We introduce the concept of "universal" password model—a password model that, once pre-trained, can automatically adapt its guessing strategy based on the target system. To achieve this, the model does not need to access any plaintext passwords from the target credentials. Instead, it exploits users’ auxiliary information, such as email addresses, as a proxy signal to predict the underlying password distribution.Specifically, the model uses deep learning to capture the correlation between the auxiliary data of a group of users (e.g., users of a web application) and their passwords. It then exploits those patterns to create a tailored password model for the target system at inference time. No further training steps, targeted data collection, or prior knowledge of the community’s password distribution is required.Besides improving over current password strength estimation techniques, the model enables any end-user (e.g., system administrators) to autonomously generate tailored password models for their systems without the often unworkable requirements of collecting suitable training data and fitting the underlying machine learning model. Ultimately, our framework enables the democratization of well-calibrated password models to the community, addressing a major challenge in the deployment of password security solutions at scale.

Credential tweaking attacks use breached passwords to generate semantically similar passwords and gain access to victims’ services. These attacks sidestep the first generation of compromised credential checking (C3) services. The second generation of compromised credential checking services, called “Might I Get Pwned” (MIGP), is a privacy-preserving protocol that defends against credential tweaking attacks by allowing clients to query whether a password or a semantically similar variation is present in the server’s compromised credentials dataset. The desired privacy requirements include not revealing the user’s entered password to the server and ensuring that no compromised credentials are disclosed to the client.In this work, we formalize the cryptographic leakage of the MIGP protocol and perform a security analysis to assess its impact on the credentials held by the server. We focus on how this leakage aids breach extraction attacks, where an honest-but-curious client interacts with the server to extract information about the stored credentials. Furthermore, we discover additional leakage that arises from the implementation of Cloudflare’s deployment of MIGP. We evaluate how the discovered leakage affects the guessing capability of an attacker in relation to breach extraction attacks. Finally, we propose MIGP 2.0, a new iteration of the MIGP protocol designed to minimize data leakage and prevent the introduced attacks.

In this work, we carry out the first, in-depth, privacy analysis of Decentralized Learning—a collaborative machine learning framework aimed at addressing the main limitations of federated learning. We introduce a suite of novel attacks for both passive and active decentralized adversaries. We demonstrate that, contrary to what is claimed by decentralized learning proposers, decentralized learning does not offer any security advantage over federated learning. Rather, it increases the attack surface enabling any user in the system to perform privacy attacks such as gradient inversion, and even gain full control over honest users’ local model. We also show that, given the state of the art in protections, privacy-preserving configurations of decentralized learning require fully connected networks, losing any practical advantage over the federated setup and therefore completely defeating the objective of the decentralized approach.

Secure aggregation is a cryptographic protocol that securely computes the aggregation of its inputs. It is pivotal in keeping model updates private in federated learning. Indeed, the use of secure aggregation prevents the server from learning the value and the source of the individual model updates provided by the users, hampering inference and data attribution attacks.

We investigate the security of split learning---a novel collaborative machine learning framework that enables peak performance by requiring minimal resource consumption. In the present paper, we expose vulnerabilities of the protocol and demonstrate its inherent insecurity by introducing general attack strategies targeting the reconstruction of clients' private training sets. More prominently, we show that a malicious server can actively hijack the learning process of the distributed model and bring it into an insecure state that enables inference attacks on clients' data. We implement different adaptations of the attack and test them on various datasets as well as within realistic threat scenarios. We demonstrate that our attack can overcome recently proposed defensive techniques aimed at enhancing the security of the split learning protocol. Finally, we also illustrate the protocol's insecurity against malicious clients by extending previously devised attacks for Federated Learning.

Learning useful representations from unstructured data is one of the core challenges, as well as a driving force, of modern data-driven approaches. Deep learning has demonstrated the broad advantages of learning and harnessing such representations.In this paper, we introduce a deep generative model representation learning approach for password guessing. We show that an abstract password representation naturally offers compelling and versatile properties that open new directions in the extensively studied, and yet presently active, password guessing field. These properties can establish novel password generation techniques that are neither feasible nor practical with the existing probabilistic and non-probabilistic approaches. Based on these properties, we introduce: (1) A general framework for conditional password guessing that can generate passwords with arbitrary biases; and (2) an Expectation Maximization-inspired framework that can dynamically adapt the estimated password distribution to match the distribution of the attacked password set.

We describe main issues and design principles of an efficient implementation, tailored to recent generations of Nvidia Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), of an Algebraic Multigrid (AMG) preconditioner previously proposed by one of the authors and already available in the open-source package BootCMatch: Bootstrap algebraic multigrid based on Compatible weighted Matching for standard CPU. The AMG method relies on a new approach for coarsening sparse symmetric positive definite (spd) matrices, named "coarsening based on compatible weighted matching". It exploits maximum weight matching in the adjacency graph of the sparse matrix, driven by the principle of compatible relaxation, providing a suitable aggregation of unknowns which goes beyond the limits of the usual heuristics applied in the current methods. We adopt an approximate solution of the maximum weight matching problem, based on a recently proposed parallel algorithm, referred as the Suitor algorithm, and show that it allow us to obtain good quality coarse matrices for our AMG on GPUs. We exploit inherent parallelism of modern GPUs in all the kernels involving sparse matrix computations both for the setup of the preconditioner and for its application in a Krylov solver, outperforming preconditioners available in Nvidia AmgX library. We report results about a large set of linear systems arising from discretization of scalar and vector partial differential equations (PDEs).