Kernel task scheduling is important for application performance, adaptability to new hardware, and complex user requirements. However, developing, testing, and debugging new scheduling algorithms in Linux, the most widely used cloud operating system, is slow and difficult. We developed Enoki, a framework for high velocity development of Linux kernel schedulers. Enoki schedulers are written in safe Rust, and the system supports live upgrade of new scheduling policies into the kernel, userspace debugging, and bidirectional communication with applications. A scheduler implemented with Enoki achieved near identical performance (within 1% on average) to the default Linux scheduler CFS on a wide range of benchmarks. Enoki is also able to support a range of research schedulers, specifically the Shinjuku scheduler, a locality aware scheduler, and the Arachne core arbiter, with good performance.

Linux has become the de-facto operating system of our age, but its vulnerabilities are a constant threat to service availability, user privacy, and data integrity. While one might scrap Linux and start over, the cost of that would be prohibitive due to Linux's ubiquitous deployment. In this paper, we propose an alternative, incremental route to a safer Linux through proper modularization and gradual replacement module by module. We lay out the research challenges and potential solutions for this route, and discuss the open questions ahead.

The ability to extend kernel functionality safely has long been a design goal for operating systems. Modern operating systems, such as Linux, are structured for extensibility to enable sharing a single code base among many environments. Unfortunately, safety has lagged behind, and bugs in kernel extensions continue to cause problems. We study three recent kernel extensions critical to Docker containers (Overlay File System, Open vSwitch Datapath, and AppArmor) to guide further research in extension safety. We find that all the studied kernel extensions suffer from the same set of low-level memory, concurrency, and type errors. Though safe kernel extensibility is a well-studied area, existing solutions are heavyweight, requiring extensive changes to the kernel and/or expensive runtime checks. We then explore the feasibility of writing kernel extensions in a high-level, type safe language (i.e., Rust) while preserving compatibility with Linux and find this to be an appealing approach. We show that there are key challenges to implementing this approach and propose potential solutions.