The emergent capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have prompted interest in using them as surrogates for human subjects in opinion surveys. However, prior evaluations of LLM-based opinion simulation have relied heavily on costly, domain-specific survey data, and mixed empirical results leave their reliability in question. To enable cost-effective, early-stage evaluation, we introduce a quality control assessment designed to test the viability of LLM-simulated opinions on Likert-scale tasks without requiring large-scale human data for validation. This assessment comprises two key tests: logical consistency and alignment with stakeholder expectations, offering a low-cost, domain-adaptable validation tool. We apply our quality control assessment to an opinion simulation task relevant to AI-assisted content moderation and fact-checking workflows---a socially impactful use case---and evaluate nine LLMs using a baseline prompt engineering method (backstory prompting), as well as fine-tuning and in-context learning variants. None of the models or methods pass the full assessment, revealing several failure modes. We conclude with a discussion of the risk management implications and release TopicMisinfo, a benchmark dataset with paired human and LLM annotations simulated by various models and approaches, to support future research.

Typically, fair machine learning research focuses on a single decision maker and assumes that the underlying population is stationary. However, many of the critical domains motivating this work are characterized by competitive marketplaces with many decision makers. Realistically, we might expect only a subset of them to adopt any non-compulsory fairness-conscious policy, a situation that political philosophers call partial compliance. This possibility raises important questions: how does partial compliance and the consequent strategic behavior of decision subjects affect the allocation outcomes? If k% of employers were to voluntarily adopt a fairness-promoting intervention, should we expect k% progress (in aggregate) towards the benefits of universal adoption, or will the dynamics of partial compliance wash out the hoped-for benefits? How might adopting a global (versus local) perspective impact the conclusions of an auditor? In this paper, we propose a simple model of an employment market, leveraging simulation as a tool to explore the impact of both interaction effects and incentive effects on outcomes and auditing metrics. Our key findings are that at equilibrium: (1) partial compliance by k% of employers can result in far less than proportional (k%) progress towards the full compliance outcomes; (2) the gap is more severe when fair employers match global (vs local) statistics; (3) choices of local vs global statistics can paint dramatically different pictures of the performance vis-a-vis fairness desiderata of compliant versus non-compliant employers; (4) partial compliance based on local parity measures can induce extreme segregation. Finally, we discuss implications for auditors and insights concerning the design of regulatory frameworks.

Inspired by recent breakthroughs in predictive modeling, practitioners in both industry and government have turned to machine learning with hopes of operationalizing predictions to drive automated decisions. Unfortunately, many social desiderata concerning consequential decisions, such as justice or fairness, have no natural formulation within a purely predictive framework. In the hopes of mitigating these problems, researchers have proposed a variety of metrics for quantifying deviations from various statistical parities that we might hope to observe in a fair world, offering a variety of algorithms that attempt to satisfy subsets of these parities or to trade off the degree to which they are satisfied against utility. In this paper, we connect this approach to fair machine learning to the literature on ideal and non-ideal methodological approaches in political philosophy. The ideal approach requires positing the principles according to which a just world would operate. In the most straightforward application of ideal theory, one supports a proposed policy by arguing that it closes a discrepancy between the real and ideal worlds. However, by failing to account for the mechanisms by which our non-ideal world arose, the responsibilities of various decision-makers, and the impacts of their actions, naive applications of ideal thinking can lead to misguided policies. In this paper, we demonstrate a connection between the recent literature on fair machine learning and the ideal approach in political philosophy, and show that some recently uncovered shortcomings in proposed algorithms reflect broader troubles faced by the ideal approach. We work this analysis through for different formulations of fairness and conclude with a critical discussion of real-world impacts and directions for new research.