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Oliver Schick

dblp:249/0225 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 93% Privacy and data protection · 7%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
malicious security
0.812024
Don't Eject the Impostor: Fast Three-Party Computation With a Known Cheater · SP 2024
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure computation protocols
0.812024
Don't Eject the Impostor: Fast Three-Party Computation With a Known Cheater · SP 2024
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure multiparty computation
0.812024
Don't Eject the Impostor: Fast Three-Party Computation With a Known Cheater · SP 2024
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure multiparty computation
three-party computation
0.812024
Don't Eject the Impostor: Fast Three-Party Computation With a Known Cheater · SP 2024
Privacy and data protection
privacy-preserving machine learning
0.212024
Don't Eject the Impostor: Fast Three-Party Computation With a Known Cheater · SP 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

verification technique · 0.8semi-honest protocol · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Don't Eject the Impostor: Fast Three-Party Computation With a Known Cheater
abstract
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) enables (joint) computations on sensitive data while maintaining privacy. In real-world scenarios, asymmetric trust assumptions are often most realistic, where one somewhat trustworthy entity interacts with smaller clients. We generalize previous two-party computation (2PC) protocols like MUSE (USENIX Security’21) and SIMC (USENIX Security’22) to the three-party setting (3PC) with one malicious party, avoiding the performance limitations of dishonest-majority inherent to 2PC.We introduce two protocols, AUXILIATOR and SOCIUM, in a machine learning (ML) friendly design with a fast online phase and novel verification techniques in the setup phase. These protocols bridge the gap between prior 3PC approaches that considered either fully semi-honest or malicious settings. AUXILIATOR enhances the semi-honest two-party setting with a malicious helper, significantly improving communication by at least two orders of magnitude. SOCIUM extends the client-malicious setting with one malicious client and a semi-honest server, achieving substantial communication improvement by at least one order of magnitude compared to SIMC.Besides an implementation of our new protocols, we provide the first open-source implementation of the semi-honest 3PC protocol ASTRA (CCSW’19) and a variant of the malicious 3PC protocol SWIFT (USENIX Security’21).
Andreas Brüggemann, Oliver Schick, Thomas Schneider 0003, Ajith Suresh, Hossein Yalame
SP2