Today's online platforms heavily lean on algorithmic recommendations for bolstering user engagement and driving revenue. However, these recommendations can impact multiple stakeholders simultaneously---the platform, items (sellers), and users (customers)---each with their unique objectives, making it difficult to find the right middle ground that accommodates all stakeholders. To address this, we introduce a novel fair recommendation framework, Problem (FAIR), that flexibly balances multi-stakeholder interests via a constrained optimization formulation. We next explore Problem (FAIR) in a dynamic online setting where data uncertainty further adds complexity, and propose a low-regret algorithm FORM that concurrently performs real-time learning and fair recommendations, two tasks that are often at odds. Via both theoretical analysis and a numerical case study on real-world data, we demonstrate the efficacy of our framework and method in maintaining platform revenue while ensuring desired levels of fairness for both items and users.

Online advertising channels commonly focus on maximizing total advertiser welfare to enhance channel health, and previous literature has studied augmenting ad auctions with machine learning predictions on advertiser values (also known asmachine-learned advice ) to improve total welfare. Yet, such improvements could come at the cost of individual bidders' welfare and do not shed light on how particular advertiser bidding strategies impact welfare. Motivated by this, we present an analysis on an individual bidder's welfare loss in the autobidding world for auctions with and without machine-learned advice, and also uncover how advertiser strategies relate to such losses. In particular, we demonstrate how ad platforms can utilize ML advice to improve welfare guarantee on the aggregate and individual bidder level by setting ML advice as personalized reserve prices when the platform consists ofautobidders who maximize value while respecting a return on ad spend (ROAS) constraint. Under parallel VCG auctions with such ML advice-based reserves, we present a worst-case welfare lower-bound guarantee for an individual autobidder, and show that the lower-bound guarantee is positively correlated with ML advice quality as well as the scale of bids induced by the autobidder's bidding strategies. Further, we show that no truthful, and possibly randomized mechanism with anonymous allocations can achieve universally better individual welfare guarantees than VCG, in the presence of personalized reserves based on ML-advice of equal quality. Moreover, we extend our individual welfare guarantee results to generalized first price (GFP) and generalized second price (GSP) auctions. Finally, we present numerical studies using semi-synthetic data derived from ad auction logs of a search ad platform to showcase improvements in individual welfare when setting personalized reserve prices with ML-advice.

We consider a dynamic pricing problem for repeated contextual second-price auctions with multiple strategic buyers who aim to maximize their long-term time discounted utility. The seller has limited information on buyers’ overall demand curves which depends on a non-parametric market-noise distribution, and buyers may potentially submit corrupted bids (relative to true valuations) to manipulate the seller’s pricing policy for more favorable reserve prices in the future. We focus on designing the seller’s learning policy to set contextual reserve prices where the seller’s goal is to minimize regret compared to the revenue of a benchmark clairvoyant policy that has full information of buyers’ demand. We propose a policy with a phased-structure that incorporates randomized “isolation” periods, during which a buyer is randomly chosen to solely participate in the auction. We show that this design allows the seller to control the number of periods in which buyers significantly corrupt their bids. We then prove that our policy enjoys a T-period regret of $O(\sqrt{T})$ facing strategic buyers. Finally, we conduct numerical simulations to compare our proposed algorithm to standard pricing policies. Our numerical results show that our algorithm outperforms these policies under various buyer bidding behavior.

Internet advertisers (buyers) repeatedly procure ad impressions from ad platforms (sellers) with the aim to maximize total conversion (i.e. ad value) while respecting both budget and return-on-investment (ROI) constraints for efficient utilization of limited monetary resources. Facing such a constrained buyer who aims to learn her optimal strategy to acquire impressions, we study from a seller’s perspective how to learn and price ad impressions through repeated posted price mechanisms to maximize revenue. For this two-sided learning setup, we propose a learning algorithm for the seller that utilizes an episodic binary-search procedure to identify a revenue-optimal selling price. We show that such a simple learning algorithm enjoys low seller regret when within each episode, the budget and ROI constrained buyer approximately best responds to the posted price. We present simple yet natural buyer’s bidding algorithms under which the buyer approximately best responds while satisfying budget and ROI constraints, leading to a low regret for our proposed seller pricing algorithm. The design of our seller algorithm is motivated by the fact that the seller’s revenue function admits a bell-shaped structure when the buyer best responds to prices under budget and ROI constraints, enabling our seller algorithm to identify revenue-optimal selling prices efficiently.

In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser's global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channels and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem.

Today's online advertisers procure digital ad impressions through interacting with autobidding platforms: advertisers convey high level procurement goals via setting levers such as budget, target return-on-investment, max cost per click, etc.. Then ads platforms subsequently procure impressions on advertisers' behalf, and report final procurement conversions (e.g. click) to advertisers. In practice, advertisers may receive minimal information on platforms' procurement details, and procurement outcomes are subject to non-stationary factors like seasonal patterns, occasional system corruptions, and market trends which make it difficult for advertisers to optimize lever decisions effectively. Motivated by this, we present an online learning framework that helps advertisers dynamically optimize ad platform lever decisions while subject to general long-term constraints in a realistic bandit feedback environment with non-stationary procurement outcomes. In particular, we introduce a primal-dual algorithm for online decision making with multi-dimension decision variables, bandit feedback and long-term uncertain constraints. We show that our algorithm achieves low regret in many worlds when procurement outcomes are generated through procedures that are stochastic, adversarial, adversarially corrupted, periodic, and ergodic, respectively, without having to know which procedure is the ground truth. Finally, we emphasize that our proposed algorithm and theoretical results extend beyond the applications of online advertising.

We consider the use of decision trees for decision-making problems under the predict-then-optimize framework. That is, we would like to first use a decision tree to predict unknown input parameters of an optimization problem, and then make decisions by solving the optimization problem using the predicted parameters. A natural loss function in this framework is to measure the suboptimality of the decisions induced by the predicted input parameters, as opposed to measuring loss using input parameter prediction error. This natural loss function is known in the literature as the Smart Predict-then-Optimize (SPO) loss, and we propose a tractable methodology called SPO Trees (SPOTs) for training decision trees under this loss. SPOTs benefit from the interpretability of decision trees, providing an interpretable segmentation of contextual features into groups with distinct optimal solutions to the optimization problem of interest. We conduct several numerical experiments on synthetic and real data including the prediction of travel times for shortest path problems and predicting click probabilities for news article recommendation. We demonstrate on these datasets that SPOTs simultaneously provide higher quality decisions and significantly lower model complexity than other machine learning approaches (e.g., CART) trained to minimize prediction error.

We study long-run market stability for repeated price competitions between two firms, where consumer demand depends on firms' posted prices and consumers’ price expectations called reference prices. Consumers' reference prices vary over time according to a memory-based dynamic, which is a weighted average of all historical prices. We focus on the setting where firms are not aware of demand functions and how reference prices are formed but have access to an oracle that provides a measure of consumers' responsiveness to the current posted prices. We show that if the firms run no-regret algorithms, in particular, online mirror descent (OMD), with decreasing step sizes, the market stabilizes in the sense that firms' prices and reference prices converge to a stable Nash Equilibrium (SNE). Interestingly, we also show that there exist constant step sizes under which the market stabilizes. We further characterize the rate of convergence to the SNE for both decreasing and constant OMD step sizes.