Creativity has long been considered one of the most difficult aspect of human intelligence for AI to mimic. However, the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs), like ChatGPT, has raised questions about whether AI can match or even surpass human creativity. We present CREATIVITY INDEX as the first step to quantify the linguistic creativity of a text by reconstructing it from existing text snippets on the web. CREATIVITY INDEX is motivated by the hypothesis that the seemingly remarkable creativity of LLMs may be attributable in large part to the creativity of human-written texts on the web. To compute CREATIVITY INDEX efficiently, we introduce DJ SEARCH, a novel dynamic programming algorithm that can search verbatim and near-verbatim matches of text snippets from a given document against the web. Experiments reveal that the CREATIVITY INDEX of professional human authors is on average 66.2% higher than that of LLMs, and that alignment reduces the CREATIVITY INDEX of LLMs by an average of 30.1%. In addition, we find that distinguished authors like Hemingway exhibit measurably higher CREATIVITY INDEX compared to other human writers. Finally, we demonstrate that CREATIVITY INDEX can be used as a surprisingly effective criterion for zero-shot machine text detection, surpassing the strongest existing zero-shot system, DetectGPT, by a significant margin of 30.2%, and even outperforming the strongest supervised system, GhostBuster, in five out of six domains.

Do large language models (LLMs) have theory of mind? A plethora of papers and benchmarks have been introduced to evaluate if current models have been able to develop this key ability of social intelligence. However, all rely on limited datasets with simple patterns that can potentially lead to problematic blind spots in evaluation and an overestimation of model capabilities. We introduce ExploreToM, the first framework to allow large-scale generation of diverse and challenging theory of mind data for robust training and evaluation. Our approach leverages an A* search over a custom domain-specific language to produce complex story structures and novel, diverse, yet plausible scenarios to stress test the limits of LLMs. Our evaluation reveals that state-of-the-art LLMs, such as Llama-3.1-70B and GPT-4o, show accuracies as low as 0% and 9% on ExploreToM-generated data, highlighting the need for more robust theory of mind evaluation. As our generations are a conceptual superset of prior work, fine-tuning on our data yields a 27-point accuracy improvement on the classic ToMi benchmark (Le et al., 2019). ExploreToM also enables uncovering underlying skills and factors missing for models to show theory of mind, such as unreliable state tracking or data imbalances, which may contribute to models' poor performance on benchmarks.

Alignment tuning has become the de facto standard practice for enabling base large language models (LLMs) to serve as open-domain AI assistants. The alignment tuning process typically involves instruction learning through supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and preference tuning via reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). A recent study, LIMA (Zhou et al., 2023), shows that using merely 1K examples for SFT can achieve significant alignment performance as well, suggesting that the effect of alignment tuning might be "superficial." This raises questions about how exactly the alignment tuning transforms a base LLM. We analyze the effect of alignment tuning by examining the token distribution shift between base LLMs and their aligned counterparts (e.g., Llama-2 and Llama-2-chat). Our findings reveal that base LLMs and their alignment-tuned versions perform nearly identically in decoding on the majority of token positions (i.e., they share the top-ranked tokens). Most distribution shifts occur with stylistic tokens (e.g., discourse markers, safety disclaimers). This direct evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that alignment tuning primarily learns to adopt the language style of AI assistants, and that the knowledge required for answering user queries predominantly comes from the base LLMs themselves. Based on these findings, we rethink the alignment of LLMs by posing the research question: how effectively can we align base LLMs without SFT or RLHF? To address this, we introduce a simple, tuning-free alignment method, URIAL (Untuned LLMs with Restyled In-context Alignment). URIAL achieves effective alignment purely through in-context learning (ICL) with base LLMs, requiring as few as three constant stylistic examples and a system prompt. We conduct a fine-grained and interpretable evaluation on a diverse set of examples, named just-eval-instruct. Results demonstrate that base LLMs with URIAL can match or even surpass the performance of LLMs aligned with SFT (Mistral-7b-Instruct) or SFT+RLHF (Llama-2-70b-chat). We show that the gap between tuning-free and tuning-based alignment methods can be significantly reduced through strategic prompting and ICL. Our findings on the superficial nature of alignment tuning and results with URIAL suggest that deeper analysis and theoretical understanding of alignment is crucial to future LLM research.

