We enhance auto-regressive language models by conditioning on document chunks retrieved from a large corpus, based on local similarity with preceding tokens. With a 2 trillion token database, our Retrieval-Enhanced Transformer (RETRO) obtains comparable performance to GPT-3 and Jurassic-1 on the Pile, despite using 25{\texttimes} fewer parameters. After fine-tuning, RETRO performance translates to downstream knowledge-intensive tasks such as question answering. RETRO combines a frozen Bert retriever, a differentiable encoder and a chunked cross-attention mechanism to predict tokens based on an order of magnitude more data than what is typically consumed during training. We typically train RETRO from scratch, yet can also rapidly RETROfit pre-trained transformers with retrieval and still achieve good performance. Our work opens up new avenues for improving language models through explicit memory at unprecedented scale.

Rémi Leblond, Jean-Baptiste Alayrac, Laurent Sifre, Miruna Pislar, Lespiau Jean-Baptiste, Ioannis Antonoglou, Karen Simonyan, Oriol Vinyals. Proceedings of the 2021 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing. 2021.

In this paper we investigate the Follow the Regularized Leader dynamics in sequential imperfect information games (IIG). We generalize existing results of Poincar{é} recurrence from normal-form games to zero-sum two-player imperfect information games and other sequential game settings. We then investigate how adapting the reward (by adding a regularization term) of the game can give strong convergence guarantees in monotone games. We continue by showing how this reward adaptation technique can be leveraged to build algorithms that converge exactly to the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show how these insights can be directly used to build state-of-the-art model-free algorithms for zero-sum two-player Imperfect Information Games (IIG).

We introduce and analyze a class of algorithms, called Mirror Ascent against an Improved Opponent (MAIO), for computing Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games, both in normal form and in sequential form with imperfect information. These algorithms update the policy of each player with a mirror-ascent step to maximize the value of playing against an improved opponent. An improved opponent can be a best response, a greedy policy, a policy improved by policy gradient, or by any other reinforcement learning or search techniques. We establish a convergence result of the last iterate to the set of Nash equilibria and show that the speed of convergence depends on the amount of improvement offered by these improved policies. In addition, we show that under some condition, if we use a best response as improved policy, then an exponential convergence rate is achieved.

In this paper, we present exploitability descent, a new algorithm to compute approximate equilibria in two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with imperfect information, by direct policy optimization against worst-case opponents. We prove that when following this optimization, the exploitability of a player's strategy converges asymptotically to zero, and hence when both players employ this optimization, the joint policies converge to a Nash equilibrium. Unlike fictitious play (XFP) and counterfactual regret minimization (CFR), our convergence result pertains to the policies being optimized rather than the average policies. Our experiments demonstrate convergence rates comparable to XFP and CFR in four benchmark games in the tabular case. Using function approximation, we find that our algorithm outperforms the tabular version in two of the games, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first such result in imperfect information games among this class of algorithms.