper, we first use process algebra CSP to model the TCP-based communication process of the Graphene architecture.Then, we use the model checker PAT to run the CSP model of Graphene and subsequently verify six properties, including Deadlock Freedom, Divergence Freedom, Data Reachability, Cloud User Faking, Cloud Instance Faking, and Central Key Server Faking.According to the verification results, our model satisfies all the above six properties.Therefore, we can conclude that the TCP communication execution process in the Graphene architecture fulfills the anticipated security standards, thus indicating that the system is reliable.

In this study, we propose a unified framework for designing a class of server-centric network topologies for DML by adopting top-down design method and combinatorial design theory. Simulation results show that this flexible framework is capable of effectively supporting various DML tasks. Our framework can generate compatible topologies that meet various resource constraints and different DML tasks.

Autonomous vehicles rely on sensors to measure road condition and make driving decisions, and their safety relies heavily on the reliability of these sensors. Out of all obstacle detection sensors, ultrasonic sensors have the largest market share and are expected to be increasingly installed on automobiles. Such sensors discover obstacles by emitting ultrasounds and analyzing their reflections. By exploiting the built-in vulnerabilities of sensors, we designed random spoofing, adaptive spoofing, and jamming attacks on ultrasonic sensors, and we managed to trick a vehicle to stop when it should keep moving, and let it fail to stop when it should. We validate our attacks on stand-alone sensors and moving vehicles, including a Tesla Model S with the “Autopilot” system. The results show that the attacks cause blindness and malfunction of not only sensors but also autonomous vehicles, which can lead to collisions. To enhance the security of ultrasonic sensors and autonomous vehicles, we propose two defense strategies, single-sensor-based physical shift authentication that verifies signals on the physical level, and multiple sensor consistency check that employs multiple sensors to verify signals on the system level. Our experiments on real sensors and MATLAB simulation reveal the validity of both schemes.