Alesia Chernikova

dblp:239/4953 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2022
0000-0001-7166-6051ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 Cyber Network Resilience Against Self-Propagating Malware Attacks
Alesia Chernikova, Nicolò Gozzi, Simona Boboila, Priyanka Angadi, John Loughner, Matthew Wilden, Nicola Perra, Tina Eliassi-Rad, Alina Oprea
ESORICS (1)1
2022 FENCE: Feasible Evasion Attacks on Neural Networks in Constrained Environments
abstract
As advances in Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) demonstrate unprecedented levels of performance in many critical applications, their vulnerability to attacks is still an open question. We consider evasion attacks at testing time against Deep Learning in constrained environments, in which dependencies between features need to be satisfied. These situations may arise naturally in tabular data or may be the result of feature engineering in specific application domains, such as threat detection in cyber security. We propose a general iterative gradient-based framework called FENCE for crafting evasion attacks that take into consideration the specifics of constrained domains and application requirements. We apply it against Feed-Forward Neural Networks trained for two cyber security applications: network traffic botnet classification and malicious domain classification, to generate feasible adversarial examples. We extensively evaluate the success rate and performance of our attacks, compare their improvement over several baselines, and analyze factors that impact the attack success rate, including the optimization objective and the data imbalance. We show that with minimal effort (e.g., generating 12 additional network connections), an attacker can change the model’s prediction from the Malicious class to Benign and evade the classifier. We show that models trained on datasets with higher imbalance are more vulnerable to our FENCE attacks. Finally, we demonstrate the potential of performing adversarial training in constrained domains to increase the model resilience against these evasion attacks.
Alesia Chernikova, Alina Oprea
ACM Trans. Priv. Secur.1