Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Sharadha Srinivasan

dblp:279/3172 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 92% Mathematical optimization · 8%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › equilibrium analysis
equilibrium existence
0.512021
Graphical Economies with Resale · EC 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › market equilibrium
exchange economy
0.512021
Graphical Economies with Resale · EC 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › market equilibrium
general equilibrium
0.512021
Graphical Economies with Resale · EC 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › solution concepts in games › equilibrium concepts
approximate equilibrium
0.112021
Graphical Economies with Resale · EC 2021
Mathematical optimization
auction algorithm
0.112021
Graphical Economies with Resale · EC 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

weak gross substitutes · 0.5convex optimization · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 Graphical Economies with Resale
abstract
Kakade, Kearns, and Ortiz (KKO) introduce a graph-theoretic generalization of the classic Arrow--Debreu (AD) exchange economy. Despite its appeal as a networked version of AD, we argue that the KKO model is too local, in the sense that goods cannot travel more than one hop through the network. We introduce an alternative model in which agents may purchase goods on credit in order to resell them. In contrast to KKO, our model allows for long-range trade, and yields equilibria in more settings than KKO, including sparse endowments. Our model smoothly interpolates between the KKO and AD equilibrium concepts: we recover KKO when the resale capacity is zero, and recover AD when it is sufficiently large. We give general equilibrium existence results, and an auction-based algorithm to compute approximate equilibria when agent utilities satisfy the weak gross-substitutes property.
Gabriel P. Andrade, Rafael M. Frongillo, Sharadha Srinivasan, Elliot Gorokhovsky
EC3