Legislators and policymakers worldwide are debating options for suppressing illegal, harmful and undesirable material online. Drawing on several quantitative data sources, we show that deplatforming an active community to suppress online hate and harassment, even with a substantial concerted effort involving several tech firms, can be hard. Our case study is the disruption of the largest and longest-running harassment forum Kiwi Farms in late 2022, which is probably the most extensive industry effort to date. Despite the active participation of a number of tech companies over several consecutive months, this campaign failed to shut down the forum and remove its objectionable content. While briefly raising public awareness, it led to rapid platform displacement and traffic fragmentation. Part of the activity decamped to Telegram, while traffic shifted from the primary domain to previously abandoned alternatives. The forum experienced intermittent outages for several weeks, after which the community leading the campaign lost interest, traffic was directed back to the main domain, users quickly returned, and the forum was back online and became even more connected. The forum members themselves stopped discussing the incident shortly thereafter, and the net effect was that forum activity, active users, threads, posts and traffic were all cut by about half. The disruption largely affected casual users (of whom roughly 87% left), while half the core members remained engaged. It also drew many newcomers, who exhibited increasing levels of toxicity during the first few weeks of participation. Deplatforming a community without a court order raises philosophical issues about censorship versus free speech; ethical and legal issues about the role of industry in online content moderation; and practical issues on the efficacy of private-sector versus government action. Deplatforming a dispersed community using a series of court orders against individual service providers appears unlikely to be very effective if the censor cannot incapacitate the key maintainers, whether by arresting them, enjoining them or otherwise deterring them.

There has been substantial commentary on the role of cyberattacks carried out by low-level cybercrime actors in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. We analyse 358k website defacement attacks, 1.7M UDP amplification DDoS attacks, 1764 posts made by 372 users on Hack Forums mentioning the two countries, and 441 Telegram announcements (with 58k replies) of a volunteer hacking group for two months before and four months after the invasion. We find the conflict briefly but notably caught the attention of low-level cybercrime actors, with significant increases in online discussion and both types of attacks targeting Russia and Ukraine. However, there was little evidence of high-profile actions; the role of these players in the ongoing hybrid warfare is minor, and they should be separated from persistent and motivated 'hacktivists' in state-sponsored operations. Their involvement in the conflict appears to have been short-lived and fleeting, with a clear loss of interest in discussing the situation and carrying out both website defacement and DDoS attacks against either Russia or Ukraine after just a few weeks.

Trust and reputation play a core role in underground cybercrime markets, where participants are anonymous and there is little legal recourse for dispute arbitration. These underground markets exist in tension between two opposing forces: the drive to hide incriminating information, and the trust and stability benefits that greater openness yields. Revealing information about transactions to mitigate scams also provides valuable data about the market. We analyse the first dataset, of which we are aware, about the transactions created and completed on a well-known and high-traffic underground marketplace, Hack Forums, along with the associated threads and posts made by its users over two recent years, from June 2018 to June 2020. We use statistical modelling approaches to analyse the economic and social characteristics of the market over three eras, especially its performance as an infrastructure for trust. In the Set-up era, we observe the growth of users making only one transaction, as well as 'power-users' who make many transactions. In the Stable era, we observe a wide range of activities (including large-scale transfers of intermediate currencies such as Amazon Giftcards) which declines slowly from an initial peak. Finally, we analyse the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, concluding that while we see a significant increase in transactins across all categories, this reflects a stimulus of the market, rather than a transformation. New users overcome the 'cold start' problem by engaging in low-level currency exchanges to prove their trustworthiness. We observe currency exchange accounts for most contracts, and Bitcoin and PayPal are the preferred payment methods by trading values and number of contracts involved. The market is becoming more centralised over time around influential users and threads, with significant changes observed during the Set-up and Covid-19 eras.

Network adversaries, such as malicious transit autonomous systems (ASes), have been shown to be capable of partitioning the Bitcoin's peer-to-peer network via routing-level attacks; e.g., a network adversary exploits a BGP vulnerability and performs a prefix hijacking attack (viz. Apostolaki et al. [3]). Due to the nature of BGP operation, such a hijacking is globally observable and thus enables immediate detection of the attack and the identification of the perpetrator. In this paper, we present a stealthier attack, which we call the EREBUS attack, that partitions the Bitcoin network without any routing manipulations, which makes the attack undetectable to control-plane and even to data-plane detectors. The novel aspect of EREBUS is that it makes the adversary AS a natural man-in-the-middle network of all the peer connections of one or more targeted Bitcoin nodes by patiently influencing the targeted nodes' peering decision. We show that affecting the peering decision of a Bitcoin node, which is believed to be infeasible after a series of bug patches against the earlier Eclipse attack [29], is possible for the network adversary that can use abundant network address resources (e.g., spoofing millions of IP addresses in many other ASes) reliably for an extended period of time at a negligible cost. The EREBUS attack is readily available for large ASes, such as Tier-1 and large Tier-2 ASes, against the vast majority of 10K public Bitcoin nodes with only about 520 bit/s of attack traffic rate per targeted Bitcoin node and a modest (e.g., 5-6 weeks) attack execution period. The EREBUS attack can be mounted by nation-state adversaries who would be willing to execute sophisticated attack strategies patiently to compromise cryptocurrencies (e.g., control the consensus, take down a cryptocurrency, censor transactions). As the attack exploits the topological advantage of being a network adversary but not the specific vulnerabilities of Bitcoin core, no quick patches seem to be available. We discuss that some naive solutions (e.g., whitelisting, rate-limiting) are ineffective and third-party proxy solutions may worsen the Bitcoin's centralization problem. We provide some suggested modifications to the Bitcoin core and show that they effectively make the EREBUS attack significantly harder; yet, their non-trivial changes to the Bitcoin's network operation (e.g., peering dynamics, propagation delays) should be examined thoroughly before their wide deployment.