The modern food supply chain often involves multiple layers of participants spread across different countries and continents. This complex system offers significant benefits to businesses worldwide; however, it also presents several challenges. One major problem is the inability to trace the product flow back to its origin, a critical issue in many industries. Another issue is the lack of trust among supply chain participants. Blockchain technology can help address these and other challenges faced by the supply chain industry. However, it is surprising that, globally, there are still not many examples of the technology's adoption, with most projects remaining in the pilot stage. This paper explores the field of custom blockchain design tailored to specific applications, with a focus on supply chain operations in the food industry. It includes the development of a lightweight yet fully featured Python prototype for a decentralized blockchain system. In addition to common features like block validation and state updates, the prototype includes a newly designed type of transaction tailored specifically for supply chain operations. These transactions eliminate the need for smart contracts, making the system more lightweight compared to general-purpose blockchain platforms such as Ethereum and less prone to security vulnerabilities. The prototype is designed as a public blockchain network, with Proof of Work selected as the consensus algorithm. The novelty of this research work lies in advancing the concept of a custom blockchain solution for the food industry. The key elements of the prototype have been unit tested. The overall evaluation was completed using a Python script that simulates product flow through an example supply chain, allowing product provenance to be determined by tracing the product flow back to its origin.

Smart grid brings various advantages such as increased automation in decision making, tighter coupling between production and consumption, and increased digitalization. Because of the many changes that the smart grid inflicts on the power grid as critical infrastructure, cyber security and robust resilience against cyberattacks are essential to handle. With an increased number of attack interfaces and more use of IP-enabled communication, digital stations or IEC 61850 substations need to operate according to a zero-trust security model. Cyber resilience needs to be an integrated part of the substation and its components. This paper presents an experiment utilizing a Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) Digital Station environment (enclave), where the focus is on attacking the SCADA protocol IEC 60870-5-104. We implemented 14 attacks, the attacks are described in detail, including the result of each attack action. Furthermore, the paper discusses the implications of the findings in the experiment and what power grid asset owners can do to protect their substations as part of their digitizing efforts.