VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Lennart Almstedt
dblp:253/7142
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0002-0537-4955ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 2 · 2 since 2021Computer networks · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | ContractBox: Realizing accountable data sharing on the edge using a small scale blockchainabstractThe utilization of IoT devices is becoming omnipresent in industrial settings. However, adoption in more rural areas still poses challenges. Especially when processing data on the edge, privacy, data integrity, accountability and data ownership pose challenges since the devices may be easily accessed and manipulated. We present ContractBox, a system that provides accountable and trusted data sharing based on a publisher–subscriber system, as well as trusted computing on the edge. ContractBox uses a Trusted Execution Environment to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of clients’ data and code. Furthermore, it provides security by using WebAssembly to execute the smart contracts in their own sandboxed environment. This design protects the host as well as co-located smart contracts from misbehaving executions. Lastly, it ensures the immutability and accountability of the published data by storing it in a blockchain. We show that ContractBox can process several thousand publications per second with various payloads and host multiple smart contract runtimes on a single edge device. ContractBox also achieves up to 35 times higher throughput than a comparable deployment of Hyperledger Fabric. Lennart Almstedt, Kai Bleeke, Mohammad Mahhouk, Leander Jehl, Rüdiger Kapitza, Lars C. Wolf |
Comput. Networks | 1 |
| 2021 | Precursor: a fast, client-centric and trusted key-value store using RDMA and Intel SGXabstractAs offered by the Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX), trusted execution enables confidentiality and integrity for off-site deployed services. Thereby, securing key-value stores has received particular attention, as they are a building block for many complex applications to speed-up request processing. Initially, the developers' main design challenge has been to address the performance barriers of SGX. Besides, we identified the integration of a SGX-secured key-value store with recent network technologies, especially RDMA, as an essential emerging requirement. RDMA allows fast direct access to remote memory at high bandwidth. As SGX-protected memory cannot be directly accessed over the network, a fast exchange between the main and trusted memory must be enabled. More importantly, SGX-protected services can be expected to be CPU-bound as a result of the vast number of cryptographic operations required to transfer and store data securely. Ines Messadi, Shivananda Neumann, Nico Weichbrodt, Lennart Almstedt, Mohammad Mahhouk, Rüdiger Kapitza |
Middleware | 4 |
| 2021 | sgx-dl: dynamic loading and hot-patching for secure applications: experience paperabstractTrusted execution as offered by Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is considered as an enabler to protect the integrity and confidentiality of stateful workloads such as key-value stores and databases in untrusted environments. These systems are typically long running and require extension mechanisms built on top of dynamic loading as well as hot-patching to avoid downtimes and apply security updates faster. However, such essential mechanisms are currently neglected or even missing in combination with trusted execution. Nico Weichbrodt, Joshua Heinemann, Lennart Almstedt, Pierre-Louis Aublin, Rüdiger Kapitza |
Middleware | 3 |