Recently, there has been increasing concern about a new failure mode in data-center systems: when there is an external shock, such as a sudden load spike or some machine failures, systems will sometimes respond with reduced throughput - but, in contrast to a traditional overload situation, the throughput does not recover once the external shock disappears, and remains permanently degraded. This phenomenon has been called a metastable failure.

This paper presents Pesto, a high-performance Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) database that offers full SQL compatibility. Pesto intentionally forgoes the use of State Machine Replication (SMR); SMR-based designs offer poor performance due to the several round trips required to order transactions. Pesto, instead, allows for replicas to remain inconsistent, and only synchronizes on demand to ensure that the database remain serializable in the presence of concurrent transactions and malicious actors. On TPC-C, Pesto matches the throughput of Peloton [20] and Postgres [21], two unreplicated SQL database systems, while increasing throughput by 2.3x compared to classic SMR-based BFT-architectures, and reducing latency by 2.7x to 3.9x. Pesto's leaderless design minimizes the impact of replica failures and ensures robust performance.

There have been several reductions from multivalued consensus to binary consensus over the past 20 years. To the best of our knowledge, none of them solved it for Byzantine asynchronous settings. In this paper, we close this gap. Moreover, we do so in subquadratic communication, using newly developed subquadratic binary Byzantine Agreement techniques.

Byzantine Agreement (BA) is a key component in many distributed systems. While Dolev and Reischuk have proven a long time ago that quadratic communication complexity is necessary for worst-case runs, the question of what can be done in practically common runs with fewer failures remained open. In this paper we present the first Byzantine Broadcast algorithm with O(n(f+1)) communication complexity in a model with resilience of n = 2t+1, where 0 ≤ f ≤ t is the actual number of process failures in a run. And for BA with strong unanimity, we present the first optimal-resilience algorithm that has linear communication complexity in the failure-free case and a quadratic cost otherwise.

We address fully-defective asynchronous networks, in which all links are subject to an unlimited number of alteration errors, implying that all messages in the network may be completely corrupted. Despite the possible intuition that such a setting is too harsh for any reliable communication, we show how to simulate any algorithm for a noiseless setting over any fully-defective setting, given that the network is 2-edge connected. We prove that if the network is not 2-edge connected, no non-trivial computation in the fully-defective setting is possible.

Byzantine Agreement (BA) is a key component in many distributed systems. While Dolev and Reischuk have proven a long time ago that quadratic word complexity is necessary for worst-case runs, the question of what can be done in practically common runs with fewer failures remained open. In this paper we present the first Byzantine Broadcast algorithm with O(n(f+1)) word complexity in a model with resilience of n=2t+1, where 0 ≤ f ≤ t is the actual number of process failures in a run.

We formalize Byzantine linearizability, a correctness condition that specifies whether a concurrent object with a sequential specification is resilient against Byzantine failures. Using this definition, we systematically study Byzantine-tolerant emulations of various objects from registers. We focus on three useful objects- reliable broadcast, atomic snapshot, and asset transfer. We prove that there exist n-process f-resilient Byzantine linearizable implementations of such objects from registers if and only if f < n/2.

This paper presents HashWires, a hash-based range proof protocol that is applicable in settings for which there is a trusted third party (typically a credential issuer) that can generate commitments. We refer to these as “credential-based” range proofs (CBRPs). HashWires improves upon hashchain solutions that are typically restricted to micro-payments for small interval ranges, achieving an exponential speedup in proof generation and verification time. Under reasonable assumptions and performance considerations, a Hash-Wires proof can be as small as 305 bytes for 64-bit integers. Although CBRPs are not zero-knowledge and are inherently less flexible than general zero-knowledge range proofs, we provide a number of applications in which a credential issuer can leverage HashWires to provide range proofs for private values, without having to rely on heavyweight cryptographic tools and assumptions.

King and Saia were the first to break the quadratic word complexity bound for Byzantine Agreement in synchronous systems against an adaptive adversary, and Algorand broke this bound with near-optimal resilience (first in the synchronous model and then with eventual-synchrony). Yet the question of asynchronous sub-quadratic Byzantine Agreement remained open. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to answer this question in the affirmative. A key component of our solution is a shared coin algorithm based on a VRF. A second essential ingredient is VRF-based committee sampling, which we formalize and utilize in the asynchronous model for the first time. Our algorithms work against a delayed-adaptive adversary, which cannot perform after-the-fact removals but has full control of Byzantine processes and full information about communication in earlier rounds. Using committee sampling and our shared coin, we solve Byzantine Agreement with high probability, with a word complexity of Õ(n) and O(1) expected time, breaking the O(n2) bit barrier for asynchronous Byzantine Agreement.

King and Saia were the first to break the quadratic word complexity bound for Byzantine Agreement in synchronous systems against an adaptive adversary, and Algorand broke this bound with near-optimal resilience (first in the synchronous model and then with eventual-synchrony). Yet the question of asynchronous sub-quadratic Byzantine Agreement remained open. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to answer this question in the affirmative. A key component of our solution is a shared coin algorithm based on a VRF. A second essential ingredient is VRF-based committee sampling, which we formalize and utilize in the asynchronous model for the first time. Our algorithms work against a delayed-adaptive adversary, which cannot perform after-the-fact removals but has full control of Byzantine processes and full information about communication in earlier rounds. Using committee sampling and our shared coin, we solve Byzantine Agreement with high probability, with a word complexity of $\widetilde{O}(n)$ and $O(1)$ expected time, breaking the $O(n^2)$ bit barrier for asynchronous Byzantine Agreement.