Increasingly, safety-critical systems include artificial intelligence and machine learning components (i.e., Learning-Enabled Components (LECs)). However, when behavior is learned in a training environment that fails to fully capture real-world phenomena, the response of an LEC to untrained phenomena is uncertain, and therefore cannot be assured as safe. Automated methods are needed for self-assessment and adaptation to decide when learned behavior can be trusted. This work introduces a model-driven approach to manage self-adaptation of a Learning-Enabled System (LES) to account for run-time contexts for which the learned behavior of LECs cannot be trusted. The resulting framework enables an LES to monitor and evaluate goal models at run time to determine whether or not LECs can be expected to meet functional objectives. Using this framework enables stakeholders to have more confidence that LECs are used only in contexts comparable to those validated at design time.

Cyber-physical systems that implement self-adaptive behavior, such as autonomous robots, need to ensure that requirements remain satisfied across run-time adaptations. The Robot Operating System (ROS), a middleware infrastructure for robotic systems, is widely used in both research and industrial applications. However, ROS itself does not assure self-adaptive behavior. This paper introduces AC-ROS, which fills this gap by using assurance case models at run time to manage the self-adaptive operation of ROS-based systems. Assurance cases provide structured arguments that a system satisfies requirements and can be specified graphically with Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) models. AC-ROS uses GSN models to instantiate a ROS-based MAPE-K framework, which in turn uses these models at run time to assure system behavior adheres to requirements across adaptations. For this study, AC-ROS is implemented and tested on EvoRally, a 1:5-scale autonomous vehicle.