Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a powerful primitive that has found applications in important real-world settings requiring access control. Compared to traditional public-key encryption, ABE has established itself as a considerably more complex primitive that is additionally less efficient to implement. It is therefore paramount that the we can simplify the design of ABE schemes that are efficient, provide strong security guarantees, minimize the complexity in their descriptions and support all practical features that are desirable for common real-world settings. One of such practical features that is currently still difficult to achieve is multi-authority support. Motivated by NIST's ongoing standardization efforts around multi-authority schemes, we put a specific focus on simplifying the support of multiple authorities in the design of schemes. Abstract: Code to separate paragraphs

Abstract The Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS) responds to client hostname queries with corresponding IP addresses and records. Traditional DNS is unencrypted and leaks user information to on-lookers. Recent efforts to secure DNS using DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) have been gaining traction, ostensibly protecting DNS messages from third parties. However, the small number of available public large-scale DoT and DoH resolvers has reinforced DNS privacy concerns, specifically that DNS operators could use query contents and client IP addresses to link activities with identities. Oblivious DNS over HTTPS (ODoH) safeguards against these problems. In this paper we implement and deploy interoperable instantiations of the protocol, construct a corresponding formal model and analysis, and evaluate the protocols’ performance with wide-scale measurements. Results suggest that ODoH is a practical privacy-enhancing replacement for DNS.