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Harrison Rosenberg

dblp:230/3942 · also Harrison R. Rosenberg · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · unresolved

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Generative modeling · 78% Trustworthy machine learning · 16% Face, body and person analysis · 7%
Network and information security
1 paper
Privacy and data protection · 100%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Generative modeling
diffusion model
0.812024
Limitations of Face Image Generation · AAAI 2024
Machine learning › Generative modeling
face synthesis
0.812024
Limitations of Face Image Generation · AAAI 2024
Machine learning › Generative modeling › diffusion model
text-to-image generation
0.812024
Limitations of Face Image Generation · AAAI 2024
Privacy and data protection › facial privacy protection
face obfuscation
0.712023
Fairness Properties of Face Recognition and Obfuscation Systems · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › fairness
demographic disparities
0.212024
Limitations of Face Image Generation · AAAI 2024
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
fairness
0.212024
Limitations of Face Image Generation · AAAI 2024
Computer vision › Face, body and person analysis
face recognition
0.212023
Fairness Properties of Face Recognition and Obfuscation Systems · USENIX Security Symposium 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

user study · 0.8embedding-based metrics · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Limitations of Face Image Generation
abstract
Text-to-image diffusion models have achieved widespread popularity due to their unprecedented image generation capability. In particular, their ability to synthesize and modify human faces has spurred research into using generated face images in both training data augmentation and model performance assessments. In this paper, we study the efficacy and shortcomings of generative models in the context of face generation. Utilizing a combination of qualitative and quantitative measures, including embedding-based metrics and user studies, we present a framework to audit the characteristics of generated faces conditioned on a set of social attributes. We applied our framework on faces generated through state-of-the-art text-to-image diffusion models. We identify several limitations of face image generation that include faithfulness to the text prompt, demographic disparities, and distributional shifts. Furthermore, we present an analytical model that provides insights into how training data selection contributes to the performance of generative models. Our survey data and analytics code can be found online at https://github.com/wi-pi/Limitations_of_Face_Generation
Harrison Rosenberg, Shimaa Ahmed, Guruprasad V. Ramesh, Kassem Fawaz, Ramya Korlakai Vinayak
AAAI1
2023 Fairness Properties of Face Recognition and Obfuscation Systems
Harrison Rosenberg, Brian Tang, Kassem Fawaz, Somesh Jha
USENIX Security Symposium1
2019 A Geometric Perspective on the Transferability of Adversarial Directions
abstract
State-of-the-art machine learning models frequently misclassify inputs that have been perturbed in an adversarial manner. Adversarial perturbations generated for a given input and a specific classifier often seem to be effective on other inputs and even different classifiers. In other words, adversarial perturbations seem to transfer between different inputs, models, and even different neural network architectures. In this work, we show that in the context of linear classifiers and two-layer ReLU networks, there provably exist directions that give rise to adversarial perturbations for many classifiers and data points simultaneously. We show that these “transferable adversarial directions” are guaranteed to exist for linear separators of a given set, and will exist with high probability for linear classifiers trained on independent sets drawn from the same distribution. We extend our results to large classes of two-layer ReLU networks. We further show that adversarial directions for ReLU networks transfer to linear classifiers while the reverse need not hold, suggesting that adversarial perturbations for more complex models are more likely to transfer to other classifiers. We validate our findings empirically, even for deeper ReLU networks.
Zachary Charles, Harrison Rosenberg, Dimitris S. Papailiopoulos
AISTATS2