Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Sharadha Srinivasan
dblp:279/3172
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 92% Mathematical optimization · 8% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › equilibrium analysis
equilibrium existence |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Graphical Economies with Resale · EC 2021 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › market equilibrium
exchange economy |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Graphical Economies with Resale · EC 2021 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › market equilibrium
general equilibrium |
0.5 | 1 | 2021 | Graphical Economies with Resale · EC 2021 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › solution concepts in games › equilibrium concepts
approximate equilibrium |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | Graphical Economies with Resale · EC 2021 |
Mathematical optimization
auction algorithm |
0.1 | 1 | 2021 | Graphical Economies with Resale · EC 2021 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
weak gross substitutes · 0.5convex optimization · 0.5
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Graphical Economies with ResaleabstractKakade, Kearns, and Ortiz (KKO) introduce a graph-theoretic generalization of the classic Arrow--Debreu (AD) exchange economy. Despite its appeal as a networked version of AD, we argue that the KKO model is too local, in the sense that goods cannot travel more than one hop through the network. We introduce an alternative model in which agents may purchase goods on credit in order to resell them. In contrast to KKO, our model allows for long-range trade, and yields equilibria in more settings than KKO, including sparse endowments. Our model smoothly interpolates between the KKO and AD equilibrium concepts: we recover KKO when the resale capacity is zero, and recover AD when it is sufficiently large. We give general equilibrium existence results, and an auction-based algorithm to compute approximate equilibria when agent utilities satisfy the weak gross-substitutes property. Gabriel P. Andrade, Rafael M. Frongillo, Sharadha Srinivasan, Elliot Gorokhovsky |
EC | 3 |