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Jad Rahme

dblp:243/5777 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Reinforcement learning · 80% Planning, search and constraint satisfaction · 20%
Theoretical computer science
2 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
1.022021
Auction Learning as a Two-Player Game · ICLR 2021
A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design · AAAI 2021
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
generalization in reinforcement learning
0.512021
Why Generalization in RL is Difficult: Epistemic POMDPs and Implicit Partial Observability · NeurIPS 2021
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
multi-agent reinforcement learning
0.512021
Auction Learning as a Two-Player Game · ICLR 2021
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Planning, search and constraint satisfaction › planning under uncertainty
partially observable markov decision process
0.512021
Why Generalization in RL is Difficult: Epistemic POMDPs and Implicit Partial Observability · NeurIPS 2021
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
two-player game
0.512021
Auction Learning as a Two-Player Game · ICLR 2021
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › exploration
uncertainty-guided exploration
0.512021
Why Generalization in RL is Difficult: Epistemic POMDPs and Implicit Partial Observability · NeurIPS 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
revenue-maximizing auction
0.512021
A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design · AAAI 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

reinforcement learning · 1.0game theory · 1.0permutation-equivariant neural network · 0.5ensemble methods · 0.5deep learning · 0.5POMDP formulation · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design
abstract
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. Theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits in the past decades and analytical solutions are known for only a few simple settings. Computational approaches to the problem through the use of LPs have their own set of limitations. Building on the success of deep learning, a new approach was recently proposed by Duetting et al. (2019) in which the auction is modeled by a feed-forward neural network and the design problem is framed as a learning problem. The neural architectures used in that work are general purpose and do not take advantage of any of the symmetries the problem could present, such as permutation equivariance. In this work, we consider auction design problems that have permutation-equivariant symmetry and construct a neural architecture that is capable of perfectly recovering the permutation-equivariant optimal mechanism, which we show is not possible with the previous architecture. We demonstrate that permutation-equivariant architectures are not only capable of recovering previous results, they also have better generalization properties.
Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, Joan Bruna, S. Matthew Weinberg
AAAI1
2021 Auction Learning as a Two-Player Game
Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, S. Matthew Weinberg
ICLR1
2021 Why Generalization in RL is Difficult: Epistemic POMDPs and Implicit Partial Observability
abstract
Generalization is a central challenge for the deployment of reinforcement learning (RL) systems in the real world. In this paper, we show that the sequential structure of the RL problem necessitates new approaches to generalization beyond the well-studied techniques used in supervised learning. While supervised learning methods can generalize effectively without explicitly accounting for epistemic uncertainty, we describe why appropriate uncertainty handling can actually be essential in RL. We show that generalization to unseen test conditions from a limited number of training conditions induces a kind of implicit partial observability, effectively turning even fully-observed MDPs into POMDPs. Informed by this observation, we recast the problem of generalization in RL as solving the induced partially observed Markov decision process, which we call the epistemic POMDP. We demonstrate the failure modes of algorithms that do not appropriately handle this partial observability, and suggest a simple ensemble-based technique for approximately solving the partially observed problem. Empirically, we demonstrate that our simple algorithm derived from the epistemic POMDP achieves significant gains in generalization over current methods on the Procgen benchmark suite.
Dibya Ghosh, Jad Rahme, Aviral Kumar, Amy Zhang 0001, Ryan P. Adams, Sergey Levine
NeurIPS2