Payment Channel Hub (PCH) is a promising solution to the scalability issue of first-generation blockchains or cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. It supports off-chain payments between a sender and a receiver through an intermediary (called the tumbler). Relationship anonymity and value privacy are desirable features of privacy-preserving PCHs, which prevent the tumbler from identifying the sender and receiver pairs as well as the payment amounts. To our knowledge, all existing Bitcoin-compatible PCH constructions that guarantee relationship anonymity allow only a (predefined) fixed payment amount. Thus, to achieve payments with different amounts, they would require either multiple PCH systems or running one PCH system multiple times. Neither of these solutions would be deemed practical.In this paper, we propose the first Bitcoin-compatible PCH that achieves relationship anonymity and supports variable amounts for payment. To achieve this, we have several layers of technical constructions, each of which could be of independent interest to the community. First, we propose BlindChannel, a novel bi-directional payment channel protocol for privacy-preserving payments, where one of the channel parties is unable to see the channel balances. Then, we further propose BlindHub, a three-party (sender, tumbler, receiver) protocol for private conditional payments, where the tumbler pays to the receiver only if the sender pays to the tumbler. The appealing additional feature of BlindHub is that the tumbler cannot link the sender and the receiver while supporting a variable payment amount. To construct BlindHub, we also introduce two new cryptographic primitives as building blocks, namely Blind Adaptor Signature (BAS), and Flexible Blind Conditional Signature (FBCS). BAS is an adaptor signature protocol built on top of a blind signature scheme. FBCS is a new cryptographic notion enabling us to provide an atomic and privacy-preserving PCH. Lastly, we instantiate both BlindChannel and BlindHub protocols and present implementation results to show their practicality.

Payment channels have been a promising solution to blockchain scalability. While payment channels for script-empowered blockchains (such as Bitcoin and Ethereum) have been well studied, developing payment channels for scriptless blockchains (such as Monero) is considered challenging. In particular, nabling bidirectional payment on scriptless blockchains remains an open challenge.

We propose MoNet, the first bi-directional payment channel network with unlimited lifetime for Monero. It is fully compatible with Monero without requiring any modification of the current Monero blockchain. MoNet preserves transaction fungibility, i.e., transactions over MoNet and Monero are indistinguishable, and guarantees anonymity of Monero and MoNet users by avoiding any potential privacy leakage introduced by the new payment channel network. We also propose a new crypto primitive, named Verifiable Consecutive One-way Function (VCOF). It allows one to generate a sequence of statement-witness pairs in a consecutive and verifiable way, and these statement-witness pairs are one-way, namely it is easy to compute a statement-witness pair by knowing any of the pre-generated pairs, but hard in an opposite flow. By using VCOF, a signer can produce a series of consecutive adaptor signatures CAS. We further propose the generic construction of consecutive adaptor signature as an important building block of MoNet. We develop a proof-of-concept implementation for MoNet, and our evaluation shows that MoNet can reach the same transaction throughput as Lightning Network, the payment channel network for Bitcoin. Moreover, we provide a security analysis of MoNet under the Universal Composable (UC) security framework.

Honest majority is the key security assumption of Proof-of-Work (PoW) based blockchains. However, the recent 51% attacks render this assumption unrealistic in practice. In this paper, we challenge this assumption against rational miners in the PoW-based blockchains in reality. In particular, we show that the current incentive mechanism may encourage rational miners to launch 51% attacks in two cases. In the first case, we consider a miner of a stronger blockchain launches 51% attacks on a weaker blockchain, where the two blockchains share the same mining algorithm. In the second case, we consider a miner rents mining power from cloud mining services to launch 51% attacks. As 51% attacks lead to double-spending, the miner can profit from these two attacks. If such double-spending is more profitable than mining, miners are more intended to launch 51% attacks rather than mine honestly.