Machine teaching studies the interaction between a teacher and a student/learner where the teacher selects training examples for the learner to learn a specific task. The typical assumption is that the teacher has perfect knowledge of the task---this knowledge comprises knowing the desired learning target, having the exact task representation used by the learner, and knowing the parameters capturing the learning dynamics of the learner. Inspired by real-world applications of machine teaching in education, we consider the setting where teacher's knowledge is limited and noisy, and the key research question we study is the following: When does a teacher succeed or fail in effectively teaching a learner using its imperfect knowledge? We answer this question by showing connections to how imperfect knowledge affects the teacher's solution of the corresponding machine teaching problem when constructing optimal teaching sets. Our results have important implications for designing robust teaching algorithms for real-world applications.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) enables an agent to learn complex behavior by observing demonstrations from a (near-)optimal policy. The typical assumption is that the learner's goal is to match the teacher’s demonstrated behavior. In this paper, we consider the setting where the learner has its own preferences that it additionally takes into consideration. These preferences can for example capture behavioral biases, mismatched worldviews, or physical constraints. We study two teaching approaches: learner-agnostic teaching, where the teacher provides demonstrations from an optimal policy ignoring the learner's preferences, and learner-aware teaching, where the teacher accounts for the learner’s preferences. We design learner-aware teaching algorithms and show that significant performance improvements can be achieved over learner-agnostic teaching.

Learning near-optimal behaviour from an expert's demonstrations typically relies on the assumption that the learner knows the features that the true reward function depends on. In this paper, we study the problem of learning from demonstrations in the setting where this is not the case, i.e., where there is a mismatch between the worldviews of the learner and the expert. We introduce a natural quantity, the teaching risk, which measures the potential suboptimality of policies that look optimal to the learner in this setting. We show that bounds on the teaching risk guarantee that the learner is able to find a near-optimal policy using standard algorithms based on inverse reinforcement learning. Based on these findings, we suggest a teaching scheme in which the expert can decrease the teaching risk by updating the learner's worldview, and thus ultimately enable her to find a near-optimal policy.