VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Zongqi Chen
dblp:271/5654
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2021
0000-0001-7207-2343ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Computer networks · 1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Enhanced Mixup Training: a Defense Method Against Membership Inference Attack
Zongqi Chen, Hongwei Li 0001, Meng Hao 0001, Guowen Xu |
ISPEC | 1 |
| 2021 | Privacy-Enhanced Federated Learning Against Poisoning AdversariesabstractFederated learning (FL), as a distributed machine learning setting, has received considerable attention in recent years. To alleviate privacy concerns, FL essentially promises that multiple parties jointly train the model by exchanging gradients rather than raw data. However, intrinsic privacy issue still exists in FL, e.g., user’s training samples could be revealed by solely inferring gradients. Moreover, the emerging poisoning attack also poses a crucial security threat to FL. In particular, due to the distributed nature of FL, malicious users may submit crafted gradients during the training process to undermine the integrity and availability of the model. Furthermore, there exists a contradiction in simultaneously addressing two issues, that is, privacy-preserving FL solutions are dedicated to ensuring gradients indistinguishability, whereas the defenses against poisoning attacks tend to remove outliers based on their similarity. To solve such a dilemma, in this paper, we aim to build a bridge between the two issues. Specifically, we present a privacy-enhanced FL (PEFL) framework that adopts homomorphic encryption as the underlying technology and provides the server with a channel to punish poisoners via the effective gradient data extraction of the logarithmic function. To the best of our knowledge, the PEFL is the first effort to efficiently detect the poisoning behaviors in FL under ciphertext. Detailed theoretical analyses illustrate the security and convergence properties of the scheme. Moreover, the experiments conducted on real-world datasets show that the PEFL can effectively defend against label-flipping and backdoor attacks, two representative poisoning attacks in FL. Xiaoyuan Liu 0002, Hongwei Li 0001, Guowen Xu, Zongqi Chen, Rongxing Lu |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 4 |
| 2020 | Privacy-aware and Resource-saving Collaborative Learning for Healthcare in Cloud ComputingabstractElectronic health records (EHR), generated in healthcare, contain extensive digital information, such as diagnoses, medications and complications. Recently, many studies have focused on constructing deep learning (DL) models with EHR data to improve the quality of healthcare services. However, in traditional centralized training, the collection of EHR causes serious privacy issues due to vulnerable transmission channels and untrusted DL service providers. An alternative that can mitigate the above privacy threat is federated learning (FL). It enables multiple healthcare institutions to learn a global predictive model by exchanging locally calculated updates without disclosing the private dataset. Unfortunately, the latest studies have shown that the local updates still expose sensitive information about the original training data. While several privacy-preserving FL protocols have been proposed, few prior works focused on energy consumption issues. Specifically, local training requires extensive computational resources, which is prohibitively expensive for resource-limited institutions. To overcome the above problems, we propose PRCL, a Privacy-aware and Resource-saving Collaborative Learning protocol. To reduce the local computational overhead, we design a novel model splitting method that partitions the neural network into three parts and outsources the computationally large middle part to cloud servers. By using the lightweight data perturbation and packed partially homomorphic encryption, PRCL protects the privacy of the original data and labels, as well as the parameters of the model. Moreover, we analyze the security of the proposed protocol, and demonstrate the superior performance of PRCL in terms of accuracy and efficiency. Meng Hao 0001, Hongwei Li 0001, Guowen Xu, Zhe Liu 0001, Zongqi Chen |
ICC | 5 |