Privacy protection has become an increasing concern in modern machine learning applications. Privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) has attracted growing research attention, with approaches such as secure multiparty computation (MPC) and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) being actively explored. However, existing evaluations of these approaches have frequently been done on a narrow, fragmented setup and have only focused on a specific performance metric, such as the online inference latency of a specific batch size. From the existing reports, it is hard to compare different approaches, especially when considering other metrics like energy/cost or broader system setups (various hyperparameters, offline overheads, future hardware/network configurations, etc.). We present a unified characterization of three popular approaches—two variants of MPC based on arithmetic/binary sharing conversion and function secret sharing, and FHE—on their performance and cost in performing privacy-preserving inference on multiple CNN and Transformer models. We study a range of LAN and WAN environments, model sizes, batch sizes, and input sequence lengths. We evaluate not only the performance but also the energy consumption and monetary cost of deployment under a realistic scenario, taking into account their offline and online computation/communication overheads. We provide empirical guidance for selecting, optimizing, and deploying these privacy-preserving compute paradigms, and outline how evolving hardware and network trends are likely to shift trade-offs between the two MPC schemes and FHE. This work provides system-level insights for researchers and practitioners who seek to understand or accelerate PPML workloads.

Language Models (LM) have been extensively utilized for learning DNA sequence patterns and generating synthetic sequences. In this paper, we present a novel approach for the generation of synthetic DNA data using pangenomes in combination with LM. We introduce three innovative pangenome-based tokenization schemes that enhance DNA sequence generation. Our experimental results demonstrate the superiority of pangenome-based tokenization over classical methods in generating high-utility synthetic DNA sequences, highlighting significant improvements in training efficiency and sequence quality.

In this paper, we propose a new secure machine learning inference platform assisted by a small dedicated security processor, which will be easier to protect and deploy compared to today's TEEs integrated into high-performance processors. Our platform provides three main advantages over the state-of-the-art: (i) We achieve significant performance improvements compared to state-of-the-art distributed Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning (PPML) protocols, with only a small security processor that is comparable to a discrete security chip such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) or on-chip security subsystems in SoCs similar to the Apple enclave processor. In the semi-honest setting with WAN/GPU, our scheme is 4X-63X faster than Falcon (PoPETs'21) and AriaNN (PoPETs'22) and 3.8X-12X more communication efficient. We achieve even higher performance improvements in the malicious setting. (ii) Our platform guarantees security with abort against malicious adversaries under honest majority assumption. (iii) Our technique is not limited by the size of secure memory in a TEE and can support high-capacity modern neural networks like ResNet18 and Transformer. While previous work investigated the use of high-performance TEEs in PPML, this work represents the first to show that even tiny secure hardware with very limited performance can be leveraged to significantly speed-up distributed PPML protocols if the protocol can be carefully designed for lightweight trusted hardware.

Localization services for wireless devices play an increasingly important role in our daily lives and a plethora of emerging services and applications already rely on precise position information. Widely used on-device positioning methods, such as the global positioning system, enable accurate outdoor positioning and provide the users with full control over what services and applications are allowed to access their location information. In order to provide accurate positioning indoors or in cluttered urban scenarios without line-of-sight satellite connectivity, powerful off-device positioning systems, which process channel state information (CSI) measured at the infrastructure base stations or access points with deep neural networks, have emerged recently. Such off-device wireless positioning systems inherently link a user’s data transmission with its localization, since accurate CSI measurements are necessary for reliable wireless communication—this not only prevents the users from controlling who can access this information but also enables virtually everyone in the device’s range to estimate its location, resulting in serious privacy and security concerns. We therefore propose on-device attacks against off-device wireless positioning systems in multi-antenna orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing systems while remaining standard compliant and minimizing the impact on quality-of-service, and we demonstrate their efficacy using real-world measured datasets for cellular outdoor and wireless LAN indoor scenarios. We also investigate defenses to counter such attack mechanisms, and we discuss the limitations and implications on protecting location privacy in existing and future wireless communication systems.