Tiny devices have become ubiquitous in people's daily lives. Their applications dictate tight energy budgets, but also require reasonable performance to meet user expectations. To this end, the hardware of tiny devices has been highly optimized, making further optimizations difficult. In this work, we identify a missed opportunity: the bitwidth selection of program variables. Today's compilers directly translate the bitwidth specified in the source code to the binary. However, we observe that most variables do not utilize the full bitwidth specified in the source code for the majority of execution. To leverage this opportunity, we propose BitSpec : a system that performs fine-grained speculation on the bitwidth of program variables. BitSpec is implemented as a compiler-architecture co-design, where the compiler transparently reduces the bitwidth of program variables to their expected needs and the hardware monitors speculative variables, reporting misspeculation to the software, which re-executes at the original bitwidth, ensuring correctness. BitSpec reduces energy consumption by 9.9% on average, up to 28.2% .

Cyclic logic encryption is newly proposed in the area of hardware security. It introduces feedback cycles into the circuit to defeat existing logic decryption techniques. To ensure that the circuit is acyclic under the correct key, CycSAT is developed to add the acyclic condition as a CNF formula to the SAT-based attack. However, we found that it is impossible to capture all cycles in any graph with any set of feedback signals as done in the CycSAT algorithm. In this paper, we propose a behavioral SAT-based attack called BeSAT. Be-SAT observes the behavior of the encrypted circuit on top of the structural analysis, so the stateful and oscillatory keys missed by CycSAT can still be blocked. The experimental results show that BeSAT successfully overcomes the drawback of CycSAT.