Experience replay is a foundational technique in reinforcement learning that enhances learning stability by storing past experiences in a replay buffer and reusing them during training. Despite its practical success, its theoretical properties remain underexplored. In this paper, we present a theoretical framework that models experience replay using resampled U- and V-statistics, providing rigorous variance reduction guarantees. We apply this framework to policy evaluation tasks using the Least-Squares Temporal Difference (LSTD) algorithm and a Partial Differential Equation (PDE)-based model-free algorithm, demonstrating significant improvements in stability and efficiency, particularly in data-scarce scenarios. Beyond policy evaluation, we extend the framework to kernel ridge regression, showing that the experience replay-based method reduces the computational cost from the traditional cubic time to quadratic time in the sample size, while also reducing variance. Extensive numerical experiments validate our theoretical findings, demonstrating the broad applicability and effectiveness of experience replay in diverse machine learning tasks.

Auto-bidding systems are widely used in advertising to automatically determine bid values under constraints such as total budget and Return-on-Spend (RoS) targets. Existing works often assume that the value of an ad impression, such as the conversion rate, is known. This paper considers the more realistic scenario where the true value is unknown. We propose a novel method that uses conformal prediction to quantify the uncertainty of these values based on machine learning methods trained on historical bidding data with contextual features, without assuming the data are i.i.d. This approach is compatible with current industry systems that use machine learning to predict values. Building on prediction intervals, we introduce an adjusted value estimator derived from machine learning predictions, and show that it provides performance guarantees without requiring knowledge of the true value. We apply this method to enhance existing auto-bidding algorithms with budget and RoS constraints, and establish theoretical guarantees for achieving high reward while keeping RoS violations low. Empirical results on both simulated and real-world industrial datasets demonstrate that our approach improves performance while maintaining computational efficiency.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong generative capabilities but remain prone to inconsistencies and hallucinations. We introduce Peer Elicitation Games (PEG), a training-free, game-theoretic framework for aligning LLMs through a peer elicitation mechanism involving a generator and multiple discriminators instantiated from distinct base models. Discriminators interact in a peer evaluation setting, where utilities are computed using a determinant-based mutual information score that provably incentivizes truthful reporting without requiring ground-truth labels. We establish theoretical guarantees showing that each agent, via online learning, achieves sublinear regret in the sense their cumulative performance approaches that of the best fixed truthful strategy in hindsight. Moreover, we prove last-iterate convergence to a truthful Nash equilibrium, ensuring that the actual policies used by agents converge to stable and truthful behavior over time. Empirical evaluations across multiple benchmarks demonstrate significant improvements in factual accuracy. These results position PEG as a practical approach for eliciting truthful behavior from LLMs without supervision or fine-tuning.