Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has been empirically shown to enhance the performance of large language models (LLMs) in knowledge-intensive domains such as healthcare, finance, and legal contexts. Given a query, RAG retrieves relevant documents from a corpus and integrates them into the LLMs’ generation process. In this study, we investigate the adversarial robustness of RAG, focusing specifically on examining the retrieval system. First, across 225 different setup combinations of corpus, retriever, query, and targeted information, we show that retrieval systems are vulnerable to universal poisoning attacks in medical Q&A. In such attacks, adversaries generate poisoned documents containing a broad spectrum of targeted information, such as personally identifiable information. When these poisoned documents are inserted into a corpus, they can be accurately retrieved by any users, as long as attacker-specified queries are used. To understand this vulnerability, we discovered that the deviation from the query’s embedding to that of the poisoned document tends to follow a pattern in which the high similarity between the poisoned document and the query is retained, thereby enabling precise retrieval. Based on these findings, we develop a new detection-based defense to ensure the safe use of RAG. Through extensive experiments spanning various Q&A domains, we observed that our proposed method consistently achieves excellent detection rates in nearly all cases.

Backdoor attacks pose a significant security risk to machine learning applications due to their stealthy nature and potentially serious consequences. Such attacks involve embedding triggers within a learning model with the intention of causing malicious behavior when an active trigger is present while maintaining regular functionality without it. This paper derives a fundamental understanding of backdoor attacks that applies to both discriminative and generative models, including diffusion models and large language models. We evaluate the effectiveness of any backdoor attack incorporating a constant trigger, by establishing tight lower and upper boundaries for the performance of the compromised model on both clean and backdoor test data. The developed theory answers a series of fundamental but previously underexplored problems, including (1) what are the determining factors for a backdoor attack's success, (2) what is the direction of the most effective backdoor attack, and (3) when will a human-imperceptible trigger succeed. We demonstrate the theory by conducting experiments using benchmark datasets and state-of-the-art backdoor attack scenarios. Our code is available \href{https://github.com/KeyWgh/DemystifyBackdoor}{here}.

Safeguarding intellectual property and preventing potential misuse of AI-generated images are of paramount importance. This paper introduces a robust and agile plug-and-play watermark detection framework, referred to as RAW. As a departure from existing encoder-decoder methods, which incorporate fixed binary codes as watermarks within latent representations, our approach introduces learnable watermarks directly into the original image data. Subsequently, we employ a classifier that is jointly trained with the watermark to detect the presence of the watermark. The proposed framework is compatible with various generative architectures and supports on-the-fly watermark injection after training. By incorporating state-of-the-art smoothing techniques, we show that the framework also provides provable guarantees regarding the false positive rate for misclassifying a watermarked image, even in the presence of adversarial attacks targeting watermark removal. Experiments on a diverse range of images generated by state-of-the-art diffusion models demonstrate substantially improved watermark encoding speed and watermark detection performance, under adversarial attacks, while maintaining image quality. Our code is publicly available [here](https://github.com/jeremyxianx/RAWatermark).

A poisoning backdoor attack is a rising security concern for deep learning. This type of attack can result in the backdoored model functioning normally most of the time but exhibiting abnormal behavior when presented with inputs containing the backdoor trigger, making it difficult to detect and prevent. In this work, we propose the adaptability hypothesis to understand when and why a backdoor attack works for general learning models, including deep neural networks, based on the theoretical investigation of classical kernel-based learning models. The adaptability hypothesis postulates that for an effective attack, the effect of incorporating a new dataset on the predictions of the original data points will be small, provided that the original data points are distant from the new dataset. Experiments on benchmark image datasets and state-of-the-art backdoor attacks for deep neural networks are conducted to corroborate the hypothesis. Our finding provides insight into the factors that affect the attack’s effectiveness and has implications for the design of future attacks and defenses.

Backdoor attacks involve inserting poisoned samples during training, resulting in a model containing a hidden backdoor that can trigger specific behaviors without impacting performance on normal samples. These attacks are challenging to detect, as the backdoored model appears normal until activated by the backdoor trigger, rendering them particularly stealthy. In this study, we devise a unified inference-stage detection framework to defend against backdoor attacks. We first rigorously formulate the inference-stage backdoor detection problem, encompassing various existing methods, and discuss several challenges and limitations. We then propose a framework with provable guarantees on the false positive rate or the probability of misclassifying a clean sample. Further, we derive the most powerful detection rule to maximize the detection power, namely the rate of accurately identifying a backdoor sample, given a false positive rate under classical learning scenarios. Based on the theoretically optimal detection rule, we suggest a practical and effective approach for real-world applications based on the latent representations of backdoored deep nets. We extensively evaluate our method on 14 different backdoor attacks using Computer Vision (CV) and Natural Language Processing (NLP) benchmark datasets. The experimental findings align with our theoretical results. We significantly surpass the state-of-the-art methods, e.g., up to 300\% improvement on the detection power as evaluated by AUCROC, over the state-of-the-art defense against advanced adaptive backdoor attacks.

Supervised learning scenarios, where labels and features are possibly mismatched, have been an emerging concern in machine learning applications. For example, researchers often need to align heterogeneous data from multiple resources to the same entities without a unique identifier in the socioeconomic study. Such a mismatch problem can significantly affect the learning performance if it is not appropriately addressed. Due to the combinatorial nature of the mismatch problem, existing methods are often designed for small datasets and simple linear models but are not scalable to large-scale datasets and complex models. In this paper, we first present a new formulation of the mismatch problem that supports continuous optimization problems and allows for gradient-based methods. Moreover, we develop a computation and memory efficient method to process complex data and models. Empirical studies on synthetic and real-world data show significantly better performance of the proposed algorithms than state-of-the-art methods.

The rapid development in data collecting devices and computation platforms produces an emerging number of agents, each equipped with a unique data modality over a particular population of subjects. While an agent’s predictive performance may be enhanced by transmitting others’ data to it, this is often unrealistic due to intractable transmission costs and security concerns. In this paper, we propose a method named ASCII for an agent to improve its classification performance through assistance from other agents, without sharing proprietary data and model information. The main idea is to iteratively interchange an ignorance value between 0 and 1 for each collated sample among agents, where the value represents the urgency of further assistance needed. The method is naturally suitable for privacy-aware, transmission-economical, and decentralized learning scenarios. The method is also general as it allows the agents to use arbitrary classifiers such as logistic regression, ensemble tree, and neural network, and they may be heterogeneous among agents. We demonstrate the proposed method with extensive experimental studies.

In an increasing number of AI scenarios, collaborations among different organizations or agents (e.g., human and robots, mobile units) are often essential to accomplish an organization-specific mission. However, to avoid leaking useful and possibly proprietary information, organizations typically enforce stringent security constraints on sharing modeling algorithms and data, which significantly limits collaborations. In this work, we introduce the Assisted Learning framework for organizations to assist each other in supervised learning tasks without revealing any organization's algorithm, data, or even task. An organization seeks assistance by broadcasting task-specific but nonsensitive statistics and incorporating others' feedback in one or more iterations to eventually improve its predictive performance. Theoretical and experimental studies, including real-world medical benchmarks, show that Assisted Learning can often achieve near-oracle learning performance as if data and training processes were centralized.