Designing policies that are both efficient and acceptable for conversational service robots in open and diverse environments is non-trivial. Unlike fixed, hand-tuned parameters, online learning can adapt to non-stationary conditions. In this paper, we study how to adapt a social robot’s speech policy in the wild. During a 12-day in-situ deployment with over 1,400 public encounters, we cast online policy optimization as a multi-armed bandit problem and use Thompson sampling to select among six actions defined by speech rate (slow/normal/fast) and verbosity (concise/detailed). We compare three complementary binary rewards–Ru (user rating), Rc (conversation closure), and Rt (≥2 turns)–and show that each induces distinct arm distributions and interaction behaviors. We complement the online results with offline evaluations that analyze contextual factors (e.g., crowd level, group size) using video-annotated data. Taken together, we distill ready-to-use design lessons for deploying online optimization of speech policies in real public HRI settings.

Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around their optimum, i.e., Nash equilibrium. When a game periodically varies (called a ``periodic'' game), however, the Nash equilibrium moves generically. How learning dynamics behave in such periodic games is of interest but still unclear. Interestingly, we discover that the behavior is highly dependent on the relationship between the two speeds at which the game changes and at which players learn. We observe that when these two speeds synchronize, the learning dynamics diverge, and their time-average does not converge. Otherwise, the learning dynamics draw complicated cycles, but their time-average converges. Under some assumptions introduced for the dynamical systems analysis, we prove that this behavior occurs. Furthermore, our experiments observe this behavior even if these assumptions are removed. This study discovers a novel phenomenon, i.e., synchronization, and gains insight widely applicable to learning in periodic games.

Minimum Bayes Risk (MBR) decoding optimizes output selection by maximizing the expected utility value of an underlying human distribution.While prior work has shown the effectiveness of MBR decoding through empirical evaluation, few studies have analytically investigated why the method is effective.As a result of our analysis, we show that, given the size n of the reference hypothesis set used in computation, MBR decoding approaches the optimal solution with high probability at a rate of O n -1 2 , under certain assumptions, even though the language space Y is significantly larger |Y| ≫ n.This result helps to theoretically explain the strong performance observed in several prior empirical studies on MBR decoding.In addition, we provide the performance gap for maximum-a-posteriori (MAP) decoding and compare it to MBR decoding.The result of this paper indicates that MBR decoding tends to converge to the optimal solution faster than MAP decoding in several cases.

This paper presents a payoff perturbation technique, introducing a strong convexity to players' payoff functions in games. This technique is specifically designed for first-order methods to achieve last-iterate convergence in games where the gradient of the payoff functions is monotone in the strategy profile space, potentially containing additive noise. Although perturbation is known to facilitate the convergence of learning algorithms, the magnitude of perturbation requires careful adjustment to ensure last-iterate convergence. Previous studies have proposed a scheme in which the magnitude is determined by the distance from a periodically re-initialized anchoring or reference strategy. Building upon this, we propose Gradient Ascent with Boosting Payoff Perturbation, which incorporates a novel perturbation into the underlying payoff function, maintaining the periodically re-initializing anchoring strategy scheme. This innovation empowers us to provide faster last-iterate convergence rates against the existing payoff perturbed algorithms, even in the presence of additive noise.

In this paper, we investigate the problem of recovering hidden communities in the Labeled Stochastic Block Model (LSBM) with a finite number of clusters whose sizes grow linearly with the total number of nodes. We derive the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the expected number of misclassified nodes is less than $ s $, for any number $ s = o(n) $. To achieve this, we propose IAC (Instance-Adaptive Clustering), the first algorithm whose performance matches the instance-specific lower bounds both in expectation and with high probability. IAC is a novel two-phase algorithm that consists of a one-shot spectral clustering step followed by iterative likelihood-based cluster assignment improvements. This approach is based on the instance-specific lower bound and notably does not require any knowledge of the model parameters, including the number of clusters. By performing the spectral clustering only once, IAC maintains an overall computational complexity of $ \mathcal{O}(n\, \text{polylog}(n)) $, making it scalable and practical for large-scale problems.

Yuu Jinnai, Tetsuro Morimura, Kaito Ariu, Kenshi Abe. Proceedings of the 2025 Conference of the Nations of the Americas Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2025.

This study raises and addresses the problem of time-delayed feedback in learning in games. Because learning in games assumes that multiple agents independently learn their strategies, a discrepancy in optimization often emerges among the agents. To overcome this discrepancy, the prediction of the future reward is incorporated into algorithms, typically known as Optimistic Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (OFTRL). However, the time delay in observing the past rewards hinders the prediction. Indeed, this study firstly proves that even a single-step delay worsens the performance of OFTRL from the aspects of social regret and convergence. This study proposes the weighted OFTRL (WOFTRL), where the prediction vector of the next reward in OFTRL is weighted $n$ times. We further capture an intuition that the optimistic weight cancels out this time delay. We prove that when the optimistic weight exceeds the time delay, our WOFTRL recovers the good performances that social regret is constant in general-sum normal-form games, and the strategies last-iterate converge to the Nash equilibrium in poly-matrix zero-sum games. The theoretical results are supported and strengthened by our experiments.

