One of the most basic lower bounds in machine learning is that in nearly any nontrivial setting, it takes at least $1/\epsilon$ samples to learn to error $\epsilon$ (and more, if the classifier being learned is complex). However, suppose that data points are agents who have the ability to improve by a small amount if doing so will allow them to receive a (desired) positive classification. In that case, we may actually be able to achieve zero error by just being "close enough". For example, imagine a hiring test used to measure an agent's skill at some job such that for some threshold $\theta$, agents who score above $\theta$ will be successful and those who score below $\theta$ will not (i.e., learning a threshold on the line). Suppose also that by putting in effort, agents can improve their skill level by some small amount $r$. In that case, if we learn an approximation $\hat{\theta}$ of $\theta$ such that $\theta \leq \hat{\theta} \leq \theta + r$ and use it for hiring, we can actually achieve error zero, in the sense that (a) any agent classified as positive is truly qualified, and (b) any agent who truly is qualified can be classified as positive by putting in effort. Thus, the ability for agents to improve has the potential to allow for a goal one could not hope to achieve in standard models, namely zero error.\ In this paper, we explore this phenomenon more broadly, giving general results and examining under what conditions the ability of agents to improve can allow for a reduction in the sample complexity of learning, or alternatively, can make learning harder. We also examine both theoretically and empirically what kinds of improvement-aware algorithms can take into account agents who have the ability to improve to a limited extent when it is in their interest to do so.

In the wake of increasing political extremism, online platforms have been criticized for contributing to polarization. One line of criticism has focused on echo chambers and the recommended content served to users by these platforms. In this work, we introduce the fair exposure problem: given limited intervention power of the platform, the goal is to enforce balance in the spread of content (e.g., news articles) among two groups of users through constraints similar to those imposed by the Fairness Doctrine in the United States in the past. Groups are characterized by different affiliations (e.g., political views) and have different preferences for content. We develop a stylized framework that models intra- and inter-group content propagation under homophily, and we formulate the platform's decision as an optimization problem that aims at maximizing user engagement, potentially under fairness constraints. Our main notion of fairness requires that each group see a mixture of their preferred and non-preferred content, encouraging information diversity. Promoting such information diversity is often viewed as desirable and a potential means for breaking out of harmful echo chambers. We study the solutions to both the fairness-agnostic and fairness-aware problems. We prove that a fairness-agnostic approach inevitably leads to group-homogeneous targeting by the platform. This is only partially mitigated by imposing fairness constraints: we show that there exist optimal fairness-aware solutions which target one group with different types of content and the other group with only one type that is not necessarily the group's most preferred. Finally, using simulations with real-world data, we study the system dynamics and quantify the price of fairness.

Biases in large-scale image datasets are known to influence the performance of computer vision models as a function of geographic context. To investigate the limitations of standard Internet data collection methods in low- and middle-income countries, we analyze human-centric image geo-diversity on a massive scale using geotagged Flickr images associated with each nation in Africa. We report the quantity and content of available data with comparisons to population-matched nations in Europe as well as the distribution of data according to fine-grained intra-national wealth estimates. Temporal analyses are performed at two-year intervals to expose emerging data trends. Furthermore, we present findings for an “othering” phenomenon as evidenced by a substantial number of images from Africa being taken by non-local photographers. The results of our study suggest that further work is required to capture image data representative of African people and their environments and, ultimately, to improve the applicability of computer vision models in a global context.

The increasing growth of robots and other technological devices in homes makes it critical to understand child- device interactions within the home, especially given the real possibility of child aggression towards these devices. To explore factors that currently and will, in the future, shape child-robot interaction in the home related to children’s aggressive behavior, we conducted a 2 x 3 x 3 between-subjects crowdsourced study (N = 332) that examined how parents would respond and perceive their child interacting with different technological devices. Participants were shown a video clip of a person interacting with a technological device (robot, smart speaker, or tablet), exhibiting either aggressive or neutral behavior, and interacting with the device in one of three interaction modalities (audio, physical, or audio+physical). Imagining that the person in the video was their child, parents who observed aggressive behavior compared with neutral behavior indicated greater concern, a higher likelihood to intervene, distinct intervention methods, a higher perception of device mistreatment, and greater sympathy for the device. Despite hypothesizing that the robot would be seen as the most anthropomorphic, animate and, warm device, participant ratings of the robot were no different than the smart speaker, however, both devices were rated more highly on those dimensions than the tablet.

The classical Perceptron algorithm provides a simple and elegant procedure for learning a linear classifier. In each step, the algorithm observes the sample's position and label and updates the current predictor accordingly if it makes a mistake. However, in presence of strategic agents that desire to be classified as positive and that are able to modify their position by a limited amount, the classifier may not be able to observe the true position of agents but rather a position where the agent pretends to be. Unlike the original setting with perfect knowledge of positions, in this situation the Perceptron algorithm fails to achieve its guarantees, and we illustrate examples with the predictor oscillating between two solutions forever, making an unbounded number of mistakes even though a perfect large-margin linear classifier exists. Our main contribution is providing a modified Perceptron-style algorithm which makes a bounded number of mistakes in presence of strategic agents with both $\ell_2$ and weighted $\ell_1$ manipulation costs. In our baseline model, knowledge of the manipulation costs (i.e., the extent to which an agent may manipulate) is assumed. In our most general model, we relax this assumption and provide an algorithm which learns and refines both the classifier and its cost estimates to achieve good mistake bounds even when manipulation costs are unknown.