In the ever-evolving blockchain ecosystem, decentralized exchanges (DEXs) have seen significant growth, which, however, has also brought challenges of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). DEXs offer a decentralized platform for cryptocurrency trading. Such trading mechanisms primarily include Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) and batch auctions.

Public goods projects, such as open-source technology, are essential for the blockchain ecosystem's growth. However, funding these projects effectively remains a critical issue within the ecosystem. Currently, the funding protocols for blockchain public goods lack professionalism and fail to learn from past experiences. To address this challenge, our research introduces a human oracle protocol involving public goods projects, experts, and funders. In our approach, funders contribute investments to a funding pool, while experts offer investment advice based on their expertise in public goods projects. The oracle's decisions on funding support are influenced by the reputations of the experts. Experts earn or lose reputation based on how well their project implementations align with their advice, with successful investments leading to higher reputations. Our oracle is designed to adapt to changing circumstances, such as experts exiting or entering the decision-making process. We also introduce a regret bound to gauge the oracle's effectiveness. Theoretically, we establish an upper regret bound for both static and dynamic models and demonstrate its closeness to an asymptotically equal lower bound. Empirically, we implement our protocol on a test chain and show that our oracle's investment decisions closely mirror optimal investments in hindsight.

We consider a hierarchical structure of a permissioned blockchain with three types of participant: providers, collectors, and governors. Providers forward transactions to collectors; collectors upload received transactions to governors after verifying and labeling them; and governors validate a portion of the labeled transactions they receive, pack valid transactions into a block, and append the block to the ledger. This model has various fields of application including data collection from the Internet-of-Things and second-hand markets. Our main contribution is to propose a reputation-based protocol to help governors evaluate the reliability of collectors. Specifically, given a transaction, each governor runs a softmax-based function to calculate a probability for each collector that sent and labeled this transaction. The probabilities, calculated using collectors’ reputations as inputs, represent the likelihood of the lead governor selecting the labeled transaction from collectors to consider for further validation. After the lead governor verifies a transaction, all collectors’ reputations are updated in line with the agreement of their labeling and the validity of the transaction as found by the lead governor. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that our protocol can significantly reduce governors’ verification workloads while maintaining firm liveness and high incentives.

Nowadays, sharding is deemed a promising way to save traditional blockchain protocols from their low scalability. However, such a technique also brings several potential risks and a huge communication burden. An improper design may give rise to an inconsistent state among different committees. Further, the communication burden arising from cross-shard transactions, unfortunately, reduces the system's performance. In this paper, we first summarize five essential issues that all sharding blockchain designers face. For each issue, we discuss its key challenge and propose our suggested solutions. In order to break the performance bottlenecks, we design a committee structure and propose a reputation mechanism for selecting leaders. The term reputation in our design reflects each node's honest computation resources. In addition, we present a recovery procedure in case the leader is malicious. Theoretically, we prove that the system is robust under our design. Further simulation results also support this. In addition, the results show that selecting leaders by reputation can dramatically improve the system's performance.

Public goods projects, including open source technology, client development, and blockchain knowledge education, play an important role in the flourishing blockchain ecosystem. Accordingly, decision making for public goods funding is a key issue in the studies of the blockchain ecosystem. This work develops a human oracle protocol approach, involved with public goods projects, experts, and funders, as a solution to the public goods investment problem on blockchain. In our human oracle, funders contribute their investments, which are stored in a funding pool. Experts provide investment advice on public goods projects based on their experience. Decisions made by the human oracle on the amount of support from the funding pool are based on experts’ reputation. The reputation of each expert is updated by the performance of the project’s implementation in comparison to her advice. That is, better investment performance brings a higher reputation. Besides being applied to static model, our human oracle can also be extended to accommodate dynamic settings, in which the experts might leave or join the decision-making process. We introduce a regret bound to measure the effectiveness of our human oracle. Theoretically, we prove an upper regret bound for both static and dynamic models, and prove its tightness with an asymptotically equal lower bound. Empirically, we show that our oracle’s investment decision is close to the optimal investment in hindsight.

Blockchain protocols require nodes to verify all received transactions before forwarding them. However, massive spam transactions cause the participants in blockchain systems to consume many resources in verifying and propagating transactions. This paper proposes a reputation-based mechanism to increase the efficiency of processing transactions by considering the reputations of the sending nodes. Reputations are in turn adjusted based on the quality of transaction processing. Our proposed reputation-based mechanism offers three main contributions. First, we modify the verification strategy so that nodes set a probability of verifying a received transaction considering the likelihood of it being spam: transactions from a node with a low reputation have a high probability of being verified. Second, we optimize the transaction forwarding protocol to reduce propagation delay by prioritizing forwarding transactions to reputable receivers. Third, we design a data request protocol that provides alternative data exchange methods for nodes with different reputations. A series of simulations demonstrate the performance of our reputation-based mechanism.