In the Lasry--Lions framework, Mean-Field Games (MFGs) model interactions among an infinite number of agents. However, existing algorithms either require strict monotonicity or only guarantee the convergence of averaged iterates, as in Fictitious Play in continuous time. We address this gap with the following theoretical result. First, we prove that the last-iterated policy of a proximal-point (PP) update with KL regularization converges to an MFG equilibrium under non-strict monotonicity. Second, we see that each PP update is equivalent to finding the equilibria of a KL-regularized MFG. We then prove that this equilibrium can be found using mirror descent with an exponential last-iterate convergence rate. Building on these insights, we propose the Approximate Proximal-Point ($\mathtt{APP}$) algorithm, which approximately implements the PP update via a small number of Mirror Descent steps. Numerical experiments on standard benchmarks confirm that the $\mathtt{APP}$ algorithm reliably converges to the unregularized mean-field equilibrium without time-averaging.

In online advertising, identifying the optimal creative is critical to maximizing performance. This study examines the application of top-two Thompson sampling (TTTS), an adaptive experimental design method, as an efficient alternative to traditional A/B testing for identifying the optimal creative. Our experiments on an online advertising platform highlight the effectiveness of TTTS in both accurately identifying the optimal creative and minimizing experimental costs, underscoring its potential as a promising approach to creative selection.

Learning in games considers how multiple agents maximize their own rewards through repeated games. Memory, an ability that an agent changes his/her action depending on the history of actions in previous games, is often introduced into learning to explore more clever strategies and discuss the decision-making of real agents like humans. However, such games with memory are hard to analyze because they exhibit complex phenomena like chaotic dynamics or divergence from Nash equilibrium. In particular, how asymmetry in memory capacities between agents affects learning in games is still unclear. In response, this study formulates a gradient ascent algorithm in games with asymmetry memory capacities. To obtain theoretical insights into learning dynamics, we first consider a simple case of zero-sum games. We observe complex behavior, where learning dynamics draw a heteroclinic connection from unstable fixed points to stable ones. Despite this complexity, we analyze learning dynamics and prove local convergence to these stable fixed points, i.e., the Nash equilibria. We identify the mechanism driving this convergence: an agent with a longer memory learns to exploit the other, which in turn endows the other's utility function with strict concavity. We further numerically observe such convergence in various initial strategies, action numbers, and memory lengths. This study reveals a novel phenomenon due to memory asymmetry, providing fundamental strides in learning in games and new insights into computing equilibria.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) plays a crucial role in aligning language models with human preferences.While the significance of dataset quality is generally recognized, explicit investigations into its impact within the RLHF framework, to our knowledge, have been limited.This paper addresses the issue of text quality within the preference dataset by focusing on direct preference optimization (DPO), an increasingly adopted reward-model-free RLHF method.We confirm that text quality significantly influences the performance of models optimized with DPO more than those optimized with reward-modelbased RLHF.Building on this new insight, we propose an extension of DPO, termed filtered direct preference optimization (fDPO).fDPO uses a trained reward model to monitor the quality of texts within the preference dataset during DPO training.Samples of lower quality are discarded based on comparisons with texts generated by the model being optimized, resulting in a more accurate dataset.Experimental results demonstrate that fDPO enhances the final model performance.Our code is available at https://github.com/CyberAgentAILab/ filtered-dpo.

This paper proposes a payoff perturbation technique for the Mirror Descent (MD) algorithm in games where the gradient of the payoff functions is monotone in the strategy profile space, potentially containing additive noise. The optimistic family of learning algorithms, exemplified by optimistic MD, successfully achieves *last-iterate* convergence in scenarios devoid of noise, leading the dynamics to a Nash equilibrium. A recent re-emerging trend underscores the promise of the perturbation approach, where payoff functions are perturbed based on the distance from an anchoring, or *slingshot*, strategy. In response, we propose *Adaptively Perturbed MD* (APMD), which adjusts the magnitude of the perturbation by repeatedly updating the slingshot strategy at a predefined interval. This innovation empowers us to find a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game with guaranteed rates. Empirical demonstrations affirm that our algorithm exhibits significantly accelerated convergence.

