In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

Data valuation is concerned with determining a fair valuation of data from data sources to compensate them or to identify training examples that are the most or least useful for predictions. With the rising interest in personal data ownership and data protection regulations, model owners will likely have to fulfil more data deletion requests. This raises issues that have not been addressed by existing works: Are the data valuation scores still fair with deletions? Must the scores be expensively recomputed? The answer is no. To avoid recomputations, we propose using our data valuation framework DeRDaVa upfront for valuing each data source's contribution to preserving robust model performance after anticipated data deletions. DeRDaVa can be efficiently approximated and will assign higher values to data that are more useful or less likely to be deleted. We further generalize DeRDaVa to Risk-DeRDaVa to cater to risk-averse/seeking model owners who are concerned with the worst/best-cases model utility. We also empirically demonstrate the practicality of our solutions.

Learners with a limited budget can use supervised data subset selection and active learning techniques to select a smaller training set and reduce the cost of acquiring data and training machine learning (ML) models. However, the resulting high model performance, measured by a data utility function, may not be preserved when some data owners, enabled by the GDPR’s right to erasure, request their data to be deleted from the ML model. This raises an important question for learners who are temporarily unable or unwilling to acquire data again: During the initial data acquisition of a training set of size $k$, can we proactively maximize the data utility after future unknown deletions? We propose that the learner anticipates/estimates the probability that (i) each data owner in the feasible set will independently delete its data or (ii) a number of deletions occur out of $k$, and justify our proposal with concrete real-world use cases. Then, instead of directly maximizing the data utility function, the learner can maximize the expected or risk-averse post-deletion utility based on the anticipated probabilities. We further propose how to construct these deletion-anticipative data selection ($\texttt{DADS}$) maximization objectives to preserve monotone submodularity and near-optimality of greedy solutions, how to optimize the objectives and empirically evaluate $\texttt{DADS}$’ performance on real-world datasets.

The Shapley value (SV) is adopted in various scenarios in machine learning (ML), including data valuation, agent valuation, and feature attribution, as it satisfies their fairness requirements. However, as exact SVs are infeasible to compute in practice, SV estimates are approximated instead. This approximation step raises an important question: do the SV estimates preserve the fairness guarantees of exact SVs? We observe that the fairness guarantees of exact SVs are too restrictive for SV estimates. Thus, we generalise Shapley fairness to probably approximate Shapley fairness and propose fidelity score, a metric to measure the variation of SV estimates, that determines how probable the fairness guarantees hold. Our last theoretical contribution is a novel greedy active estimation (GAE) algorithm that will maximise the lowest fidelity score and achieve a better fairness guarantee than the de facto Monte-Carlo estimation. We empirically verify GAE outperforms several existing methods in guaranteeing fairness while remaining competitive in estimation accuracy in various ML scenarios using real-world datasets.

Collaborative machine learning involves training models on data from multiple parties but must incentivize their participation. Existing data valuation methods fairly value and reward each party based on shared data or model parameters but neglect the privacy risks involved. To address this, we introduce _differential privacy_ (DP) as an incentive. Each party can select its required DP guarantee and perturb its _sufficient statistic_ (SS) accordingly. The mediator values the perturbed SS by the Bayesian surprise it elicits about the model parameters. As our valuation function enforces a _privacy-valuation trade-off_, parties are deterred from selecting excessive DP guarantees that reduce the utility of the grand coalition's model. Finally, the mediator rewards each party with different posterior samples of the model parameters. Such rewards still satisfy existing incentives like fairness but additionally preserve DP and a high similarity to the grand coalition's posterior. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of our approach on synthetic and real-world datasets.

Data valuation in machine learning (ML) is an emerging research area that studies the worth of data in ML. Data valuation is used in collaborative ML to determine a fair compensation for every data owner and in interpretable ML to identify the most responsible, noisy, or misleading training examples. This paper presents a comprehensive technical survey that provides a new formal study of data valuation in ML through its “ingredients” and the corresponding properties, grounds the discussion of common desiderata satisfied by existing data valuation strategies on our proposed ingredients, and identifies open research challenges for designing new ingredients, data valuation strategies, and cost reduction techniques.

Bayesian optimization (BO) is a popular tool for optimizing complex and costly-to-evaluate black-box objective functions. To further reduce the number of function evaluations, any party performing BO may be interested to collaborate with others to optimize the same objective function concurrently. To do this, existing BO algorithms have considered optimizing a batch of input queries in parallel and provided theoretical bounds on their cumulative regret reflecting inefficiency. However, when the objective function values are correlated with real-world rewards (e.g., money), parties may be hesitant to collaborate if they risk incurring larger cumulative regret (i.e., smaller real-world reward) than others. This paper shows that fairness and efficiency are both necessary for the collaborative BO setting. Inspired by social welfare concepts from economics, we propose a new notion of regret capturing these properties and a collaborative BO algorithm whose convergence rate can be theoretically guaranteed by bounding the new regret, both of which share an adjustable parameter for trading off between fairness vs. efficiency. We empirically demonstrate the benefits (e.g., increased fairness) of our algorithm using synthetic and real-world datasets.

Collaborative machine learning (ML) is an appealing paradigm to build high-quality ML models by training on the aggregated data from many parties. However, these parties are only willing to share their data when given enough incentives, such as a guaranteed fair reward based on their contributions. This motivates the need for measuring a party’s contribution and designing an incentive-aware reward scheme accordingly. This paper proposes to value a party’s reward based on Shapley value and information gain on model parameters given its data. Subsequently, we give each party a model as a reward. To formally incentivize the collaboration, we define some desirable properties (e.g., fairness and stability) which are inspired by cooperative game theory but adapted for our model reward that is uniquely freely replicable. Then, we propose a novel model reward scheme to satisfy fairness and trade off between the desirable properties via an adjustable parameter. The value of each party’s model reward determined by our scheme is attained by injecting Gaussian noise to the aggregated training data with an optimized noise variance. We empirically demonstrate interesting properties of our scheme and evaluate its performance using synthetic and real-world datasets.