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Elliott Zaresky-Williams

dblp:236/4962 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0003-4023-3880ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Malware analysis · 60% Privacy and data protection · 26% Security and privacy of machine learning · 13%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Trustworthy machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Malware analysis › malware detection evasion
evasive malware
0.912025
EMBER2024 - A Benchmark Dataset for Holistic Evaluation of Malware Classifiers · KDD (2) 2025
Malware analysis
malware classification
0.912025
EMBER2024 - A Benchmark Dataset for Holistic Evaluation of Malware Classifiers · KDD (2) 2025
Malware analysis
malware detection
0.912025
EMBER2024 - A Benchmark Dataset for Holistic Evaluation of Malware Classifiers · KDD (2) 2025
Privacy and data protection
differential privacy
0.612022
A General Framework for Auditing Differentially Private Machine Learning · NeurIPS 2022
Security and privacy of machine learning
membership inference
0.612022
A General Framework for Auditing Differentially Private Machine Learning · NeurIPS 2022
Privacy and data protection › differential privacy
privacy auditing
0.612022
A General Framework for Auditing Differentially Private Machine Learning · NeurIPS 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

statistical auditing · 1.1privacy search · 1.1influence-based poisoning attacks · 1.1machine learning · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 EMBER2024 - A Benchmark Dataset for Holistic Evaluation of Malware Classifiers
abstract
A lack of accessible data has historically restricted malware analysis research, and practitioners have relied heavily on datasets provided by industry sources to advance. Existing public datasets are limited by narrow scope - most include files targeting a single platform, have labels supporting just one type of malware classification task, and make no effort to capture the evasive files that make malware detection difficult in practice. We present EMBER2024, a new dataset that enables holistic evaluation of malware classifiers. Created in collaboration with the authors of EMBER2017 and EMBER2018, the EMBER2024 dataset includes hashes, metadata, feature vectors, and labels for more than 3.2 million files from six file formats. Our dataset supports the training and evaluation of machine learning models on seven malware classification tasks, including malware detection, malware family classification, and malware behavior identification. EMBER2024 is the first to include a collection of malicious files that initially went undetected by a set of antivirus products, creating a ''challenge'' set to assess classifier performance against evasive malware. This work also introduces EMBER feature version 3, with added support for several new feature types. We are releasing the EMBER2024 dataset to promote reproducibility and empower researchers in the pursuit of new malware research topics.
Robert J. Joyce, Gideon Miller, Phil Roth 0002, Richard Zak, Elliott Zaresky-Williams, Hyrum S. Anderson, Edward Raff, James Holt
KDD (2)5
2022 A General Framework for Auditing Differentially Private Machine Learning
abstract
We present a framework to statistically audit the privacy guarantee conferred by a differentially private machine learner in practice. While previous works have taken steps toward evaluating privacy loss through poisoning attacks or membership inference, they have been tailored to specific models or have demonstrated low statistical power. Our work develops a general methodology to empirically evaluate the privacy of differentially private machine learning implementations, combining improved privacy search and verification methods with a toolkit of influence-based poisoning attacks. We demonstrate significantly improved auditing power over previous approaches on a variety of models including logistic regression, Naive Bayes, and random forest. Our method can be used to detect privacy violations due to implementation errors or misuse. When violations are not present, it can aid in understanding the amount of information that can be leaked from a given dataset, algorithm, and privacy specification.
Fred Lu, Joseph Munoz, Maya Fuchs, Tyler LeBlond, Elliott Zaresky-Williams, Edward Raff, Francis Ferraro, Brian Testa
NeurIPS5