Accelerating Machine Learning (ML) workloads requires efficient methods due to their large optimization space. Autotuning has emerged as an effective approach for systematically evaluating variations of implementations. Traditionally, autotuning requires the workloads to be executed on the target hardware (HW). We present an interface that allows executing autotuning workloads on simulators. This approach offers high scalability when the availability of the target HW is limited, as many simulations can be run in parallel on any accessible HW.Additionally, we evaluate the feasibility of using fast instruction-accurate simulators for autotuning. We train various predictors to forecast the performance of ML workload implementations on the target HW based on simulation statistics.Our results demonstrate that the tuned predictors are highly effective. The best workload implementation in terms of actual run time on the target HW is always within the top 3% of predictions for the tested x86, ARM, and RISC-V-based architectures. In the best case, this approach outperforms native execution on the target HW for embedded architectures when running as few as three samples on three simulators in parallel.

Dynamic Binary Translators (DBTs) facilitate the execution of binaries across different Instruction Set Architectures (ISAs). Similar to a just-in-time compiler, they recompile machine code from one ISA to another, and subsequently execute the generated code. To achieve near-native execution speed, several challenges must be overcome. This includes the problem of register allocation (RA). In classical compiler engineering, RA is often performed by global methods. However, due to the nature of DBTs, established global methods like graph coloring or linear scan are hardly applicable. This is why state-of-the-art DBTs, like QEMU, use basic-block-local methods, which come with several disadvantages. Addressing these flaws, we propose a novel global method based on static target-to-host mappings. As most applications only work on a small set of registers, mapping them statically from host to target significantly reduces load/store overhead. In a case study using our RISC-V-on-ARM64 user-mode simulator RISE-SIM, we demonstrate speedups of up to 1.4 x compared to basic-block-local methods.

An Application-Specific Instruction Set Processor (ASIP) is a specialized microprocessor that provides a trade-off between the programmability of a General Purpose Processor (GPP) and the performance and energy-efficiency of dedicated hardware accelerators. ASIPs are often derived from off-the-shelf GPPs extended by custom instructions tailored towards a specific software workload. One of the most important challenges of designing an ASIP is to find said custom instructions that help to increase performance without being too costly in terms of area and power consumption. To date, solving this challenge is relatively labor-intensive and typically performed manually.Addressing the lack of automation, we present Custom Instruction Designer for RISC-V Extensions (CIDRE), a front-to-back tool for ASIP design. CIDRE automatically analyzes hot spots in RISC-V applications and generates custom instruction suggestions with a corresponding nML description. The nML description can be used with other electronic design automation tools to accurately assess the cost and benefits of the found suggestions. In a RISC-V benchmark study, we were able to accelerate embedded benchmarks from Embench and MiBench by up to 2.47x with less than 24% area increase. The entire process was conducted completely automatically.

Modern and future AI-based automotive applications, such as autonomous driving, require the efficient real-time processing of huge amounts of data from different sensors, like camera, radar, and LiDAR. In the ZuSE-KI-AVF project, multiple university, and industry partners collaborate to develop a novel massive parallel processor architecture, based on a cus-tomized RISC-V host processor, and an efficient high-performance vertical vector coprocessor. In addition, a software development framework is also provided to efficiently program AI-based sensor processing applications. The proposed processor system was verified and evaluated on a state-of-the-art UltraScale+ FPGA board, reaching a processing performance of up to 126.9 FPS, while executing the YOLO-LITE CNN on 224x224 input images. Further optimizations of the FPGA design and the realization of the processor system on a 22nm FDSOI CMOS technology are planned.

Despite its ever-increasing impact, security is not considered as a design objective in commercial electronic design automation (EDA) tools. This results in vulnerabilities being overlooked during the software-hardware design process. Specifically, vulnerabilities that allow leakage of sensitive data might stay unnoticed by standard testing, as the leakage itself might not result in evident functional changes. Therefore, EDA tools are needed to elaborate the confidentiality of sensitive data during the design process. However, state-of-the-art implementations either solely consider the hardware or restrict the expressiveness of the security properties that must be proven. Consequently, more proficient tools are required to assist in the software and hardware design. To address this issue, we propose SoftFlow, an EDA tool that allows determining whether a given software exploits existing leakage paths in hardware. Based on our analysis, the leakage paths can be retained if proven not to be exploited by software. This is desirable if the removal significantly impacts the design’s performance or functionality, or if the path cannot be removed as the chip is already manufactured. We demonstrate the feasibility of SoftFlow by identifying vulnerabilities in OpenSSL cryptographic C programs, and redesigning them to avoid leakage of cryptographic keys in a RISC-V architecture.