Minimum Bayes Risk (MBR) decoding has been shown to be a powerful alternative to beam search decoding in a variety of text generation tasks. MBR decoding selects a hypothesis from a pool of hypotheses that has the least expected risk under a probability model according to a given utility function. Since it is impractical to compute the expected risk exactly over all possible hypotheses, two approximations are commonly used in MBR. First, it integrates over a sampled set of hypotheses rather than over all possible hypotheses. Second, it estimates the probability of each hypothesis using a Monte Carlo estimator. While the first approximation is necessary to make it computationally feasible, the second is not essential since we typically have access to the model probability at inference time. We propose model-based MBR (MBMBR), a variant of MBR that uses the model probability itself as the estimate of the probability distribution instead of the Monte Carlo estimate. We show analytically and empirically that the model-based estimate is more promising than the Monte Carlo estimate in text generation tasks. Our experiments show that MBMBR outperforms MBR in several text generation tasks, both with encoder-decoder models and with language models.

We study the matroid semi-bandits problem, where at each round the learner plays a subset of $K$ arms from a feasible set, and the goal is to maximize the expected cumulative linear rewards. Existing algorithms have per-round time complexity at least $\Omega(K)$, which becomes expensive when $K$ is large. To address this computational issue, we propose FasterCUCB whose sampling rule takes time sublinear in $K$ for common classes of matroids: $\mathcal{O}(D\text{ polylog}(K)\text{ polylog}(T))$ for uniform matroids, partition matroids, and graphical matroids, and $\mathcal{O}(D\sqrt{K}\text{ polylog}(T))$ for transversal matroids. Here, $D$ is the maximum number of elements in any feasible subset of arms, and $T$ is the horizon. Our technique is based on dynamic maintenance of an approximate maximum-weight basis over inner-product weights. Although the introduction of an approximate maximum-weight basis presents a challenge in regret analysis, we can still guarantee an upper bound on regret as tight as CUCB in the sense that it matches the gap-dependent lower bound by Kveton et al. (2014a) asymptotically.

We study the problem of best-arm identification with fixed budget in stochastic multi-armed bandits with Bernoulli rewards. For the problem with two arms, also known as the A/B testing problem, we prove that there is no algorithm that (i) performs as well as the algorithm sampling each arm equally (referred to as the uniform sampling algorithm) in all instances, and that (ii) strictly outperforms uniform sampling on at least one instance. In short, there is no algorithm better than the uniform sampling algorithm. To establish this result, we first introduce the natural class of consistent and stable algorithms, and show that any algorithm that performs as well as the uniform sampling algorithm in all instances belongs to this class. The proof then proceeds by deriving a lower bound on the error rate satisfied by any consistent and stable algorithm, and by showing that the uniform sampling algorithm matches this lower bound. Our results provide a solution to the two open problems presented in (Qin, 2022). For the general problem with more than two arms, we provide a first set of results. We characterize the asymptotic error rate of the celebrated Successive Rejects (SR) algorithm (Audibert et al., 2010) and show that, surprisingly, the uniform sampling algorithm outperforms the SR algorithm in some instances.

Abstract We study the problem of clustering a set of items from binary user feedback. Such a problem arises in crowdsourcing platforms solving large-scale labeling tasks with minimal effort put on the users. For example, in some of the recent reCAPTCHA systems, users clicks (binary answers) can be used to efficiently label images. In our inference problem, items are grouped into initially unknown non-overlapping clusters. To recover these clusters, the learner sequentially presents to users a finite list of items together with a question with a binary answer selected from a fixed finite set. For each of these items, the user provides a noisy answer whose expectation is determined by the item cluster and the question and by an item-specific parameter characterizing the hardness of classifying the item. The objective is to devise an algorithm with a minimal cluster recovery error rate. We derive problem-specific information-theoretical lower bounds on the error rate satisfied by any algorithm, for both uniform and adaptive (list, question) selection strategies. For uniform selection, we present a simple algorithm built upon the K-means algorithm and whose performance almost matches the fundamental limits. For adaptive selection, we develop an adaptive algorithm that is inspired by the derivation of the information-theoretical error lower bounds, and in turn allocates the budget in an efficient way. The algorithm learns to select items hard to cluster and relevant questions more often. We compare the performance of our algorithms with or without the adaptive selection strategy numerically and illustrate the gain achieved by being adaptive.

This paper proposes Mutation-Driven Multiplicative Weights Update (M2WU) for learning an equilibrium in two-player zero-sum normal-form games and proves that it exhibits the last-iterate convergence property in both full and noisy feedback settings. In the former, players observe their exact gradient vectors of the utility functions. In the latter, they only observe the noisy gradient vectors. Even the celebrated Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU) and Optimistic MWU (OMWU) algorithms may not converge to a Nash equilibrium with noisy feedback. On the contrary, M2WU exhibits the last-iterate convergence to a stationary point near a Nash equilibrium in both feedback settings. We then prove that it converges to an exact Nash equilibrium by iteratively adapting the mutation term. We empirically confirm that M2WU outperforms MWU and OMWU in exploitability and convergence rates.

