Hrishikesh Khandeparkar

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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none

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Theory of computation · 2 · 1 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Nontruthful Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions
abstract
We provide the first separation in the approximation guarantee achievable by truthful and nontruthful algorithms for combinatorial auctions with polynomial communication. Specifically, we prove that any truthful mechanism guaranteeing a $(\nicefrac{3}{4}-\nicefrac{1}{240}+\varepsilon)$-approximation for two buyers with XOS valuations over $m$ items requires $\exp(\Omega(\varepsilon^2 \cdot m))$ communication, whereas a nontruthful algorithm by Dobzinski and Schapira [ Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), SIAM, 2006, pp. 1064--1073] and Feige [ SIAM J. Comput., 39 (2009), pp. 122--142] is already known to achieve a $\nicefrac{3}{4}$-approximation in ${poly}(m)$ communication. We obtain our separation by proving that any simultaneous protocol (not necessarily truthful) which guarantees a $(\nicefrac{3}{4}-\nicefrac{1}{240}+\varepsilon)$-approximation requires communication $\exp(\Omega(\varepsilon^2 \cdot m))$. The taxation complexity framework of Dobzinski [ Proceedings of the 57th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), IEEE, 2016, pp. 209--218] extends this lower bound to all truthful mechanisms (including interactive truthful mechanisms).
Sepehr Assadi, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, S. Matthew Weinberg
SIAM J. Comput.2
2020 Separating the communication complexity of truthful and non-truthful combinatorial auctions
abstract
We prove the first separation in the approximation guarantee achievable by truthful and non-truthful combinatorial auctions with polynomial communication. Specifically, we prove that any truthful auction guaranteeing a (34−1240+є)-approximation for two buyers with XOS valuations over m items requires exp(Ω(ε2 · m)) communication whereas a non-truthful auction by Feige [J. Comput. 2009] is already known to achieve a 34-approximation in (m) communication.
Sepehr Assadi, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, S. Matthew Weinberg
STOC2
2019 A Theoretical Analysis of Contrastive Unsupervised Representation Learning
abstract
Recent empirical works have successfully used unlabeled data to learn feature representations that are broadly useful in downstream classification tasks. Several of these methods are reminiscent of the well-known word2vec embedding algorithm: leveraging availability of pairs of semantically “similar" data points and “negative samples," the learner forces the inner product of representations of similar pairs with each other to be higher on average than with negative samples. The current paper uses the term contrastive learning for such algorithms and presents a theoretical framework for analyzing them by introducing latent classes and hypothesizing that semantically similar points are sampled from the same latent class. This framework allows us to show provable guarantees on the performance of the learned representations on the average classification task that is comprised of a subset of the same set of latent classes. Our generalization bound also shows that learned representations can reduce (labeled) sample complexity on downstream tasks. We conduct controlled experiments in both the text and image domains to support the theory.
Nikunj Saunshi, Orestis Plevrakis, Sanjeev Arora, Mikhail Khodak, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar
ICML5