Generative AI’s humanlike qualities are driving its rapid adoption in professional domains. However, this anthropomorphic appeal raises concerns from HCI and responsible AI scholars about potential hazards and harms, such as overtrust in system outputs. To investigate how technology workers navigate these humanlike qualities and anticipate emergent harms, we conducted focus groups with 30 professionals across six job functions (ML engineering, product policy, UX research and design, product management, technology writing, and communications). Our findings reveal an unsettled knowledge environment surrounding humanlike generative AI, where workers’ varying perspectives illuminate a range of potential risks for individuals, knowledge work fields, and society. We argue that workers require comprehensive support, including clearer conceptions of “humanlikeness” to effectively mitigate these risks. To aid in mitigation strategies, we provide a conceptual map articulating the identified hazards and their connection to conflated notions of “humanlikeness.”

Dreams of machines rivaling human intelligence have shaped the field of AI since its inception. Yet, the very meaning of human-level AI or artificial general intelligence (AGI) remains elusive and contested. Definitions of AGI embrace a diverse range of incompatible values and assumptions. Contending with the fractured worldviews of AGI discourse is vital for critiques that pursue different values and futures. To that end, we provide a taxonomy of AGI definitions, laying the ground for examining the key social, political, and ethical assumptions they make. We highlight instances in which these definitions frame AGI or human-level AI as a technical topic and expose the value-laden choices being implicitly made. Drawing on feminist, STS, and social science scholarship on the political and social character of intelligence in both humans and machines, we propose contextual, democratic, and participatory paths to imagining future forms of machine intelligence. The development of future forms of AI must involve explicit attention to the values it encodes, the people it includes or excludes, and a commitment to epistemic justice.

Identifying potential social and ethical risks in emerging machine learning (ML) models and their applications remains challenging. In this work, we applied two well-established safety engineering frameworks (FMEA, STPA) to a case study involving text-to-image models at three stages of the ML product development pipeline: data processing, integration of a T2I model with other models, and use. Results of our analysis demonstrate the safety frameworks – both of which are not designed explicitly examine social and ethical risks – can uncover failure and hazards that pose social and ethical risks. We discovered a broad range of failures and hazards (i.e., functional, social, and ethical) by analyzing interactions (i.e., between different ML models in the product, between the ML product and user, and between development teams) and processes (i.e., preparation of training data or workflows for using an ML service/product). Our findings underscore the value and importance of examining beyond an ML model in examining social and ethical risks, especially when we have minimal information about an ML model.

Understanding the landscape of potential harms from algorithmic systems enables practitioners to better anticipate consequences of the systems they build. It also supports the prospect of incorporating controls to help minimize harms that emerge from the interplay of technologies and social and cultural dynamics. A growing body of scholarship has identified a wide range of harms across different algorithmic technologies. However, computing research and practitioners lack a high level and synthesized overview of harms from algorithmic systems. Based on a scoping review of computing research (n=172), we present an applied taxonomy of sociotechnical harms to support a more systematic surfacing of potential harms in algorithmic systems. The final taxonomy builds on and refers to existing taxonomies, classifications, and terminologies. Five major themes related to sociotechnical harms — representational, allocative, quality-of-service, interpersonal harms, and social system/societal harms — and sub-themes are presented along with a description of these categories. We conclude with a discussion of challenges and opportunities for future research.

Inappropriate design and deployment of machine learning (ML) systems lead to negative downstream social and ethical impacts – described here as social and ethical risks – for users, society, and the environment. Despite the growing need to regulate ML systems, current processes for assessing and mitigating risks are disjointed and inconsistent. We interviewed 30 industry practitioners on their current social and ethical risk management practices and collected their first reactions on adapting safety engineering frameworks into their practice – namely, System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). Our findings suggest STPA/FMEA can provide an appropriate structure for social and ethical risk assessment and mitigation processes. However, we also find nontrivial challenges in integrating such frameworks in the fast-paced culture of the ML industry. We call on the CHI community to strengthen existing frameworks and assess their efficacy, ensuring that ML systems are safer for all people.

In this paper we argue that standard calls for explainability that focus on the epistemic inscrutability of black-box machine learning models may be misplaced. If we presume, for the sake of this paper, that machine learning can be a source of knowledge, then it makes sense to wonder what kind of \em justification it involves. How do we rationalize on the one hand the seeming justificatory black box with the observed wide adoption of machine learning? We argue that, in general, people implicitly adoptreliabilism regarding machine learning. Reliabilism is an epistemological theory of epistemic justification according to which a belief is warranted if it has been produced by a reliable process or method \citegoldman2012reliabilism. We argue that, in cases where model deployments require \em moral justification, reliabilism is not sufficient, and instead justifying deployment requires establishing robust human processes as a moral "wrapper'' around machine outputs. We then suggest that, in certain high-stakes domains with moral consequences, reliabilism does not provide another kind of necessary justification---moral justification. Finally, we offer cautions relevant to the (implicit or explicit) adoption of the reliabilist interpretation of machine learning.