The recent rapid progress in (self) supervised learning models is in large part predicted by empirical scaling laws: a model's performance scales proportionally to its size. Analogous scaling laws remain elusive for reinforcement learning domains, however, where increasing the parameter count of a model often hurts its final performance. In this paper, we demonstrate that incorporating Mixture-of-Expert (MoE) modules, and in particular Soft MoEs (Puigcerver et al., 2023), into value-based networks results in more parameter-scalable models, evidenced by substantial performance increases across a variety of training regimes and model sizes. This work thus provides strong empirical evidence towards developing scaling laws for reinforcement learning.

What data or environments to use for training to improve downstream performance is a longstanding and very topical question in reinforcement learning. In particular, Unsupervised Environment Design (UED) methods have gained recent attention as their adaptive curricula promise to enable agents to be robust to in- and out-of-distribution tasks. This work investigates how existing UED methods select training environments, focusing on task prioritisation metrics. Surprisingly, despite methods aiming to maximise regret in theory, the practical approximations do not correlate with regret but with success rate. As a result, a significant portion of an agent's experience comes from environments it has already mastered, offering little to no contribution toward enhancing its abilities. Put differently, current methods fail to predict intuitive measures of *learnability*. Specifically, they are unable to consistently identify those scenarios that the agent can sometimes solve, but not always. Based on our analysis, we develop a method that directly trains on scenarios with high learnability. This simple and intuitive approach outperforms existing UED methods in several binary-outcome environments, including the standard domain of Minigrid and a novel setting closely inspired by a real-world robotics problem. We further introduce a new adversarial evaluation procedure for directly measuring robustness, closely mirroring the conditional value at risk (CVaR). We open-source all our code and present visualisations of final policies here: https://github.com/amacrutherford/sampling-for-learnability.

Benchmarks are crucial in the development of machine learning algorithms, significantly influencing reinforcement learning (RL) research through the available environments. Traditionally, RL environments run on the CPU, which limits their scalability with the computational resources typically available in academia. However, recent advancements in JAX have enabled the wider use of hardware acceleration, enabling massively parallel RL training pipelines and environments. While this has been successfully applied to single-agent RL, it has not yet been widely adopted for multi-agent scenarios. In this paper, we present JaxMARL, the first open-source, easy-to-use code base that combines GPU-enabled efficiency with support for a large number of commonly used MARL environments and popular baseline algorithms. Our experiments show that, in terms of wall clock time, our JAX-based training pipeline is up to 12,500 times faster than existing approaches. This enables efficient and thorough evaluations, potentially alleviating the evaluation crisis in the field. We also introduce and benchmark SMAX, a vectorised, simplified version of the popular StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge, which removes the need to run the StarCraft II game engine. This not only enables GPU acceleration, but also provides a more flexible MARL environment, unlocking the potential for self-play, meta-learning, and other future applications in MARL. The code is available at https://github.com/flairox/jaxmarl.

Adversarial attacks in reinforcement learning (RL) often assume highly-privileged access to the victim’s parameters, environment, or data. Instead, this paper proposes a novel adversarial setting called a Cheap Talk MDP in which an Adversary can merely append deterministic messages to the Victim’s observation, resulting in a minimal range of influence. The Adversary cannot occlude ground truth, influence underlying environment dynamics or reward signals, introduce non-stationarity, add stochasticity, see the Victim’s actions, or access their parameters. Additionally, we present a simple meta-learning algorithm called Adversarial Cheap Talk (ACT) to train Adversaries in this setting. We demonstrate that an Adversary trained with ACT can still significantly influence the Victim’s training and testing performance, despite the highly constrained setting. Affecting train-time performance reveals a new attack vector and provides insight into the success and failure modes of existing RL algorithms. More specifically, we show that an ACT Adversary is capable of harming performance by interfering with the learner’s function approximation, or instead helping the Victim’s performance by outputting useful features. Finally, we show that an ACT Adversary can manipulate messages during train-time to directly and arbitrarily control the Victim at test-time.

In general-sum games the interaction of self-interested learning agents commonly leads to collectively worst-case outcomes, such as defect-defect in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD). To overcome this, some methods, such as Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness (LOLA), directly shape the learning process of their opponents. However, these methods are myopic since only a small number of steps can be anticipated, are asymmetric since they treat other agents as naive learners, and require the use of higher-order derivatives, which are calculated through white-box access to an opponent’s differentiable learning algorithm. To address these issues, we propose Model-Free Opponent Shaping (M-FOS). M-FOS learns in a meta-game in which each meta-step is an episode of the underlying game. The meta-state consists of the policies in the underlying game and the meta-policy produces a new policy to be used in the next episode. M-FOS then uses generic model-free optimisation methods to learn meta-policies that accomplish long-horizon opponent shaping. Empirically, M-FOS near-optimally exploits naive learners and other, more sophisticated algorithms from the literature. For example, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first method to learn the well-known ZD extortion strategy in the IPD. In the same settings, M-FOS leads to socially optimal outcomes under meta-self-play. Finally, we show that M-FOS can be scaled to high-dimensional settings.

Learning in general-sum games is unstable and frequently leads to socially undesirable (Pareto-dominated) outcomes. To mitigate this, Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness (LOLA) introduced opponent shaping to this setting, by accounting for each agent’s influence on their opponents’ anticipated learning steps. However, the original LOLA formulation (and follow-up work) is inconsistent because LOLA models other agents as naive learners rather than LOLA agents. In previous work, this inconsistency was suggested as a cause of LOLA’s failure to preserve stable fixed points (SFPs). First, we formalize consistency and show that higher-order LOLA (HOLA) solves LOLA’s inconsistency problem if it converges. Second, we correct a claim made in the literature by Sch{ä}fer and Anandkumar (2019), proving that Competitive Gradient Descent (CGD) does not recover HOLA as a series expansion (and fails to solve the consistency problem). Third, we propose a new method called Consistent LOLA (COLA), which learns update functions that are consistent under mutual opponent shaping. It requires no more than second-order derivatives and learns consistent update functions even when HOLA fails to converge. However, we also prove that even consistent update functions do not preserve SFPs, contradicting the hypothesis that this shortcoming is caused by LOLA’s inconsistency. Finally, in an empirical evaluation on a set of general-sum games, we find that COLA finds prosocial solutions and that it converges under a wider range of learning rates than HOLA and LOLA. We support the latter finding with a theoretical result for a simple game.