The ability to derive underlying principles from a handful of observations and then generalize to novel situations---known as inductive reasoning---is central to human intelligence. Prior work suggests that language models (LMs) often fall short on inductive reasoning, despite achieving impressive success on research benchmarks. In this work, we conduct a systematic study of the inductive reasoning capabilities of LMs through $\textit{iterative hypothesis refinement}$, a technique that more closely mirrors the human inductive process than standard input-output prompting. Iterative hypothesis refinement employs a three-step process: proposing, selecting, and refining hypotheses in the form of textual rules. By examining the intermediate rules, we observe that LMs are phenomenal $\textit{hypothesis proposers}$ (i.e., generating candidate rules), and when coupled with a (task-specific) symbolic interpreter that is able to systematically filter the proposed set of rules, this hybrid approach achieves strong results across inductive reasoning benchmarks that require inducing causal relations, language-like instructions, and symbolic concepts. However, they also behave as puzzling $\textit{inductive reasoners}$, showing notable performance gaps between rule induction (i.e., identifying plausible rules) and rule application (i.e., applying proposed rules to instances), suggesting that LMs are proposing hypotheses without being able to actually apply the rules. Through empirical and human analyses, we further reveal several discrepancies between the inductive reasoning processes of LMs and humans, shedding light on both the potentials and limitations of using LMs in inductive reasoning tasks.

As large language models (LLMs) are adopted as a fundamental component of language technologies, it is crucial to accurately characterize their performance. Because choices in prompt design can strongly influence model behavior, this design process is critical in effectively using any modern pre-trained generative language model. In this work, we focus on LLM sensitivity to a quintessential class of meaning-preserving design choices: prompt formatting. We find that several widely used open-source LLMs are extremely sensitive to subtle changes in prompt formatting in few-shot settings, with performance differences of up to 76 accuracy points when evaluated using LLaMA-2-13B. Sensitivity remains even when increasing model size, the number of few-shot examples, or performing instruction tuning. Our analysis suggests that work evaluating LLMs with prompting-based methods would benefit from reporting a range of performance across plausible prompt formats, instead of the currently-standard practice of reporting performance on a single format. We also show that format performance only weakly correlates between models, which puts into question the methodological validity of comparing models with an arbitrarily chosen, fixed prompt format. To facilitate systematic analysis we propose FormatSpread, an algorithm that rapidly evaluates a sampled set of plausible prompt formats for a given task, and reports the interval of expected performance without accessing model weights. Furthermore, we present a suite of analyses that characterize the nature of this sensitivity, including exploring the influence of particular atomic perturbations and the internal representation of particular formats.

Theory of Mind (ToM)-the ability to reason about the mental states of other people-is a key element of our social intelligence.Yet, despite their ever more impressive performance, large-scale neural language models still lack basic theory of mind capabilities out-of-the-box.We posit that simply scaling up models will not imbue them with theory of mind due to the inherently symbolic and implicit nature of the phenomenon, and instead investigate an alternative: can we design a decoding-time algorithm that enhances theory of mind of off-the-shelf neural language models without explicit supervision?We present SYMBOLICTOM, a plug-andplay approach to reason about the belief states of multiple characters in reading comprehension tasks via explicit symbolic representation.More concretely, our approach tracks each entity's beliefs, their estimation of other entities' beliefs, and higher-order levels of reasoning, all through graphical representations, allowing for more precise and interpretable reasoning than previous approaches.Empirical results on the well-known ToMi benchmark (Le et al., 2019) demonstrate that SYMBOLICTOM dramatically enhances off-the-shelf neural networks' theory of mind in a zero-shot setting while showing robust out-of-distribution performance compared to supervised baselines.Our work also reveals spurious patterns in existing theory of mind benchmarks, emphasizing the importance of out-of-distribution evaluation and methods that do not overfit a particular dataset.