Transportation sharing in goods (bike sharing), distinguished from service sharing (ride), has been one of the most active sectors of the sharing economy recently. Such a business model, facilitated by the mobile Internet and cloud computing platforms, seeks supplies in vehicles on demands at matched times and rental locations. The success has attracted more competitors into it, counter-effectively resulted in redundancies in total supplies, reducing social efficiency. In this work, we take electric car sharing as an example to propose a business solution to deal with such a dilemma. Our main idea is to set up a joint venture to provide shared electric cars for different competitors to operate on. These competitors provide their differentiated service for their customers through their own electric mobile Apps, while reducing the infrastructure cost through the joint venture. We study this business model as a two-stage Stackelberg game to analyze the optimal pricing and the sharing scheme of the leader (joint venture) and its followers (car sharing operators). Our model places the sharing of the electric vehicles in two tiers: One among the customers (to reduce the cost of time sharing) and the other among the operators (to reduce the cost of space sharing).

Permissioned blockchains take more reliability on participants than permissionless ones. In this poster, we focus on a hierarchical scenario of permissioned blockchains, which includes three types of participants: providers, collectors, and governors. Such a scenario has many applications in the field of IoT data collection, horizontal strategic alliances, etc. Our object is to reduce the cost of the governor's transaction verification. For this purpose, we propose a reputation protocol to help the governor measure the reliability of collectors. Based on the measurement of collectors' reputations, governors can pack high-quality transactions from reliable collectors into blocks, and thus the cost of verifying transactions can be decreased effectively. Through theoretical analysis, our protocol dramatically reduces the verification loss of governors.

For a blockchain system, the network layer is of great importance for scalability and security. The critical task of blockchain networks is to provide a fast delivery of data. A rapid spread accelerates the transactions to be included into blocks and then confirmed. Existing blockchain systems, especially the cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, take a simple strategy that requires relay nodes to verify all received transactions and then forward valid ones to all outbound neighbors. Unfortunately, this design is inefficient and slows down the transmission of transactions. In this paper, we introduce the concept of reputation and propose a novel relay protocol, RepuLay, to accelerate the transmission of transactions across the network. First of all, we design a reputation mechanism to help each node identify the unreliable and inactive neighbors. In this mechanism, two values are used to define one’s reputation. Each node keeps a local list of reputations of all its neighbors. Based on the reputation mechanism, RepuLay adopts probabilistic strategies to process transactions. More specifically, after receiving a transaction, the relay node verifies it with a certain probability, which is deduced from the first value of sender’s reputation. Next, the valid and unverified transactions are forwarded to some neighbors. Each neighbor has some probability to be chosen as a receiver and the probability is determined by its second value of reputation. Theoretically, we prove that our design can guarantee the quality of relayed transactions. Further simulation results confirm that RepuLay effectively accelerates the spread of transactions and optimize the usage of nodes’ bandwidths.

Traditional public distributed ledgers have not been able to scale-out well and work efficiently. Sharding is deemed as a promising way to solve this problem. By partitioning all nodes into small committees and letting them work in parallel, we can significantly lower the amount of communication and computation, reduce the overhead on each node’s storage, as well as enhance the throughput of the distributed ledger. Existing sharding-based protocols still suffer from several serious drawbacks. The first thing is that all non-faulty nodes must connect well with each other, which demands a huge number of communication channels in the network. Moreover, previous protocols have faced great loss in efficiency in the case where the honesty of each committee’s leader is in question. At the same time, no explicit incentive is provided for nodes to actively participate in the protocol.We present CycLedger, a scalable and secure parallel protocol for distributed ledger via sharding. Our protocol selects a leader and a partial set for each committee, who are in charge of maintaining intra-shard consensus and communicating with other committees, to reduce the amortized complexity of communication, computation, and storage on all nodes. We introduce a novel semi-commitment scheme between committees and a recovery procedure to prevent the system from crashing even when leaders of committees are malicious. To add incentive for the network, we use the concept of reputation, which measures each node’s trusty computing power. As nodes with a higher reputation receive more rewards, there is an encouragement for nodes with strong computing ability to work honestly to gain reputation. In this way, we strike out a new path to establish scalability, security, and incentive for the sharding-based distributed ledger.

As one of the fastest-growing applications in the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network, the development of blockchain technology is accompanied by different attacks. Those include whitewashing, free-riding, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, particularly because of features such as anonymity, distributed, permissionless in the blockchain network. One popular of them is spam transactions. Although the blockchain protocol requires each node to verify all received transactions, many nodes choose to forward transactions without verification to conserve their computational power, as there is no punishment for such a shirking. And it makes the blockchain vulnerable to the spreading of spam transactions over the network and creates extra burdens for all nodes in the network. We propose a reputation mechanism for the blockchain system to tackle this problem: Each node will locally compute reputations of its neighbors, and decide the probability to verify a received transaction based on the reputation value of the transaction sender. In turn, its neighbors will have an incentive to conduct verification to keep its reputation high. Subsequently, spam transactions can be blocked before reaching the miners. We have conducted a series of simulations, which clearly demonstrate the advantage of our reputation mechanism.