Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Phil Wright
dblp:229/1765
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Systems, architecture and hardware · 1Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › electronic voting
end-to-end verifiable e-voting |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Towards End-to-End Verifiable Online Voting: Adding Verifiability to Established Voting Systems · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2024 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › electronic voting
verifiable voting |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Towards End-to-End Verifiable Online Voting: Adding Verifiability to Established Voting Systems · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2024 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › electronic voting › verifiable voting
voter verification |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Towards End-to-End Verifiable Online Voting: Adding Verifiability to Established Voting Systems · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
tracker-based vote verification · 0.8selene verifiability layer · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Towards End-to-End Verifiable Online Voting: Adding Verifiability to Established Voting SystemsabstractOnline voting for independent elections is generally supported by trusted election providers. Typically these providers do not offer any way in which a voter can verify their vote, and hence the providers are trusted with ballot privacy and in ensuring correctness. Despite the desire to offer online voting for political elections, this lack of transparency and verifiability is often seen as a significant barrier to the large-scale adoption of online elections. Adding verifiability to an online election increases transparency and integrity, as well as allowing voters to verify that the vote they cast has been recorded correctly and included in the tally. However, replacing existing online systems with those that provide verifiable voting requires new algorithms and code to be deployed, and this presents a significant business risk to commercial election providers, as well as the societal risk for official elections selecting for public office. In this paper we present the first step in an incremental approach which minimises the business risk but demonstrates the advantages of verifiability, by developing an implementation of key elements of a Selene-based verifiability layer and adding it to an operational online voting system. Selene is a verifiable voting protocol that publishes votes in plaintext alongside a voter's tracker. These trackers enable voters to confirm that their votes have been captured correctly by the system, such that the election provider does not know which tracker has been allocated to which voter. This results in a system where even a “dishonest but cautious” election authority running the system cannot be sure of changing the result in an undetectable way, and hence gives stronger guarantees on the integrity of the election than were previously present. We explore the challenges presented by adding a verifiability layer to an operational system. The system was used in two initial trials conducted within real contested elections. We conclude by outlining the further steps in the road-map towards the deployment of a fully trustworthy online voting system. Mohammed Alsadi 0001, Matthew Casey 0001, Constantin Catalin Dragan, François Dupressoir, Luke Riley, Muntadher Fadhil Sallal, Steve A. Schneider, Helen Treharne, Joe Wadsworth, Phil Wright |
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. | 10 |
| 2020 | Augmenting an Internet Voting System with Selene Verifiability using Permissioned Distributed LedgerabstractThis paper discusses an approach for incremental change to an online voting system, introducing a verifiability layer based on the Selene protocol to a trusted-third-party-based system, resulting in a fully verifiable and transparent e-voting system. The paper also describes how to use Distributed Ledger Technology as a component of the implementation of Selene to manage the verifiability data in a distributed way for resilience and trust. Muntadher Fadhil Sallal, Steve A. Schneider, Matthew Casey 0001, François Dupressoir, Helen Treharne, Constantin Catalin Dragan, Luke Riley, Phil Wright |
ICDCS | 8 |