VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Federico Bobbio
dblp:227/8212
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-1524-4740ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 1 first-author · 3 since 2021Theory of computation · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Stable Matching with Contingent PrioritiesabstractUsing school choice as a motivating example, we introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse seeks to implement contingent priorities—i.e., priorities that depend on the current assignment—to improve the likelihood that students with siblings are assigned together. We provide a series of guidelines and introduce two natural approaches to implement them: (i) absolute, whereby a prioritized student can displace any student without siblings assigned to the school, and (ii) partial, whereby prioritized students can only displace students that have a less favorable lottery than their priority provider. We study several properties of the corresponding mechanisms, including the existence of a stable assignment under contingent priorities, the complexity of finding one if it exists, and its incentive properties. Furthermore, we introduce a soft version of these priorities to guarantee existence, and we provide mathematical programming formulations to find such stable matching or certify that one does not exist. Finally, using data from the Chilean school choice system, we show that our framework can significantly increase the number of students assigned to their top preference and the number of siblings assigned together relative to current practice. A full version of this paper can be found at https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.04914 Ignacio Rios, Federico Bobbio, Margarida Carvalho, Alfredo Torrico |
EC | 2 |
| 2023 | Capacity Planning in Stable Matching: An Application to School ChoiceabstractCentralized mechanisms are becoming the standard approach to solve several assignment problems. Examples include the allocation of students to schools (school choice), high-school graduates to colleges, residents to hospitals and refugees to cities. In most of these markets, a desirable property of the assignment is stability, which guarantees that no pair of agents has incentive to circumvent the matching. Using school choice as our matching market application, we introduce the problem of jointly allocating a school capacity expansion and finding the best stable matching for the students in the expanded market. We analyze theoretically the problem, focusing on the trade-off behind the multiplicity of student-optimal assignments, and the problem complexity. Since the theoretical intractability of the problem precludes the adaptation of classical approaches to solve it efficiently, we generalize existent mathematical programming formulations of stability constraints to our setting. These generalizations result in integer quadratically-constrained programs, which are computationally hard to solve. In addition, we propose a novel mixed-integer linear programming formulation that is exponentially-large on the problem size. We show that the stability constraints can be separated in linear time, leading to an effective cutting-plane method. We evaluate the performance of our approaches in a detailed computational study, and we find that our cutting-plane method outperforms mixed-integer programming solvers applied to existent formulations extended to our problem setting. We also propose two heuristics that are effective for large instances of the problem. Finally, we use the Chilean school choice system data to demonstrate the impact of capacity planning under stability conditions. Our results show that each additional school seat can benefit multiple students. On the one hand, we can focus on access by prioritizing extra seats that benefit previously unassigned students; on the other hand, we can focus on merit by allocating extra seats that benefit several students via chains of improvement. These insights empower the decision-maker in tuning the matching algorithm to provide a fair application-oriented solution. Federico Bobbio, Margarida Carvalho, Andrea Lodi 0001, Ignacio Rios, Alfredo Torrico |
EC | 1 |
| 2023 | The first AI4TSP competition: Learning to solve stochastic routing problemsabstractThis paper reports on the first international competition on AI for the traveling salesman problem (TSP) at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2021 (IJCAI-21). The TSP is one of the classical combinatorial optimization problems, with many variants inspired by real-world applications. This first competition asked the participants to develop algorithms to solve an orienteering problem with stochastic weights and time windows (OPSWTW). It focused on two learning approaches: surrogate-based optimization and deep reinforcement learning. In this paper, we describe the problem, the competition setup, and the winning methods, and give an overview of the results. The winning methods described in this work have advanced the state-of-the-art in using AI for stochastic routing problems. Overall, by organizing this competition we have introduced routing problems as an interesting problem setting for AI researchers. The simulator of the problem has been made open-source and can be used by other researchers as a benchmark for new learning-based methods. The instances and code for the competition are available at https://github.com/paulorocosta/ai-for-tsp-competition. Yingqian Zhang 0001, Laurens Bliek, Paulo Roberto de Oliveira da Costa, Reza Refaei Afshar, Robbert Reijnen, Tom Catshoek, Daniël Vos, Sicco Verwer, Fynn Schmitt-Ulms, André Hottung, Tapan Shah 0001, Meinolf Sellmann, Kevin Tierney, Carl Perreault-Lafleur, Caroline Leboeuf, Federico Bobbio, Justine Pepin, Warley Almeida Silva, Ricardo Gama, Hugo L. Fernandes, Martin Zaefferer, Manuel López-Ibáñez 0001, Ekhine Irurozki |
Artif. Intell. | 16 |