Theory of mind (ToM) evaluations currently focus on testing models using passive narratives that inherently lack interactivity.We introduce FANTOM, a new benchmark designed to stress-test ToM within information-asymmetric conversational contexts via question answering.Our benchmark draws upon important theoretical requisites from psychology and necessary empirical considerations when evaluating large language models (LLMs).In particular, we formulate multiple types of questions that demand the same underlying reasoning to identify illusory or false sense of ToM capabilities in LLMs.We show that FANTOM is challenging for state-of-the-art LLMs, which perform significantly worse than humans even with chainof-thought reasoning or fine-tuning.1 Linda: Yeah, I got a golden retriever.She's so adorable.David: What's her favorite food?Kailey: Hey guys, I'

Transformer large language models (LLMs) have sparked admiration for their exceptional performance on tasks that demand intricate multi-step reasoning. Yet, these models simultaneously show failures on surprisingly trivial problems. This begs the question: Are these errors incidental, or do they signal more substantial limitations? In an attempt to demystify transformer LLMs, we investigate the limits of these models across three representative compositional tasks---multi-digit multiplication, logic grid puzzles, and a classic dynamic programming problem. These tasks require breaking problems down into sub-steps and synthesizing these steps into a precise answer. We formulate compositional tasks as computation graphs to systematically quantify the level of complexity, and break down reasoning steps into intermediate sub-procedures. Our empirical findings suggest that transformer LLMs solve compositional tasks by reducing multi-step compositional reasoning into linearized subgraph matching, without necessarily developing systematic problem-solving skills. To round off our empirical study, we provide theoretical arguments on abstract multi-step reasoning problems that highlight how autoregressive generations' performance can rapidly decay with increased task complexity.

We present REFEREE, a novel framework for sentence summarization that can be trained reference-free (i.e., requiring no gold summaries for supervision), while allowing direct control for compression ratio.Our work is the first to demonstrate that reference-free, controlled sentence summarization is feasible via the conceptual framework of Symbolic Knowledge Distillation (West et al., 2022), where latent knowledge in pre-trained language models is distilled via explicit examples sampled from the teacher models, further purified with three types of filters: length, fidelity, and Information Bottleneck.Moreover, we uniquely propose iterative distillation of knowledge, where student models from the previous iteration of distillation serve as teacher models in the next iteration.Starting off from a relatively modest set of GPT3-generated summaries, we demonstrate how iterative knowledge distillation can lead to considerably smaller, but better summarizers with sharper controllability.A useful by-product of this iterative distillation process is a high-quality dataset of sentence-summary pairs with varying degrees of compression ratios.Empirical results demonstrate that the final student models vastly outperform the much larger GPT3-Instruct model in terms of the controllability of compression ratios, without compromising the quality of resulting summarization. 1

Theory of mind, the ability to model others’ thoughts and desires, is a cornerstone of human social intelligence. This makes it an important challenge for the machine learning community, but previous works mainly attempt to design agents that model the "mental state" of others as passive observers or in specific predefined roles, such as in speaker-listener scenarios. In contrast, we propose to model machine theory of mind in a more general symmetric scenario. We introduce a multi-agent environment SymmToM where, like in real life, all agents can speak, listen, see other agents, and move freely through the world. Effective strategies to maximize an agent’s reward require it to develop a theory of mind. We show that reinforcement learning agents that model the mental states of others achieve significant performance improvements over agents with no such theory of mind model. Importantly, our best agents still fail to achieve performance comparable to agents with access to the gold-standard mental state of other agents, demonstrating that the modeling of theory of mind in multi-agent scenarios is very much an open challenge.