Ambition and risk-taking have been heralded as important ways for marginalized communities to get out of cycles of poverty. As a result, educational messaging often encourages individuals to strengthen their personal resolve and develop characteristics such as discipline and grit to succeed in ambitious ends. However, recent work in philosophy and sociology highlights that this messaging often does more harm than good for students in these situations. We study similar questions using a different epistemic approach and in simple theoretical models -- we provide a quantitative model of decision-making between stable and risky choices in the improving multi-armed bandits framework. We use this model to first study how individuals' "strategies" are affected by their level of grittiness and how this affects their accrued rewards. Then, we study the impact of various interventions, such as increasing grit or providing a financial safety net. Our investigation of rational decision making studies the competitive ratio between the accrued reward and the optimal reward.

We present a comprehensive evaluation of gender fairness in large language models (LLMs), focusing on their ability to handle both binary and non-binary genders.While previous studies primarily focus on binary gender distinctions, we introduce the Gender Inclusivity Fairness Index (GIFI), a novel and comprehensive metric that quantifies the diverse gender inclusivity of LLMs.GIFI consists of a wide range of evaluations at different levels, from simply probing the model with respect to provided gender pronouns to testing various aspects of model generation and cognitive behaviors under different gender assumptions, revealing biases associated with varying gender identifiers.We conduct extensive evaluations with GIFI on 22 prominent open-source and proprietary LLMs of varying sizes and capabilities, discovering significant variations in LLMs' gender inclusivity.Our study highlights the importance of improving LLMs' inclusivity, providing a critical benchmark for future advancements in gender fairness in generative models. 10.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 Mean: 0.22

We consider a recently introduced framework in which fairness is measured by worst-case outcomes across groups, rather than by the more standard differences between group outcomes. In this framework we provide provably convergent oracle-efficient learning algorithms (or equivalently, reductions to non-fair learning) for minimax group fairness. Here the goal is that of minimizing the maximum loss across all groups, rather than equalizing group losses. Our algorithms apply to both regression and classification settings and support both overall error and false positive or false negative rates as the fairness measure of interest. They also support relaxations of the fairness constraints, thus permitting study of the tradeoff between overall accuracy and minimax fairness. We compare the experimental behavior and performance of our algorithms across a variety of fairness-sensitive data sets and show empirical cases in which minimax fairness is strictly and strongly preferable to equal outcome notions.

In this paper we initiate the study of financial asset design with fairness as an explicit goal. We consider a variation on the classical problem of optimal portfolio design. In our setting, an individual consumer is specified by her risk tolerance, which corresponds to the variance in returns she is willing to accept in exchange for higher expected returns. We must design a (small) collection of portfolios and assign each consumer to a portfolio at lower or approximately equal risk than her tolerance. Fairness is imposed by demanding that the portfolios designed do not discriminate (in terms of expected returns) against less wealthy clients (or other specified protected groups).

We propose and analyze differentially private (DP) mechanisms for call auctions as an alternative to the complex and ad-hoc privacy efforts that are common in modern electronic markets. We prove that the number of shares cleared in the DP mechanisms compares favorably to the non-private optimal and provide a matching lower bound. We analyze the incentive properties of our mechanisms and their behavior under natural no-regret learning dynamics by market participants. We include simulation results and connections to the finance literature on market impact.