Jianjia Yu

dblp:251/3631 · DBLP profile ↗
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7ranked-venue papers
1as first author
6since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 5 · 1 first-author · 5 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 The First Large-Scale Systematic Study of Python Class Pollution Vulnerability
Jiacheng Zhong, Jianjia Yu, Muxi Lyu, Zifeng Kang, Yinzhi Cao
SP3
2025 Follow My Flow: Unveiling Client-Side Prototype Pollution Gadgets from One Million Real-World Websites
abstract
Prototype pollution vulnerability often has further consequences—such as Cross-site Scripting (XSS) and cookie manipulation—that are achieved via so-called gadgets, i.e., code snippets that change the control- or data-flow of a victim program for malicious purposes. Prior works face challenges in finding prototype pollution gadgets for such consequences because the control- or data-flow change sometimes needs the injection of complex property values to replace existing undefined ones through prototype pollution, which may not be seen before or cannot be solved by existing constraint solvers. In this paper, we design a dynamic analysis framework, called Gala, to automatically detect client-side prototype pollution gadgets among real-world websites, and implement an open-source version of Gala. Our key insight is to borrow existing defined values on non-vulnerable websites to victim ones where such values are undefined, thus guiding the property injection to flow to the sinks in gadgets. Our evaluation of Gala against one-million websites reveals 133 zero-day gadgets that are not found by prior works. For example, one gadget was from Meta's software and another from the Vue framework. Both have acknowledged and fixed it, with Meta rewarding us a bug bounty and Vue assigning CVE-2024-6783. Our evaluation also shows that 23 websites with prototype pollution vulnerabilities—which do not have further consequences as reported by prior works—have consequences due to gadgets found by Gala. In addition to the Meta and Vue gadgets, we also responsibly disclosed all the zero-day gadgets and those newly-discovered prototype pollution consequences to their developers.
Zifeng Kang, Muxi Lyu, Jianjia Yu, Runqi Fan, Song Li 0006, Yinzhi Cao
SP4
2025 The DOMino Effect: Detecting and Exploiting DOM Clobbering Gadgets via Concolic Execution with Symbolic DOM
Theo Lee, Jianjia Yu, Zifeng Kang, Yinzhi Cao
USENIX Security Symposium3
2024 RogueOne: Detecting Rogue Updates via Differential Data-flow Analysis Using Trust Domains
abstract
Rogue updates, an important type of software supply-chain attack in which attackers conceal malicious code inside updates to benign software, are a growing problem due to their stealth and effectiveness. We design and implement RogueOne, a system for detecting rogue updates to JavaScript packages. RogueOne uses a novel differential data-flow analysis to capture how an update changes a package's interactions with external APIs. Using an efficient form of abstract interpretation that can exclude unchanged code in a package, it constructs an object data-flow relationship graph (ODRG) that tracks data-flows among objects. RogueOne then maps objects to trust domains, a novel abstraction which summarizes trust relationships in a package. Objects are assigned a trust domain based on whether they originate in the target package, a dependency, or in a system API. RogueOne uses the ODRG to build a set of data-flows across trust domains. It compares data-flow sets across package versions to detect untrustworthy new interactions with external APIs. We evaluated RogueOne on hundreds of npm packages, demonstrating its effectiveness at detecting rogue updates and distinguishing them from benign ones. RogueOne achieves high accuracy and can be more than seven times as effective in detecting rogue updates and avoiding false positives compared to other systems built to detect malicious packages.
Raphael J. Sofaer, Yaniv David, Mingqing Kang, Jianjia Yu, Yinzhi Cao, Jason Nieh
ICSE4
2023 CoCo: Efficient Browser Extension Vulnerability Detection via Coverage-guided, Concurrent Abstract Interpretation
abstract
Extensions complement web browsers with additional functionalities and also bring new vulnerability venues, allowing privilege escalations from adversarial web pages to use extension APIs. Prior works on extension vulnerability detection adopt classic static analysis, which is unable to handle dynamic JavaScript features such as those function calls as part of array lookups. At the same time, prior abstract interpretation focuses on lightweight server-side JavaScript, which often cannot scale to client-side extension code due to object explosions in the abstract domain.
Jianjia Yu, Song Li 0006, Junmin Zhu, Yinzhi Cao
CCS1
2022 Rendering Contention Channel Made Practical in Web Browsers
Shujiang Wu, Jianjia Yu, Min Yang 0002, Yinzhi Cao
USENIX Security Symposium2
2019 Mind Band: A Crossmedia AI Music Composing Platform
abstract
Various media information in life can have an important impact on our understanding of music. In this paper, we present a demo, Mind Band, which is a Cross-Media artificial intelligent composing platform using our life elements such as emoji, image and humming. In practice, we base our system on the valence-arousal model. We use emotion analysis of life elements to map them to music pieces, which are generated by a Variational Autoencoder - Generative Adversarial Networks model. We provide users with immersive experience by uploading emoji/image/humming and retrieving emotionally related music pieces back. With this platform, everyone can be a composer.
Zhaolin Qiu, Yufan Ren, Canchen Li, Hongfu Liu 0002, Songruoyao Wu, Hanjia Zheng, Juntao Ji, Jianjia Yu
ACM Multimedia10