Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Aaron Sloman
dblp:23/5327
· DBLP profile ↗
23ranked-venue papers
20as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
0000-0003-4555-1853ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 22 · 19 first-authorGraphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 13 · 11 first-authorHuman-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 first-authorTheory of computation · 1 · 1 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
8 papers |
Robot manipulation · 38% Motion planning and robot control · 29% Knowledge representation and reasoning · 23% | |
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Logic in computer science · 100% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Robotics › Motion planning and robot control › robot learning
developmental robotics |
0.1 | 1 | 2005 | The Altricial-Precocial Spectrum for Robots · IJCAI 2005 |
Logic in computer science
modal logic |
0.0 | 1 | 1996 | Actual Possibilities · KR 1996 |
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Knowledge representation and reasoning › neuro-symbolic reasoning
symbol grounding |
0.0 | 2 | 1985 | What Enables a Machine to Understand? · IJCAI 1985 Under What Conditions Can a Machine Attribute Meanings to Symbols · IJCAI 1983 |
Computer vision › Face, body and person analysis › affective computing
emotion modeling |
0.0 | 1 | 1981 | Why Robots Will Have Emotions · IJCAI 1981 |
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Knowledge representation and reasoning
nonmonotonic reasoning |
0.0 | 1 | 1971 | Interactions Between Philosophy and Srtificial Intelligence: The Role of Intuition and Non-Logical Reasoning in Ontelligence · Artif. Intell. 1971 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
formal semantics · 0.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | Were "Super-Turing" Diagrammatic Reasoning Mechanisms Ancient Products of Biological Evolution?
Aaron Sloman |
Diagrams | 1 |
| 2018 | What Sort of Information-Processing Machinery Could Ancient Geometers Have Used?
Aaron Sloman |
Diagrams | 1 |
| 2009 | Exploring design space for an integrated intelligent system
Nick Hawes, Jeremy L. Wyatt, Aaron Sloman |
Knowl. Based Syst. | 3 |
| 2008 | The well-designed young mathematician
Aaron Sloman |
Artif. Intell. | 1 |
| 2007 | Towards an Integrated Robot with Multiple Cognitive Functions
Nick Hawes, Aaron Sloman, Jeremy L. Wyatt, Michael Zillich, Henrik Jacobsson, Geert-Jan M. Kruijff, Michael Brenner 0001, Gregor Berginc, Danijel Skocaj |
AAAI | 2 |
| 2006 | How to Put the Pieces of AI Together Again
Aaron Sloman |
AAAI | 1 |
| 2005 | The Altricial-Precocial Spectrum for Robots
Aaron Sloman, Jackie Chappell |
IJCAI | 1 |
| 2001 | Evolvable Biologically Plausible Visual ArchitecturesabstractMuch work in AI is fragmented, partly because the subject is so huge that it is difficult for anyone to think about all of it. Even within sub-fields, such as language, reasoning, and vision, there is fragmentation, as the sub-sub-fields are rich enough to keep people busy all their lives. However, there is a risk that results of isolated research will be unsuitable for future integration, e.g. in models of complete organisms, or human like robots. This paper offers a framework for thinking about the many components of visual systems and how they relate to the whole organism or machine. The viewpoint is biologically inspired, using conjectured evolutionary history as a guide to some of the features of the architecture. It may also be useful both for modelling animal vision and designing robots with similar capabilities. 1 Aaron Sloman |
BMVC | 1 |
| 2000 | Interacting Trajectories in Design Space and Niche Space: A Philosopher Speculates About Evolution
Aaron Sloman |
PPSN | 1 |
| 1998 | Damasio, Descartes, alarms and meta-managementabstractDiscusses some of the requirements for the control architecture of an intelligent human-like agent with multiple independent dynamically changing motives in a dynamically changing only partly predictable world. The architecture proposed includes a combination of reactive, deliberative and meta-management mechanisms along with one or more global "alarm" systems. The engineering design requirements are discussed in relation to our evolutionary history, evidence of brain function and recent theories of Damasio and others about the relationships between intelligence and emotions. Aaron Sloman |
SMC | 1 |
| 1996 | Actual Possibilities
Aaron Sloman |
KR | 1 |
| 1995 | A Philosophical Encounter
Aaron Sloman |
IJCAI | 1 |
| 1994 | Exploration in Design Space
Aaron Sloman |
ECAI | 1 |
| 1992 | The Emperor's Real Mind: Review of Roger Penrose'sThe Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and the Laws of Physics
Aaron Sloman |
Artif. Intell. | 1 |
| 1989 | On designing a visual system (Towards a Gibsonian computational model of vision)abstractThis paper contrasts the standard (in AI) ‘modular’ theory of the nature of vision with a more general theory of vision as involving multiple functions and multiple relationships with other sub-systems of an intelligent system. The modular theory (e.g. as expounded by Marr) treats vision as entirely, and permanently, concerned with the production of a limited range of descriptions of visible surfaces, for a central database; while the ‘labyrinthine’ design allows any output that a visual system can be trained to associate reliably with features of an optic array and allows forms of learning that set up new communication channels. The labyrinthine theory turns out to have much in common with J.J. Gibson's theory of affordances, while not eschewing information processing as he did. It also seems to fit better than the modular theory with neurophysiological evidence of rich interconnectivity within and between sub-systems in the brain. Some of the trade-offs between different designs are discussed in order to provide a unifying framework for future empirical investigations and engineering design studies. However, the paper is more about requirements than detailed designs. Aaron Sloman |
J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell. | 1 |
| 1988 | What is Computation? (Panel Introduction)
Jörg H. Siekmann, Sten-Åke Tärnlund, Aaron Sloman, Andy Clark, Margaret A. Boden |
ECAI | 3 |
| 1988 | What isn't Computation? (Panel Statement)
Aaron Sloman |
ECAI | 1 |
| 1986 | Reference without Causal Links
Aaron Sloman |
ECAI | 1 |
| 1985 | What Enables a Machine to Understand?
Aaron Sloman |
IJCAI | 1 |
| 1983 | Under What Conditions Can a Machine Attribute Meanings to Symbols
Aaron Sloman, Drew McDermott, William A. Woods, Brian Cantwell Smith, Patrick J. Hayes |
IJCAI | 1 |
| 1981 | Why Robots Will Have Emotions
Aaron Sloman, Monica Croucher |
IJCAI | 1 |
| 1971 | Interactions Between Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence: The Role of Intuition and Non-Logical Reasoning in Intelligence
Aaron Sloman |
IJCAI | 1 |
| 1971 | Interactions Between Philosophy and Srtificial Intelligence: The Role of Intuition and Non-Logical Reasoning in Ontelligence
Aaron Sloman |
Artif. Intell. | 1 |