Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Oliver Schick
dblp:249/0225
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 93% Privacy and data protection · 7% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
malicious security |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Don't Eject the Impostor: Fast Three-Party Computation With a Known Cheater · SP 2024 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure computation protocols |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Don't Eject the Impostor: Fast Three-Party Computation With a Known Cheater · SP 2024 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure multiparty computation |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Don't Eject the Impostor: Fast Three-Party Computation With a Known Cheater · SP 2024 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure multiparty computation
three-party computation |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Don't Eject the Impostor: Fast Three-Party Computation With a Known Cheater · SP 2024 |
Privacy and data protection
privacy-preserving machine learning |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Don't Eject the Impostor: Fast Three-Party Computation With a Known Cheater · SP 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
verification technique · 0.8semi-honest protocol · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Don't Eject the Impostor: Fast Three-Party Computation With a Known CheaterabstractSecure multi-party computation (MPC) enables (joint) computations on sensitive data while maintaining privacy. In real-world scenarios, asymmetric trust assumptions are often most realistic, where one somewhat trustworthy entity interacts with smaller clients. We generalize previous two-party computation (2PC) protocols like MUSE (USENIX Security’21) and SIMC (USENIX Security’22) to the three-party setting (3PC) with one malicious party, avoiding the performance limitations of dishonest-majority inherent to 2PC.We introduce two protocols, AUXILIATOR and SOCIUM, in a machine learning (ML) friendly design with a fast online phase and novel verification techniques in the setup phase. These protocols bridge the gap between prior 3PC approaches that considered either fully semi-honest or malicious settings. AUXILIATOR enhances the semi-honest two-party setting with a malicious helper, significantly improving communication by at least two orders of magnitude. SOCIUM extends the client-malicious setting with one malicious client and a semi-honest server, achieving substantial communication improvement by at least one order of magnitude compared to SIMC.Besides an implementation of our new protocols, we provide the first open-source implementation of the semi-honest 3PC protocol ASTRA (CCSW’19) and a variant of the malicious 3PC protocol SWIFT (USENIX Security’21). Andreas Brüggemann, Oliver Schick, Thomas Schneider 0003, Ajith Suresh, Hossein Yalame |
SP | 2 |