Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Berat Arik

dblp:248/7118 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Malware analysis · 42% Network security · 35% Digital forensics and information hiding · 23%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Digital forensics and information hiding › digital forensics
memory forensics
0.312018
Towards Architecture and OS-Independent Malware Detection via Memory Forensics · CCS 2018
Malware analysis › rootkit detection
compromise detection
0.112018
Towards Architecture and OS-Independent Malware Detection via Memory Forensics · CCS 2018

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

spoofing · 0.5protocol infiltration · 0.5machine learning · 0.3deep learning · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 C3PO: Large-Scale Study Of Covert Monitoring of C&C Servers via Over-Permissioned Protocol Infiltration
abstract
Current techniques to monitor botnets towards disruption or takedown are likely to result in inaccurate data gathered about the botnet or be detected by C&C orchestrators. Seeking a covert and scalable solution, we look to an evolving pattern in modern malware that integrates standardized over-permissioned protocols, exposing privileged access to C&C servers. We implement techniques to detect and exploit these protocols from over-permissioned bots toward covert C&C server monitoring. Our empirical study of 200k malware captured since 2006 revealed 62,202 over-permissioned bots (nearly 1 in 3) and 443,905 C&C monitoring capabilities, with a steady increase of over-permissioned protocol use over the last 15 years. Due to their ubiquity, we conclude that even though over-permissioned protocols allow for C&C server infiltration, the efficiency and ease of use they provide continue to make them prevalent in the malware operational landscape. This paper presents C3PO, a pipeline that enables our study and empowers incident responders to automatically identify over-permissioned protocols, infiltration vectors to spoof bot-to-C&C communication, and C&C monitoring capabilities that guide covert monitoring post infiltration. Our findings suggest the over-permissioned protocol weakness provides a scalable approach to covertly monitor C&C servers, which is a fundamental enabler of botnet disruptions and takedowns.
Jonathan Fuller 0001, Ranjita Pai Kasturi, Amit Kumar Sikder, Haichuan Xu, Berat Arik, Ehsan Asdar, Brendan Saltaformaggio
CCS5
2018 Towards Architecture and OS-Independent Malware Detection via Memory Forensics
abstract
In this work, we take a fundamentally different approach to the problem of analyzing a device for compromises via malware; our approach is OS and instruction architecture independent and relies only on having the raw binary data extracted from the memory dump of a device. Our system leverages a multi-hundred TB dataset of both compromised host memory dumps extracted from the MalRec dataset [8] and the first known dataset of benign host memory dumps running normal, non-compromised software. After an average of 30 to 45 seconds of pre-processing on a single memory dump, our system leverages both traditional machine learning and deep learning algorithms to achieve an average of 98% accuracy of detecting a compromised host.
Rachel Petrik, Berat Arik, Jared M. Smith
CCS2