Satellite communication networks play a critical role in providing connectivity to remote regions and areas with limited infrastructure. However, their inherently open nature and physical exposure make them particularly susceptible to security threats, including replay, impersonation, and man-in- the-middle attacks. The emergence of quantum computing further undermines the robustness of conventional cryptographic schemes that rely on number-theoretic assumptions. To mitigate these challenges, this article proposesHBQS, a lightweight post-quantum authentication framework designed for satellite platforms with limited resources.HBQSintegrates Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) with hash-based cryptography, leveraging SPHINCS+ digital signatures and SHA-3 hashing to provide secure mutual authentication and session key establishment. The protocolHBQSwas implemented and evaluated on embedded hardware platforms, including Raspberry Pi 4.0, PYNQ-Z2 FPGA, and a Dell ground control station. The experimental results demonstrate thatHBQSachieves mutual authentication in 0.88 ms, offering an approximately 67% reduction in execution time compared to representative baselines from the prior literature. Entropy analysis confirms that the proposed protocol maintains a high entropy across critical components, withHBQSachieving a signature entropy of 164.63 bits and PUF response entropy of 172.58 bits, indicating strong resistance to statistical and modeling attacks. A formal security analysis conducted within the Random Oracle Model demonstrates semantic security against both classical and quantum adversaries. The protocolHBQSshows a significant improvement over existing methods, achieving approximately 67% reduction in computational execution time, approximately 11.5% faster user-side handshake time, approximately 0.6% improvement on the satellite side and full security coverage across all evaluated security features with only a 21.4% increase in static memory usage as the trade-off. These findings positionHBQSas an efficient, secure, and scalable authentication solution for next-generation satellite communication systems operating in the post-quantum era.

Security and privacy are two primary concerns in critical applications within Internet of Things (IoT) environments. The Long Range Wide Area Network (LoRaWAN) protocol facilitates long-range communication for battery-powered end devices in IoT and has gained widespread adoption among both individuals and industries. To foster trust and facilitate its use, ensuring security and privacy for data collected by end devices is essential. User authentication and key establishment protocols play a pivotal role in this regard. While existing authentication schemes in the literature are unsuitable for LoRaWAN networks, this article proposes an energy-efficient LoRaWAN authentication protocol for privacy preservation in IoT applications. Through formal verification using the Random Oracle Model (ROM) and AVISPA tool, we demonstrate our protocol’s resilience against common attacks including replay, man-in-the-middle, and impersonation threats. Performance evaluations reveal significant advantages over existing schemes: 48% faster computation (0.1953 ms vs. 0.3647 ms baseline), 24% lower communication overhead (2398 bits vs. 3168 bits), and 44% energy savings (1.27 mJ vs. 2.27 mJ) over state-of-the-art protocols. These improvements, combined with enhanced security features, such as resistance to sensor capture and stolen device attacks, make our protocol particularly suitable for practical IoT deployments in smart agriculture and industrial monitoring systems where both security and energy efficiency are paramount. The balance of strong security guarantees and low operational overhead represents a significant advance in LoRaWAN authentication mechanisms.

Internet of Things (IoT) is the next era of communication networks. The concept of IoT is that everything within the global communication network is interconnected and accessible. Since IoT has various applications, including Industry 4.0. Therefore, upcoming and existing IoT applications are highly auspicious to enhance the level of automation, efficiency, and comfort for the users. However, to a certain extent, there are numerous challenges while deploying IoT devices in the Industry 4.0, like IoT devices are assumed to have inadequate resources to support security solutions. Therefore, in order to protect the communication environment, an efficient and lightweight security solution is needed. Recently, on the basis of a hierarchical approach, Garget al.presented a lightweight, robust key agreement, and provably secure authentication protocol for the IoT environment. Their introduced protocol relies on lightweight operations, including XOR operation, concatenation, hash function, physically unclonable function (PUF), and elliptic curve cryptography. However, in this comment, we point out the security loopholes of Garget al.’s protocol and show that it is vulnerable to the IoT-node impersonation attack. Moreover, it has irrelevant generation and usage of some parameters. Therefore, we put forward some valuable suggestions for attack resilience.