Logic locking has emerged as a prominent key-driven technique to protect the integrity of integrated circuits. However, novel machine-learning-based attacks have recently been introduced to challenge the security foundations of locking schemes. These attacks are able to recover a significant percentage of the key without having access to an activated circuit. This article address this issue through two focal points. First, we present a theoretical model to test locking schemes for key-related structural leakage that can be exploited by machine learning. Second, based on the theoretical model, we introduce D-MUX: a deceptive multiplexer-based logic-locking scheme that is resilient against structure-exploiting machine learning attacks. Through the design of D-MUX, we uncover a major fallacy in the existing multiplexer-based locking schemes in the form of a structural-analysis attack. Finally, an extensive cost evaluation of D-MUX is presented. To the best of our knowledge, D-MUX is the first machine-learning-resilient locking scheme capable of protecting against all known learning-based attacks. Hereby, the presented work offers a starting point for the design and evaluation of future-generation logic locking in the era of machine learning.

The enormous amount of code required to design modern hardware implementations often leads to critical vulnerabilities being overlooked. Especially vulnerabilities that compromise the confidentiality of sensitive data, such as cryptographic keys, have a major impact on the trustworthiness of an entire system. Information flow analysis can elaborate whether information from sensitive signals flows towards outputs or untrusted components of the system. But most of these analytical strategies rely on the non-interference property, stating that the untrusted targets must not be influenced by the source’s data, which is shown to be too inflexible for many applications. To address this issue, there are approaches to quantify the information flow between components such that insignificant leakage can be neglected. Due to the high computational complexity of this quantification, approximations are needed, which introduce mispredictions. To tackle those limitations, we reformulate the approximations. Further, we propose a tool QFlow with a higher detection rate than previous tools. It can be used by non-experienced users to identify data leakages in hardware designs, thus facilitating a security-aware design process.

In the past decade, a lot of progress has been made in the design and evaluation of logic locking; a premier technique to safeguard the integrity of integrated circuits throughout the electronics supply chain. However, the widespread proliferation of machine learning has recently introduced a new pathway to evaluating logic locking schemes. This paper summarizes the recent developments in logic locking attacks and countermeasures at the frontiers of contemporary machine learning models. Based on the presented work, the key takeaways, opportunities, and challenges are highlighted to offer recommendations for the design of next-generation logic locking.

Logic locking is a prominent technique to protect the integrity of hardware designs throughout the integrated circuit design and fabrication flow. However, in recent years, the security of locking schemes has been thoroughly challenged by the introduction of various deobfuscation attacks. As in most research branches, deep learning is being introduced in the domain of logic locking as well. Therefore, in this article we present SnapShot, a novel attack on logic locking that is the first of its kind to utilize artificial neural networks to directly predict a key bit value from a locked synthesized gate-level netlist without using a golden reference. Hereby, the attack uses a simpler yet more flexible learning model compared to existing work. Two different approaches are evaluated. The first approach is based on a simple feedforward fully connected neural network. The second approach utilizes genetic algorithms to evolve more complex convolutional neural network architectures specialized for the given task. The attack flow offers a generic and customizable framework for attacking locking schemes using machine learning techniques. We perform an extensive evaluation of SnapShot for two realistic attack scenarios, comprising both reference combinational and sequential benchmark circuits as well as silicon-proven RISC-V core modules. The evaluation results show that SnapShot achieves an average key prediction accuracy of 82.60% for the selected attack scenario, with a significant performance increase of 10.49 percentage points compared to the state of the art. Moreover, SnapShot outperforms the existing technique on all evaluated benchmarks. The results indicate that the security foundation of common logic locking schemes is built on questionable assumptions. Based on the lessons learned, we discuss the vulnerabilities and potentials of logic locking uncovered by SnapShot. The conclusions offer insights into the challenges of designing future logic locking schemes that are resilient to machine learning attacks.

In this paper we present the first generation of a secure platform developed by following a security-by-design approach. The security of the platform is built on top of two pillars: a secured hardware design flow and a secure microkernel. The hardware design is protected against the insertion of hardware Trojans during the production phase through netlist obfuscation provided by logic locking. The software stack is based on a trustworthy and verified microkernel. Moreover, the system is expected to work in an environment which does not allow physical access to the device. Therefore, on-the-field attacks are only possible via software. We present a solution whose security has been achieved by relying on simple and open hardware and software solutions, namely a RISC-V processor core, open-source peripherals and an seL4--based operating system.