A/B testing is widely used in the internet industry. For online marketplaces (such as advertising markets), standard approaches to A/B testing may lead to biased results when buyers have budget constraints, as budget consumption in one arm of the experiment impacts performance of the other arm. This is often addressed using a budget-split design. Yet such splitting may degrade statistical performance as budgets become too small in each arm. We propose a parallel budget-controlled A/B testing design where we use market segmentation to identify submarkets in the larger market, and we run parallel budget-split experiments in each submarket. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach on real experiments on advertising markets at Meta. Then, we formally study interference that derives from such experimental designs, using the first-price pacing equilibrium framework as our model of market equilibration. We propose a debiased surrogate that eliminates the first-order bias of FPPE, and derive a plug-in estimator for the surrogate and establish its asymptotic normality. We then provide an estimation procedure for submarket parallel budget-controlled A/B tests. Finally, we present numerical examples on semi-synthetic data, confirming that the debiasing technique achieves the desired coverage properties.

Data-driven stochastic optimization is ubiquitous in machine learning and operational decision-making problems. Sample average approximation (SAA) and model-based approaches such as estimate-then-optimize (ETO) or integrated estimation-optimization (IEO) are all popular, with model-based approaches being able to circumvent some of the issues with SAA in complex context-dependent problems. Yet the relative performance of these methods is poorly understood, with most results confined to the dichotomous cases of the model-based approach being either well-specified or misspecified. We develop the first results that allow for a more granular analysis of the relative performance of these methods under a local misspecification setting, which models the scenario where the model-based approach is nearly well-specified. By leveraging tools from contiguity theory in statistics, we show that there is a bias-variance tradeoff between SAA, IEO, and ETO under local misspecification, and that the relative importance of the bias and the variance depends on the degree of local misspecification. Moreover, we derive explicit expressions for the decision bias, which allows us to characterize (un)impactful misspecification directions, and provide further geometric understanding of the variance.

We study an online allocation problem with sequentially arriving items and adversarially chosen agent values, with the goal of balancing fairness and efficiency. Our goal is to study the performance of algorithms that achieve strong guarantees under other input models such as stochastic inputs, in order to achieve robust guarantees against a variety of inputs. To that end, we study the PACE (Pacing According to Current Estimated utility) algorithm, an existing algorithm designed for stochastic input. We show that in the equal-budgets case, PACE is equivalent to an integral greedy algorithm. We go on to show that with natural restrictions on the adversarial input model, both the greedy allocation and PACE have asymptotically bounded multiplicative envy as well as competitive ratio for Nash welfare, with the multiplicative factors either constant or with optimal order dependence on the number of agents. This completes a "best-of-many-worlds" guarantee for PACE, since past work showed that PACE achieves guarantees for stationary and stochastic-but-non-stationary input models.

Linear Fisher market (LFM) is an equilibrium model for fair and efficient resource allocation, and first-price pacing equilibrium (FPPE) is a model for budget-management in first-price auctions. One thing they have in common is that both have a corresponding Eisenberg-Gale convex program characterization. In this paper, we introduce and devise several statistically valid bootstrap inference procedures for LFM and FPPE. The most challenging part is to bootstrap general FPPE, which reduces to bootstrapping constrained M-estimators, a largely unexplored problem. We are able to devise a bootstrap procedure for FPPE with structures by using the powerful tool of epi-convergence theory. Experiments with synthetic and semi-real data verify our theory.

In offline reinforcement learning (RL) an optimal policy is learned solely from a priori collected observational data. However, in observational data, actions are often confounded by unobserved variables. Instrumental variables (IVs), in the context of RL, are the variables whose influence on the state variables is all mediated by the action. When a valid instrument is present, we can recover the confounded transition dynamics through observational data. We study a confounded Markov decision process where the transition dynamics admit an additive nonlinear functional form. Using IVs, we derive a conditional moment restriction through which we can identify transition dynamics based on observational data. We propose a provably efficient IV-aided Value Iteration (IVVI) algorithm based on a primal-dual reformulation of the conditional moment restriction. To our knowledge, this is the first provably efficient algorithm for instrument-aided offline RL.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating sequentially arriving items to a set of individuals. For this problem, the recently-introduced PACE algorithm leverages the dual averaging algorithm to approximate competitive equilibria and thus generate online fair allocations. PACE is simple, distributed, and parameter-free, making it appealing for practical use in large-scale systems. However, current performance guarantees for PACE require i.i.d. item arrivals. Since real-world data is rarely i.i.d., or even stationary, we study the performance of PACE on nonstationary data. We start by developing new convergence results for the general dual averaging algorithm under three nonstationary input models: adversarially-corrupted stochastic input, ergodic input, and block-independent (including periodic) input. Our results show convergence of dual averaging up to errors caused by nonstationarity of the data, and recover the classical bounds when the input data is i.i.d. Using these results, we show that the PACE algorithm for online fair allocation simultaneously achieves ``best of many worlds'' guarantees against any of these nonstationary input models as well as against i.i.d. input. Finally, numerical experiments show strong empirical performance of PACE against nonstationary inputs.

Structural equation models (SEMs) are widely used in sciences, ranging from economics to psychology, to uncover causal relationships underlying a complex system under consideration and estimate structural parameters of interest. We study estimation in a class of generalized SEMs where the object of interest is defined as the solution to a linear operator equation. We formulate the linear operator equation as a min-max game, where both players are parameterized by neural networks (NNs), and learn the parameters of these neural networks using the stochastic gradient descent. We consider both 2-layer and multi-layer NNs with ReLU activation functions and prove global convergence in an overparametrized regime, where the number of neurons is diverging. The results are established using techniques from online learning and local linearization of NNs, and improve in several aspects the current state-of-the-art. For the first time we provide a tractable estimation procedure for SEMs based on NNs with provable convergence and without the need for sample splitting.