Jide S. Edu

dblp:237/9757 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
3as first author
4since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0003-1325-8740ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Computer networks · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Voice App Developer Experiences with Alexa and Google Assistant: Juggling Risks, Liability, and Security
William Seymour, Noura Abdi, Kopo M. Ramokapane, Jide S. Edu, Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Jose M. Such
USENIX Security Symposium4
2023 SkillVet: Automated Traceability Analysis of Amazon Alexa Skills
abstract
Skills, are essential components in Smart Personal Assistants (SPA). The number of skills has grown rapidly, dominated by a changing environment that has no clear business model. Skills can access personal information and this may pose a risk to users. However, there is little information about how this ecosystem works, let alone the tools that can facilitate its study. In this article, we present the largest systematic measurement of the Amazon Alexa skill ecosystem to date. We study developers’ practices in this ecosystem, including how they collect and justify the need for sensitive information, by designing a methodology to identify over-privileged skills with broken privacy policies. We collect 199,295 Alexa skills and uncover that around 43% of the skills (and 50% of the developers) that request these permissions follow bad privacy practices, including (partially) broken data permissions traceability. In order to perform this kind of analysis at scale, we presentSkillVetthat leverages machine learning and natural language processing techniques, and generates high-accuracy prediction sets. We report several concerning practices, including how developers can bypass Alexa's permission system through account linking and conversational skills, and offer recommendations on how to improve transparency, privacy and security. Resulting from the responsible disclosure we did, 13% of the reported issues no longer pose a threat at submission time.
Jide S. Edu, Xavier Ferrer Aran, Jose M. Such, Guillermo Suarez-Tangil
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.1
2022 Exploring the security and privacy risks of chatbots in messaging services
abstract
The unprecedented adoption of messaging platforms for work and recreation has made it an attractive target for malicious actors. In this context, third-party apps (so-called chatbots) offer a variety of attractive functionalities that support the experience in large channels. Unfortunately, under the current permission and deployment models, chatbots in messaging systems could steal information from channels without the victim's awareness. In this paper, we propose a methodology that incorporates static and dynamic analysis for automatically assessing security and privacy issues in messaging platform chatbots. We also provide preliminary findings from the popular Discord platform that highlight the risks that chatbots pose to users. Unlike other popular platforms like Slack or MS Teams, Discord does not implement user-permission checks---a task entrusted to third-party developers. Among others, we find that 55% of chatbots from a leading Discord repository request the "administrator" permission, and only 4.35% of chatbots with permissions actually provide a privacy policy.
Jide S. Edu, Cliona Mulligan, Fabio Pierazzi, Iasonas Polakis, Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Jose M. Such
IMC1
2022 Measuring Alexa Skill Privacy Practices across Three Years
abstract
Smart Voice Assistants are transforming the way users interact with technology. This transformation is mostly fostered by the proliferation of voice-driven applications (called skills) offered by third-party developers through an online market. We see how the number of skills has rocked in recent years, with the Amazon Alexa skill ecosystem growing from just 135 skills in early 2016 to about 125k skills in early 2021. Along with the growth in skills, there is increasing concern over the risks that third-party skills pose to users’ privacy. In this paper, we perform a systematic and longitudinal measurement study of the Alexa marketplace. We shed light on how this ecosystem evolves using data collected across three years between 2019 and 2021. We demystify developers’ data disclosure practices and present an overview of the third-party ecosystem. We see how the research community continuously contribute to the market’s sanitation, but the Amazon vetting process still requires significant improvement. We perform a responsible disclosure process reporting 675 skills with privacy issues to both Amazon and all affected developers, out of which 246 skills suffer from important issues (i.e., broken traceability). We see that 107 out of the 246 (43.5%) skills continue to display broken traceability almost one year after being reported. As a result, the overall state of affairs has improved in the ecosystem over the years. Yet, newly submitted skills and unresolved known issues pose an endemic risk.
Jide S. Edu, Xavier Ferrer Aran, Jose M. Such, Guillermo Suarez-Tangil
WWW1