Improper parsing of attacker-controlled input is a leading source of software security vulnerabilities, especially when programmers transcribe informal format descriptions in RFCs into efficient parsing logic in low-level, memory unsafe languages. Several researchers have proposed formal specification languages for data formats from which efficient code can be extracted. However, distilling informal requirements into formal specifications is challenging and, despite their benefits, new, formal languages are hard for people to learn and use. In this work, we present 3DGen, a framework that makes use of AI agents to transform mixed informal input, including natural language documents (i.e., RFCs) and example inputs into format specifications in a language called 3D. To support humans in understanding and trusting the generated specifications, 3DGen uses symbolic methods to also synthesize test inputs that can be validated against an external oracle. Symbolic test generation also helps in distinguishing multiple plausible solutions. Through a process of repeated refinement, 3DGen produces a 3D specification that conforms to a test suite, and which yields safe, efficient, provably correct, parsing code in C. We have evaluated 3DGen on 20 Internet standard formats, demonstrating the potential for AI-agents to produce formally verified$C$code at a non-trivial scale. A key enabler is the use of a domain-specific language to limit AI outputs to a class for which automated. symbolic analysis is tractable.

We focus on the integration of Formal Methods as mandatory theme in any Computer Science University curriculum. In particular, when considering the ACM Curriculum for Computer Science, the inclusion of Formal Methods as a mandatory Knowledge Area needs arguing for why and how does every computer science graduate benefit from such knowledge. We do not agree with the sentence “While there is a belief that formal methods are important and they are growing in importance, we cannot state that every computer science graduate will need to use formal methods in their career.” We argue that formal methods are and have to be an integral part of every computer science curriculum. Just as not all graduates will need to know how to work with databases either, it is still important for students to have a basic understanding of how data is stored and managed efficiently. The same way, students have to understand why and how formal methods work, what their formal background is, and how they are justified. No engineer should be ignorant of the foundations of their subject and the formal methods based on these. In this article, we aim at highlighting why every computer scientist needs to be familiar with formal methods. We argue that education in formal methods plays a key role by shaping students' programming mindset, fostering an appreciation for underlying principles, and encouraging the practice of thoughtful program design and justification, rather than simply writing programs without reflection and deeper understanding. Since integrating formal methods into the computer science curriculum is not a straightforward process, we explore the additional question: what are the tradeoffs between one dedicated knowledge area of formal methods in a computer science curriculum versus having formal methods scattered across all knowledge areas? Solving problems while designing software and software-intensive systems demands an understanding of what is required, followed by a specification and formalizing a solution in a programming language. How to do this systematically and correctly on solid grounds is exactly supported by formal methods.

Confidentiality, integrity protection, and high availability, abbreviated to CIA, are essential properties for trustworthy data systems. The rise of cloud computing and the growing demand for multiparty applications however means that building modern CIA systems is more challenging than ever. In response, we present the Confidential Consortium Framework (CCF), a general-purpose foundation for developing secure stateful CIA applications. CCF combines centralized compute with decentralized trust, supporting deployment on untrusted cloud infrastructure and transparent governance by mutually untrusted parties. CCF leverages hardware-based trusted execution environments for remotely verifiable confidentiality and code integrity. This is coupled with state machine replication backed by an auditable immutable ledger for data integrity and high availability. CCF enables each service to bring its own application logic, custom multiparty governance model, and deployment scenario, decoupling the operators of nodes from the consortium that governs them. CCF is open-source and available now at https://github.com/microsoft/CCF.