Repeated games consider a situation where multiple agents are motivated by their independent rewards throughout learning. In general, the dynamics of their learning become complex. Especially when their rewards compete with each other like zero-sum games, the dynamics often do not converge to their optimum, i.e., the Nash equilibrium. To tackle such complexity, many studies have understood various learning algorithms as dynamical systems and discovered qualitative insights among the algorithms. However, such studies have yet to handle multi-memory games (where agents can memorize actions they played in the past and choose their actions based on their memories), even though memorization plays a pivotal role in artificial intelligence and interpersonal relationship. This study extends two major learning algorithms in games, i.e., replicator dynamics and gradient ascent, into multi-memory games. Then, we prove their dynamics are identical. Furthermore, theoretically and experimentally, we clarify that the learning dynamics diverge from the Nash equilibrium in multi-memory zero-sum games and reach heteroclinic cycles (sojourn longer around the boundary of the strategy space), providing a fundamental advance in learning in games.

Bandit algorithms for online learning to rank (OLTR) problems often aim to maximize long-term revenue by utilizing user feedback. From a practical point of view, however, such algorithms have a high risk of hurting user experience due to their aggressive exploration. Thus, there has been a rising demand for safe exploration in recent years. One approach to safe exploration is to gradually enhance the quality of an original ranking that is already guaranteed acceptable quality. In this paper, we propose a safe OLTR algorithm that efficiently exchanges one of the items in the current ranking with an item outside the ranking (i.e., an unranked item) to perform exploration. We select an unranked item optimistically to explore based on Kullback-Leibler upper confidence bounds (KL-UCB) and safely re-rank the items including the selected one. Through experiments, we demonstrate that the proposed algorithm improves long-term regret from baselines without any safety violation.

In this paper, we revisit the regret minimization problem in sparse stochastic contextual linear bandits, where feature vectors may be of large dimension $d$, but where the reward function depends on a few, say $s_0\ll d$, of these features only. We present Thresholded Lasso bandit, an algorithm that (i) estimates the vector defining the reward function as well as its sparse support, i.e., significant feature elements, using the Lasso framework with thresholding, and (ii) selects an arm greedily according to this estimate projected on its support. The algorithm does not require prior knowledge of the sparsity index $s_0$ and can be parameter-free under some symmetric assumptions. For this simple algorithm, we establish non-asymptotic regret upper bounds scaling as $\mathcal{O}( \log d + \sqrt{T} )$ in general, and as $\mathcal{O}( \log d + \log T)$ under the so-called margin condition (a probabilistic condition on the separation of the arm rewards). The regret of previous algorithms scales as $\mathcal{O}( \log d + \sqrt{T \log (d T)})$ and $\mathcal{O}( \log T \log d)$ in the two settings, respectively. Through numerical experiments, we confirm that our algorithm outperforms existing methods.

The paper addresses various Multiplayer Multi-Armed Bandit (MMAB) problems, where M decision-makers, or players, collaborate to maximize their cumulative reward. We first investigate the MMAB problem where players selecting the same arms experience a collision (and are aware of it) and do not collect any reward. For this problem, we present DPE1 (Decentralized Parsimonious Exploration), a decentralized algorithm that achieves the same asymptotic regret as that obtained by an optimal centralized algorithm. DPE1 is simpler than the state-of-the-art algorithm SIC-MMAB Boursier and Perchet (2019), and yet offers better performance guarantees. We then study the MMAB problem without collision, where players may select the same arm. Players sit on vertices of a graph, and in each round, they are able to send a message to their neighbours in the graph. We present DPE2, a simple and asymptotically optimal algorithm that outperforms the state-of-the-art algorithm DD- UCB Martinez-Rubio et al. (2019). Besides, under DPE2, the expected number of bits transmitted by the players in the graph is finite.

This paper proposes a theoretical analysis of recommendation systems in an online setting, where items are sequentially recommended to users over time. In each round, a user, randomly picked from a population of $m$ users, arrives. The decision-maker observes the user and selects an item from a catalogue of $n$ items. Importantly, an item cannot be recommended twice to the same user. The probabilities that a user likes each item are unknown, and the performance of the recommendation algorithm is captured through its regret, considering as a reference an Oracle algorithm aware of these probabilities. We investigate various structural assumptions on these probabilities: we derive for each of them regret lower bounds, and devise algorithms achieving these limits. Interestingly, our analysis reveals the relative weights of the different components of regret: the component due to the constraint of not presenting the same item twice to the same user, that due to learning the chances users like items, and finally that arising when learning the underlying structure.