Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Haolin Wu 0001
dblp:240/0013-1
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0007-0493-5013ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
2 papers |
Machine translation · 50% Trustworthy machine learning · 50% | |
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Natural language and speech › Machine translation
speech translation |
1.9 | 2 | 2026 | Exploring Security Vulnerabilities in Multilingual Speech Translation Systems via Deceptive Inputs · IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 2026 When Translators Refuse to Translate: A Novel Attack to Speech Translation Systems · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial robustness |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Exploring Security Vulnerabilities in Multilingual Speech Translation Systems via Deceptive Inputs · IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 2026 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Exploring Security Vulnerabilities in Multilingual Speech Translation Systems via Deceptive Inputs · IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 2026 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | When Translators Refuse to Translate: A Novel Attack to Speech Translation Systems · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
over-the-air attack · 2.0music generation · 2.0adversarial attack · 1.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | CLAD: Robust audio deepfake detection against manipulation attacks with contrastive learning
Haolin Wu 0001, Jing Chen 0003, Ruiying Du, Cong Wu 0003, Kun He 0008, Xingcan Shang, Hao Ren 0001, Guowen Xu |
Knowl. Based Syst. | 1 |
| 2026 | Exploring Security Vulnerabilities in Multilingual Speech Translation Systems via Deceptive InputsabstractAs speech translation (ST) systems become increasingly prevalent, understanding their vulnerabilities is crucial for ensuring robust and reliable communication. However, limited work has explored this issue in depth. This paper explores methods of compromising these systems through imperceptible audio manipulations. Specifically, we present two approaches: (1) adapting perturbation-based techniques used for automatic speech recognition (ASR) attacks to the ST context, making our work the first to apply this approach to ST, and (2) proposing a novel music generation-based method to guide targeted translation, while also conducting more practical over-the-air attacks in the physical world. Our experiments reveal that carefully crafted audio perturbations can mislead translation models to produce targeted, harmful outputs, while adversarial music achieve this goal more covertly, exploiting the natural imperceptibility of music. These attacks have proven effective across multiple languages and translation models, highlighting a systemic vulnerability in current ST architectures. Beyond immediate security concerns, our findings highlight broader challenges in the robustness and interpretability of neural speech systems. Chang Liu 0089, Haolin Wu 0001, Cong Wu 0003, Weiming Zhang 0001, Nenghai Yu, Tianwei Zhang 0004, Qing Guo 0005, Jie Zhang 0073 |
IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. | 2 |
| 2025 | HARE Attack: Inaudible Harmony in Voice EnrollmentabstractSpeaker verification (SV) constitutes a prevalent biometric recognition technology safeguarding the security of sensitive data and regulating access to vital infrastructure. Current audio adversarial attack researches predominantly concentrate on deceiving systems through an touching on inference parameters of the underlying model architectures. This work introduces a pragmatic and formidable attack scenario wherein adversarial perturbations are introduced during the SV enrollment phase. These meticulously engineered distortions subtly alter voice embedding extraction, consequently influencing the verification outcome for the adversary. To enable this assault, we posit perturbations comprised of inaudible high-frequency noise and optimize them within an energy-based framework. Under black-box conditions, an evolutionary algorithm, differential evolution, resolves the intricate optimization challenge. Furthermore, we leverage a spectrum of realistic constraints, including absolute hearing thresholds, signal-to-noise ratios, and over-the-air propagation effects, to augment the robustness of our methodology. Rigorous experimentation across four voice identity datasets affirms the efficacy of our approach, demonstrating success rates exceeding 90% in digital environments and 78% in physical settings against four widely employed SV models. Xingcan Shang, Haolin Wu 0001, Kun He 0008, Jing Chen 0003 |
ICPADS | 2 |
| 2025 | When Translators Refuse to Translate: A Novel Attack to Speech Translation Systems
Haolin Wu 0001, Chang Liu 0089, Jing Chen 0003, Ruiying Du, Kun He 0008, Yu Zhang 0036, Cong Wu 0003, Tianwei Zhang 0004, Qing Guo 0005, Jie Zhang 0073 |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |