In this paper we identify and address the challenges unique to providing a secure ATM network.We analyse the network environment and consider the correct placement for a security mechanism, with particular to data transfer protection, in such an environment.We then introduce and describe a key-agile cryptographic device for ATM networks.We present the technique to provide synchronisation, dynamic key change, dynamic initialisation vector change and Message Authentication Code protection on ATM data transfer.Finally, we discuss the corresponding control functions for setting up of such a secure channel.A number of key exchange protocols are given as possible candidates for the establishment of the secure session and we describe the impact of these key exchange protocols on the design of an ATM signalling protocol.An outline of our secure signalling and signalling security effort has also been presented.

This paper examines a few techniques for booting Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) switches securely over an insecure network. Each of these techniques assume a different trust model. This work is being carried out in the context of the Fairisle ATM switch environment. In this environment we are envisaging an open multi-service network where ATM switches are booted with third party software, possibly using a third party booting service. Hence we are faced with an increased security threat, compared with a closed network environment, in ensuring that the switch has been booted with authorised and authenticated boot code. In this paper, we examines these threats and presents three schemes of countering the threats.

Despitethe possible presence of Trojan Horses in the user's process, the reference monitor has no choice but to believe that the access request made by a process reflects the user's wishes" ([GM90,

In this paper we identify and address the challenges unique to providing a secure ATM network. We analyse the network environment and consider the correct placement of security mechanisms, with particular attention to data transfer protection, in such an environment. We then introduce and describe a key agile cryptographic device for ATM networks. We present the techniques to provide data confidentiality, synchronisation, dynamic key change, dynamic initialisation vector change, data integrity and replay protection on ATM data transfer. Finally, we discuss the corresponding control functions for setting up such a secure channel. We examine the impact of key exchange protocols on the design of ATM signalling protocols. Our effort in providing novel security services in ATM signalling systems has also been presented.