In computer systems design, computer architects can evaluate features and techniques in terms of traditional design metrics like power, performance, and area but not in terms of net benefit or cost to the end user. For example, a security feature may come at a 10% cost to performance, but is this worth the tradeoff? The problem is that user-level features like security, privacy, and usability can be converted into a monetary amount but traditional architecture metrics (which lack the notion of user value) cannot. In this paper, we make the first known attempt to bridge this gap: We conduct two studies (one of which is incentive compatible) that elicit the value of performance in terms of US$ to end users. Thus in this work, we make the first known quantitative measurement of the tradeoff between performance and user value, providing architects with a novel design metric and filling a crucial gap in the end-to-end quantitative evaluation of systems.

Residue codes have been traditionally used for compute error correction rather than storage error correction. In this paper, we use these codes for storage error correction with surprising results. We find that adapting residue codes to modern memory systems offers a level of error correction comparable to traditional schemes such as Reed-Solomon with fewer bits of storage. For instance, our adaptation of residue code – MUSE ECC – can offer ChipKill protection using approximately 30% fewer bits. We show that the storage gains can be used to hold metadata needed for emerging security functionality such as memory tagging or to provide better detection capabilities against Rowhammer attacks. Our evaluation shows that memory tagging in a MUSE-enabled system shows a 12% reduction in memory bandwidth utilization while providing the same level of error correction as a traditional ECC baseline without a noticeable loss of performance. Thus, our work demonstrates a new, flexible primitive for co-designing reliability with security and performance.